§ Lord Jenkins of Putneyasked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 committed Britain to a nuclear weapons policy of 48 nuclear weapons on each Trident submarine, as reported in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June; and if not, what is the correct figure per submarine; and [HL3128]
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 committed Britain to a 50 per cent. cut in the number 57WA of its nuclear warheads, as reported in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June; and if not, what is the correct percentage cut; and [HL3129]
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 committed Britain to an operational stockpile of 200 nuclear warheads, as reported in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June; and if not, what is the size of the stockpile; and [HL3130]
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 included a commitment to replace or upgrade the Trident warhead, as reported in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June; and [HL3131]
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 included a refusal to reduce the number of Britain's nuclear weapons or to negotiate such reductions until the nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia have been greatly reduced in number, as stated in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June. [HL3132]
§ Lord GilbertI refer the noble Lord to Chapter 4, and particularly paragraphs 64, 67 and 70, of the White PaperThe Strategic Defence Review (Cm 3999) and also to the Strategic Defence Review's Supporting Essay Five, particularly paragraphs 5, 9, 10 and 14. Copies are available in the Library of the House. The content of the briefing paper to which the noble Lord refers is not a matter for Her Majesty's Government.
§ Lord Jenkins of Putneyasked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether the Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 included the retention of (a) the option to use nuclear weapons first; and (b) the option to use nuclear weapons in a sub-strategic role as a warning shot across the bows of a potential aggressor, as stated in the CND parliamentary briefing paper of 1 June.[HL3133]
§ Lord GilbertIn conducting the Strategic Defence Review, the Government concluded that a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and NATO's doctrine of deterrence, and that it would not further nuclear disarmament. The Strategic Defence Review confirmed that, in addition to its strategic deterrent role, Trident would also perform the sub-strategic nuclear role formerly assigned to RAF Tornado aircraft. A sub-strategic element is an essential component of a nuclear deterrent policy. In extreme circumstances of self defence, a capability for the more limited use of nuclear weapons would allow us to signal to an aggressor that he has miscalculated our resolve, without using the full destructive power that Trident offers. The content of the briefing paper to which the noble Lord refers is not a matter for Her Majesty's Government.