§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made with the removal and disposal of depleted uranium contamination in the Gulf resulting from coalition forces' ammunition. [109326]
§ Mr. SpellarThe clearance of hazardous materials following the conflict is primarily a matter for the governments on whose territory they lie. In the aftermath of the Gulf Conflict, the Government of Kuwait issued a number of contracts for the clearance of minefields and ordnance. UK forces were involved both in immediate battlefield clearance operations and the clearance of live firing ranges in Saudi Arabia. They also provided military advice and assistance to civilian contractors undertaking clearance work.
The US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (CHPPM) produced a report in August 1999. A copy of that report was placed in the Library of the House following their analysis of 298 soil samples taken from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1996. Only five samples contained depleted uranium. All of these came from Kuwait—four from the Iraqi Tank Yard and one from Camp Doha where, in July 1991, US DU-based ammunition caught fire. In all five cases the level of DU found was well below the level set by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for assessing whether land can be made available for unrestricted use by the public. The Government do not have any comparable scientific data concerning the levels of DU currently present in southern Iraq.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps have been taken by his Department to implement a depleted uranium training programme. [109324]
§ Mr. SpellarTraining for the hazards associated with depleted uranium (DU) already forms part of existing Service courses. In addition, Service personnel are given appropriate guidance on dealing with any potential hazards from DU during pre-deployment training.