§ The Countess of Marasked Her Majesty's Government:
What is their current scientific advice on whether depleted uranium munitions and other depleted 46WA uranium materials used by British troops, both for training purposes and in combat conditions, are hazardous. [HL385]
§ The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Gilbert)Details of our current scientific advice on Depleted Uranium were given in my letter to the noble Countess on 2 February, and subsequently published on 9 February (Official Report, col. WA 138) and repeated on 17 February at col. WA 17.
§ The Countess of Marasked Her Majesty's Government:
What controls were instigated by British Commanders at the end of Operation Granby regarding the collection and retrieval of materials from the battlefield, including those regarded by British troops as souvenirs, and whether there was any risk assessment conducted of the possible hazards associated with these materials. [HL437]
Whether they have any records of items, not issued to British troops for the purpose of carrying out their official duties during Operation Granby, which were brought back to the United Kingdom at the end of hostilities as trophies or souvenirs; whether any of these items were tested for depleted uranium contamination, either chemical or radioactive, at the time they were transported to the United Kingdom; and whether they are aware of the current location of these items. [HL471]
§ Lord GilbertSurviving contemporary departmental records indicate that MoD instructed Headquarters British Forces Middle East, HQ BFME, to set up procedures for the collection, cataloguing and securing of captured Iraqi equipment to be considered for possible return to the UK or Germany. Precise details of these procedures and the extent to which they were followed, or disseminated to troops other than those specifically involved in recovering such equipment, are not known. Units arriving at Al Jubail prior to returning to the UK or Germany were instructed to declare certain items of captured Iraqi equipment in their possession. However, it is likely that some captured Iraqi equipment left the Gulf undeclared. In the time available, the Ministry of Defence has been unable to determine the current location of items of recovered captured Iraqi equipment.
Further guidance, concerning the collection and retention of war souvenirs by individual Service personnel, was also issued by HQ BFME to subordinate formations. This guidance explained which items individuals were permitted to take out of theatre without restriction, which items required the permission of an officer not below the rank of Major, and which items could not be taken out of theatre by individuals in any circumstances, such as weapons, explosives and live ammunition. The Ministry of Defence has no knowledge of the whereabouts of personal souvenirs which may have been removed either in accordance with or in breach of these instructions.
47WABetween 1992 and 1994, the Defence Radiological Protection Service (DRPS)—now known as the Defence Research and Evaluation Agency's (DERA) Radiation Protection Services—visited 41 Army establishments in the UK and Germany to undertake radiation surveys of foreign vehicles and trophies brought back from the Gulf with the purpose of identifying instruments which used radioactive materials as illuminants so that the establishments concerned could conform with EU regulations. These surveys would have detected any radiologically significant quantities of depleted uranium contamination. I am assured that no traces of DU were detected by any of these surveys.
DRPS radiation protection advisory visits are made on a regular basis to Royal Navy, RAF and DERA establishments. These cover all radioactive materials on site, including any military equipment returned from the Gulf which might contain radioactive material, such as that used to luminise instruments and switches. Where such radioactive materials are identified they are monitored and appropriate precautions are taken. No evidence of depleted uranium contamination on military equipment returned from the Gulf has come to light during any such visit.
No record has been found on departmental files of any tests carried out to determine whether captured Iraqi equipment or personal souvenirs were contaminated with depleted uranium, or of any risk assessments carried out on recovered captured Iraqi equipment.
§ The Countess of Marasked Her Majesty's Government:
Further to the Written Answer by the Lord Henley on 6 December 1994 (WA 77), whether they still maintain that no dosemeters were issued to British troops during Operation Granby. [HL436]
§ Lord GilbertI am advised that the Written Answer to which the noble Countess refers was given in the context of dosemeters issued to those who were involved in the handling of DU ammunition in the Gulf, rather than to British troops generally. Dosemeters were not issued specifically to personnel who handled DU ammunition during Operation Granby. However, radiation dosemeters, designed to detect the high level radiation exposures expected in nuclear warfare rather than the very low level of radiation which is characteristic of depleted uranium, were issued to some British troops by units in the Gulf. These dosemeters would have been of no use for monitoring the very low levels of radiation emitted by DU ammunition.