§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the basis for the statement of 15 February by Mr. Alan Casson of his Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit that it is highly unlikely that local populations would have been exposed to any significant amount of respirable dust. [77257]
§ Mr. Doug Henderson[holding answer 18 March 1999]: I believe that the statement to which the hon. Member refers was made in a letter dated 15 February from Mr. Alan Casson, an official in my Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit, to a member of the public. The basis for that statement was fully explained in that letter, the text of which is repeated in its entirety as follows:
Letter from Mr. Alan Casson, Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit to a member of the public, dated 15 February 1999:
Thank you for your letter of 19 October to the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Robertson, which enclosed a copy of an article from the Independent concerning ill-health in southern Iraq and an alleged link to the use of depleted uranium (DU) based ammunition by UK and US forces during the 1990/91 Gulf. I have been asked to reply and apologise for not doing so sooner.867WBoth US and UK forces did indeed use DU-based ammunition during the Gulf War. UK forces used a new 120mm tank round which contained a solid DU penetrator core with a protective (non-DU) coating in its Challenger 1 tanks. US forces used 20mm, 25mm, 30mm, 105mm and 120mm ammunition rounds in its tanks, aircraft and ships. The MOD's current assessment is that UK tanks fired fewer than one hundred 120mm rounds against Iraq's military forces during hostilities (which equates to less than 1 metric tonne of DU), although additional rounds were fired during earlier work-up training to establish the round's Mean Point of Impact (MPI). In a paper published in August last year, the US Government reported that US forces in the Gulf had fired ammunition rounds containing some 290 metric tonnes of DU.It might be helpful if I explained the properties of DU and how the metal used in the manufacture of UK DU-based ammunition is produced. Uranium exists in three forms, known as isotopes. These isotopes are uranium-238, uranium-235 and uranium-234 and, in naturally occurring uranium, are found in the ratio 99.3% 238 U:0.7% 235 U:0.006% 234 U. Uranium in an 'enriched' form is used in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. The term enriched is used because the concentration of 234U has been artificially enhanced from that found in naturally occurring uranium. The by-product of this enrichment process is the production of DU, which involved the removal of virtually all234U and a reduction of the proportion of 235U to a low level. Typically, by weight, DU contains 99.7% 238 U, 0.2% 235 U and 0.00007% 234U.It might also be helpful if I explained the potential health hazards posed by the use of DU. Depleted uranium is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a Low Specific Activity material; this means that its level of radioactivity is considerably lower than that of most man-made radionuclides such as plutonium and americium. DU-based ammunition rounds can produce a small amount of radioactive and toxic particulate material when they impact with a hard surface, which could present a health risk if inhaled or ingested. However, this material is fairly rapidly diluted and dispersed into the environment by the weather, to the point where it becomes difficult to detect, usually within a few hundred metres of impact, even with the most sophisticated radiation monitoring equipment. Thus, it is unlikely that anyone other than those in an armoured vehicle hit by a DU projectile or those spending prolonged periods within a few tens of metres of the point at which a DU-based round had impacted with a hard target would be exposed to large enough quantities of the material for their health to be a risk.Solid DU fragments present only a localised external radiation hazard to anyone handling them as only a very small fraction of the radiation emitted is able to penetrate the (dead) outer layer of the skin and because these fragments are too large to be inhaled or ingested. It would be necessary for a DU fragment to be in direct contact with the skin for tens of hours before any statutory UK dose limit for members of the public would be exceeded and even this would not give rise to any observable medical effects or a significant increase in the long term cancer risk.Another potential health hazard from DU is posed by its level of chemical toxicity, which is similar to that of other heavy metals such as lead. This could give risk to health problems if soluble DU were to be ingested or inhaled but this is very unlikely as the DU residues found on the battlefield are generally in the form of solid DU fragments or relatively insoluble oxides. Should any of these insoluble oxides be ingested, most would pass straight through the body and the risk of any health effects arising from this exposure route is therefore negligible. The inhalation of insoluble oxides gives rise to effects which result from the radioactive rather than toxic properties of DU. This is because insoluble particles are retained in the lung for prolonged periods and are excreted very slowly and at concentrations unlikely to affect the kidneys which are the organ at most risk from any toxic effects.The Independent article referred to a paper written by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in April 1991 entitled "Kuwait—Depleted Uranium Contamination", which was produced for Royal Ordnance plc (rather than the Ministry of Defence) on a commercial basis. (A copy of this paper is attached for your information.) The paper calculated 500,000 potential deaths if 50 tonnes of DU dust was left in the