HL Deb 02 March 1998 vol 586 cc145-7WA

1. This paper is presented by AEA Technology which is the trading name for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. AEA Technology is the UK Government's official adviser on nuclear safety. The paper gives a realistic appraisal of the effects of depleted uranium on the Kuwaiti population.

Introduction

2. Munitions containing depleted uranium (DU) were used by both the UK and US forces in the recent war in the Gulf. The use of depleted uranium was an important contributory element in defeating the armour of Iraqi vehicles. Equipments known to have fired DU ammunition included both UK and US main battle tanks and US aircraft.

3. DU is the product of the enrichment process of U235 which is used for nuclear fuel. DU is both mildly radioactive and chemically toxic like other heavy metals. Handling of heavy metal munitions does pose some potential hazards as does the possibility of the spread of radioactive and toxic contamination as a result of firing in battle. These hazards are small when compared to those during a war, but can become a long term problem if not dealt with in peacetime and are a risk to both the military and the civilian population.

Threat

4. An accurate figure for the quantity of DU fired is difficult to acquire. A best estimate is that the US tanks fired more than 5,000 DU rounds, US aircraft many tens of thousands and UK tanks a small number of DU rounds. The tank ammunition alone will amount to greater than 50,000 lbs of DU, which is equivalent to approximately 360 GBq of radioactivity. This equates to a total dose of 107 Sv. If the tank inventory of DU was inhaled, the latest International Committee of Radiological Protection (ICRP) risk factor of 5 x 10-2 per Sv calculates 500,000 potential deaths. Obviously this theoretical figure is not realistic, however it does indicate a significant problem.

5. The DU will be spread around the battlefield and target vehicles in varying sizes and quantities from dust particles to full size penetrators and shot. It would be unwise for people to stay close to large quantities of DU for long periods and this would obviously be of concern to the local population if they collect this heavy metal and keep it. There will be specific areas in which many rounds will have been fired where localised contamination of vehicles and the soil may exceed permissible limits and these could be hazardous to both clean up teams and the local population.

6. Inhalation of airborne DU dust particles can lead to unacceptable body burdens and manufacturers of DU munitions take precautions to ensure that their staff are not exposed to undue risk for this reason. The limit of intake for members of the public is less than 2.2 x 10-3 g in one year and this could easily he exceeded if special arrangements are not made. This would equate to a radioactive dose of ImSv per year, the limit that has been proposed by the ICRP. Exceeding the dose puts the public at risk. DU can also be a danger if taken into the body by ingestion or through a cut. Furthermore if DU gets into the food chain or water then this will create potential health problems.

7. A further concern is a political one of leaving significant quantities of uranium around Kuwait. The problem will not go away and should be tackled before it becomes a political problem created by the environmental lobby. It is in both the Kuwait and the UK interest that this is not left to rear its head in the years to come.

Proposal

8. There is initially a need to identify the size of the problem. It will never be possible to remove all the DU from Kuwait left as a result of the allied forces' action, but it should be possible to remove the worst concentrations and minimise the potential health hazard. DU requires sensitive equipment and well trained operators as it is difficult to locate.

9. Therefore we propose that an exercise should be carried out by AEA Technology to ascertain which areas of Kuwait are most contaminated. This would concentrate on the knocked out vehicles and other known hard targets that are likely to have been engaged with DU ammunition. A radiological survey would ascertain the quantity of DU in such a target.

10. A clean up plan would be produced as a product of the survey to work in conjunction with the other clean up operations. This survey and the clean up can be carried out by a small and dedicated team from AEA Technology in total confidentiality.

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