§ Ms Roseanna CunninghamTo ask the President of the Board of Trade (1) what guidelines her Department has in place to restrict the supply of weapons-usable nuclear material to foreign countries; [43065]
(2) what steps her Department takes to prevent the use for military purposes abroad of weapons-usable nuclear material of United Kingdom origin. [43066]
§ Mrs. Roche[holding answer 21 May 1998]Transfers of nuclear materials from the UK to other countries are subject to strict controls. The requirements in the case of separated plutonium and uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233 to more than 20% (highly-enriched uranium or HEU) are particularly stringent.
The UK's export controls on nuclear and nuclear-related goods are derived from international nuclear non-proliferation commitments and membership of international nuclear export control regimes, in particular the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) whose members have agreed common guidelines for the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. The NSG guidelines are reproduced as International Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC 254 Parts I and II as amended. In addition, the UK was among a group of nine countries which recently adopted a set of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium published as INFCIRC 549 which adds a further requirement in the case of transfers of plutonium.
These commitments are given effect in the relevant legislation, which in this case is Council Regulation (EC) No. 3381/94 on the export of dual use goods and the related Council Decision 94/942/CSFP as amended. Separated plutonium and HEU require an export licence—even in the case of transfers to other EU Member States.
Before such a licence could be issued certain conditions would have to be fulfilled which include assurances from the recipient Government as set out in the NSG guidelines in relation to peaceful use, physical protection and retransfer of the materials. Transfers to non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) are only authorised once the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable materials in its current and future peaceful activities. In the case of separated plutonium and HEU, the UK's consent would be required for any retransfer.
Moreover, pursuant to our adoption of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium and in addition to the foregoing, before any shipment of separated plutonium exceeding 50 grams to one recipient country in any period of 12 months is undertaken, we require the recipient to provide a certificate containing details including the end-use and timetable for utilisation. The correctness of the information in the certificate has to be confirmed by the Government of the recipient country. This builds on the existing requirement within the EU for a similar certificate to be completed in the case of transfers of plutonium and HEU.
In addition to these governmental assurances an end-use undertaking would also be required from the consignee explicitly excluding uses that might result in 120W any weapon of mass destruction and an assurance that the goods would not be used in any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.
As noted, the controls that we have in place on transfers include requirements for the application of IAEA safeguards. The purpose of these safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.