Saif Sareea (Hansard, 12 November 2001)

§ Mr. Menzies Campbell
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many missions or training packages involving UK armoured vehicles and tanks as part of Saif Sareea II were(a) cancelled and (b) reduced in package due to (i) serviceability shortfalls and (ii) technical malfunctions in the vehicles; what percentage of missions or training packages involving UK armoured vehicles or tanks this represents; and if he will make a statement. [11769]

§ Mr. Hoon
[holding answer 8 November 2001]: Inevitably on occasions minor technical or mechanical problems temporarily required individual Challenger 2 tanks and other vehicles to undergo short periods of maintenance, but overall the armoured vehicles deployed on Exercise Saif Sareea 2 successfully completed the tasks required of them.
The extent of the involvement of Challenger 2 was, however, adjusted during the exercise as further experience was gained in operating the tank in the harsh desert environment. Previous experience of operating other armoured vehicle types in desert conditions meant that maintenance could be more accurately programmed and no adjustment to their involvement was necessary.
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§ Mr. Swayne
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reason logistical aspects of Saif Sareea 2 were carried out in non-tactical settings. [11748]

§ Mr. Hoon
The extent to which logistic support to a major exercise is conducted tactically requires a very careful balance to be made between the effective conduct of the wider exercise, the training benefit to be gained and the costs both financial and on military manpower. In the case of Exercise Saif Sareea, the vast majority of logistic support was conducted tactically throughout the exercise play.
The sole major exception to this was third line logistic support to the deployed land forces: logistic support to land forces in the exercise area was conducted tactically, but was non-tactical along the 1,200 kilometre line of communication across Oman. To have deployed tactically at third line would have placed a major additional burden on army logistics staffs, with little or no gain in terms of training benefit.