area.868WHowever, a number of assumptions made in this paper are very far from realistic. Indeed, the paper itself makes clear that it is not a rigorous scientific analysis of the actual situation, but a theoretical appraisal of the possible worst-case effects of firing DU-based ammunition in Kuwait. In particular, the paper assumes that all the DU fired in Kuwait was converted into respirable dust and that all of this dust was inhaled by a very large number of people.However, as I have already explained above, a DU penetrator core needs to hit a very hard target to cause the burning which produces radioactive and toxic dust. In practice, this only occurs when a DU penetrator hits extremely hard armour such as is found on only the most modern Main Battle Tanks. Such burning does not occur if the penetrator hits other, softer, types of armoured vehicles or if it misses its target and hits the ground. Of the DU-based rounds fired in Kuwait and Iraq, only a relatively small percentage would have hit a target hard enough to cause the DU penetrator to burn. Furthermore, our assessment, based on a large number of trials carried out in the UK and US, is that only about 20% of the DU in a DU-based round that has hit such a target is converted into respirable dust. Since the DU-based rounds were fired in the desert, many kilometres from the nearest village, it is highly unlikely that the local population would have been exposed to any significant amount of respirable dust.The Government does not have any information concerning the levels of DU currently present in the Gulf and cannot, therefore, comment on this matter. However, the UK tanks which were equipped with DU-based rounds during the Gulf conflict did not operate in the areas in southern Iraq in which it has been suggested that there is an elevated level of ill-health compared to that in other areas in Iraq (see next paragraph). After crossing the Saudi Arabian/Iraqi border north of Hafr al Batin, these tanks, which were part of 1 (UK) Armoured Division, turned east, entered Kuwait and pushed towards Kuwait City. We assess that 1 (UK) Armoured Division came no closer than about 75 kilometres from Az Zubayr and about 40 kilometres from Urn Qasr. The maximum range of a DU-based round fired from UK tanks is less than 15 kilometres.The article attached to your letter and a number of other articles by Robert Fisk have suggested that the use of DU-based ammunition during the Gulf War is affecting the health of some of the Iraqi population. The Government is aware that there have been suggestions, particularly in the Independent, that the use of DU-based ammunition during the Gulf conflict has caused an increase in ill-health, including deformities, cancers and birth defects, in southern Iraq (particularly around Basra, Az Zubayr and Urn Qasr). However, the Government has not seen any peer-reviewed epidemiological research data on this population to support these claims and it would, therefore, be premature to comment on this matter. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the illnesses of the types highlighted in the article attached to your letter (or in other Independent articles) are uniquely associated with exposure to DU. The Government would, of course, consider carefully any medical or scientific data which was presented on this subject.Finally, it might be helpful if I set out the role that the Government has taken to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime. Since 1991, the UK has donated around £100 million bilaterally and via the European Union for use in projects throughout Iraq (many of which have specifically targeted the needs of children and widow-headed families), making the UK one of the largest donors. The UK also co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 986 which set up the original 'oil-for-food' programme under which Iraq can sell oil to fund the purchase of humanitarian supplies. More recently, we drafted Resolutions improving and expanding the programme so that Iraq can sell US$5.3 billion of oil every 6 months (more than double the original amount).I hope this is helpful.A copy of the paper by the UK Atomic Energy Authority, which is mentioned in the letter, has already been placed in the Library of the House.
869W
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the response of Mr. Alan Casson of the Gulf Veterans Illness Unit to the letter of Mr. Bill Griffin of Templevisce, Glanmire (reference D/GVIV/a/I), 2 of 23 February, regarding depleted uranium. [77326]
§ Mr. Doug Henderson[holding answer 18 March 1999]: I am advised that Mr. Griffin telephoned a member of my Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit (GVIU) on 22 January and discussed a number of depleted uranium (DU) related issues. During this telephone conversation, Mr. Griffin offered to provide the Ministry of Defence with copies of research papers which he suggested showed that the use of DU-based ammunition by UK and US forces during the 1990–91 Gulf conflict has caused a significantly higher incidence of ill-health—including cancers and birth defects—in southern Iraq. So far, however, my officials have not received any further communication from Mr. Griffin. The Government would, of course, consider carefully any medical or scientific data which was presented on this subject.
§ Lorna FitzsimonsTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 3 March 1999,Official Report, column 776, when he expects to publish the paper setting out his Department's position concerning the testing of UK Gulf veterans for the presence of depleted uranium. [78299]
§ Mr. Doug HendersonI am today publishing a detailed paper entitled "Testing for the presence of depleted uranium in UK veterans of the Gulf conflict: The Current Position". Copies have been placed in the Library of the House.