HC Deb 02 April 1998 vol 309 cc612-4W
Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland when the Crown Office was informed of a problem relating to the statutory basis for Intermediate Diets in Summary Criminal Procedure; and if he will place in the Library copies of the correspondence between the Crown Office and offices of the Procurators Fiscal bearing on the case of Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow), 1998 SCCR:790. [37232]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: The Crown Office was informed of the problem when the opinion of the court in Vannet v. Milligan was delivered on 12 March 1998, although it became aware of the potential problem when the decision of the court in Mackay v. Ruxton was delivered.

Communications between the Crown Office and Procurators Fiscal are confidential. However, on 19 November 1997, when the decision in Mackay v. Ruxton was announced, immediate steps were taken by the Crown to minimise any potential effect arising from it.

Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will estimate the number of cases affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) which have already been determined. [37235]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: On 19 November 1997, in the case of Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) 1998 JC 51, the High Court of Justiciary held that in Scotland, the fixing of an intermediate diet when a summary trial was adjourned was not what Parliament intended. In the case of PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, decided on 12 March 1998, the court held that a Sheriff had no power, at an "unintended" intermediate diet, to adjourn the trial diet and by implication discharge a trial diet already fixed, and that the instance fell if the case was not called on the date originally fixed.

No cases are directly affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) but the Crown Office estimate that around 1,000 current cases are likely to be affected by the subsequent decision of the court in PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, decided on 12 March 1998. Several thousand concluded cases may be involved as well. However, the precise number of cases which may be affected by the decision in PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan cannot be established without disproportionate costs.

Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many of those cases affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) which have already been determined(a) are outside the time limit for appealing by way of Stated Case in terms of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 176 and (b) have been affected by undue delay as currently understood where a Bill of Suspension might otherwise be brought; and what action the Crown will take in response to any appeal in respect of those cases. [37236]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: No cases are directly affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) but it has been estimated that several thousand cases may be affected by the subsequent decision of the court in the case of PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, decided on 12 March 1998.

Any application for stated case must be lodged within seven days of the final determination of the case, although there is provision for the time limit to be extended by the High Court of Justiciary.

There is no time limit for bringing an appeal by Bill of Suspension, although delay in doing so may result in the appeal being refused on the ground of acquiescence. There is some doubt however whether such delay would be a bar to the bringing of an appeal based on fundamental nullity of the proceedings.

The Crown will consider the merits of any appeal brought.

Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland in how many of those cases affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) convictions followed upon pleas of guilty. [37237]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: No cases are affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) but the Crown Office estimate that up to 1,000 current cases may be affected by the court's subsequent decision in the case of PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, decided on 12 March 1998. Several thousand concluded cases may be involved as well. However, the precise number of cases which may be affected by the decision in PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan cannot be established without disproportionate costs. Accordingly it has not been possible to establish how many of the affected cases involved convictions following upon pleas of guilty.

Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the consequences of the judgments in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow), 1998, SCCR:790 and PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, unreported; and if he will list the categories of offence affected by the problem identified in these judgments. [37233]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: The judgments may affect any crime prosecuted on summary complaint, including: assault; sexual crimes; dishonesty; drugs offences; and driving offences including disqualified dangerous and drunk driving.

The hon. Member will be aware that a Bill was introduced to the House yesterday in order to address the implications of the High Court's judgments.

Ms Roseanna Cunningham

To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will estimate the number of cases affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) which have not yet been determined in(a) the district courts and (b) the sheriff courts; what percentage involve (i) statutory offences and (ii) common law offences; and in respect of those involving statutory offences, in how many of them is the Crown time-barred from raising fresh complaints. [37234]

Mr. McLeish

[holding answer 1 April 1998]: No cases are directly affected by the decision in Mackay v. PF (Linlithgow) but the Crown Office estimate that up to 1,000 current cases may be affected by the court's subsequent decision in the case of PF (Glasgow) v. Milligan, unreported.

It is not possible however to establish precise figures by reference to court or offence, without disproportionate costs.

In some cases affected it may be possible for the Crown to bring fresh proceedings. The extent to which the Crown will do so may depend on any time-bar which applies to the individual charges. For the reason given, no figures are available for the number of cases in which the Crown would be time-barred from raising fresh complaints.