§ Mr. Chris DaviesTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) what action has been taken by the British Railways Board to investigate the reason for a London to Manchester train on 10 July overshooting Watford Junction station; [123]
(2) what failures in approved safety procedures have been identified by the British Railways Board to explain the reason for a London-Manchester train overshooting Watford Junction station on 10 July; [119]
(3) if all train staff specifically involved in the incident on 10 July when a London-Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station have been asked to offer evidence to an internal inquiry under the auspices of the British Railways Board; [117]
(4) if he will instruct the British Railways Board to publish the fully details of the incident on 10 July when a Euston-Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station; [113]
(5) if he has requested information from the British Railways Board about the incident on 10 July when a Euston-Manchester express train overshot Watford Junction station; [121]
(6) what defect reports on (a) the trainset and (b) the locomotive which overran Watford Junction station on 10 July were made on the previous day; and what action was taken; [116]
(7) what action has been taken by the British Railways Board following the incident on 10 July when a London-Manchester train overshot Watford Junction Station; [120]
237W(8) if the results of the British Railways Board internal inquiry into the incident on 10 July when a London-Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station have been made available to the train staff involved; [118]
(9) what explanation has been provided to him by the British Railways Board for the failure of a London-Manchester train on 10 July to stop at Watford Junction station; [91]
(10) what instructions he has given to the British Railways Board about making known full details of the incident on 10 July when a Euston-Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station; [114]
(11) on what date the Health and Safety Executive was notified by his Department about the incident on 10 July when an express train overshot Watford Junction station by five miles; [662]
(12) what action has been taken by the Health and Safety Executive to investigate the reasons for a London to Manchester train on 10 July overshooting Watford Junction station; [101]
(13) what recommendations have been made by the Health and Safety Executive following the incident on 10 July when a London to Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station. [103]
§ Mr. WattsThe incident on 10 July was reported to the Health and Safety Executive's railway inspectorate by Railtrack within two hours of it occurring. HSE inspecting officers immediately started an independent investigation as to the cause. The train in question was operated by a British Railways Board subsidiary company, InterCity West Coast Ltd., which held an inquiry into technical aspects following an agreement with Railtrack.
As part of its investigation, the HSE has confirmed that the cause of the incident was the brake failure due to a hose blanking cap known as a "top hat" becoming trapped in a brake hose coupling. The "top hat" was able to spin on its axis causing an intermittent failure. The train's braking system was tested at the InterCity depot in Wembley, Middlesex before its journey to Euston, and was tested again immediately before the train's departure from Euston to Manchester. No defects were found. The blockage of the brake coupling hose which caused the brake failure must therefore have developed during the journey.
How the railways' internal inquiry is held, whom it chooses to interview, and to whom the results are made available, are matters for the railway companies involved. The Secretary of State for Transport has no statutory powers to request details of, or to instruct any railway company to make public, the findings of its internal inquiries into any incident. The HSE as the independent safety regulator does have power to require such details, and the Health and Safety Commission advises the Secretary of State for Transport. The HSE is continuing its discussions with the train operating company.
I understand from the HSE that:
- (a) a check has been made of other rolling stock to see if any similar potential obstructions exist;
- (b) suppliers of brake coupling hoses have now dispensed with the use of top hat" blanking pieces and are using alternative means of preventing ingress of dirt during storage; and
238 - (c) procedures in depots have been improved to ensure that brake hose couplings are properly checked for any potential obstruction on fitment.
The HSE will not conclude its investigation until it has reviewed the railway's internal report and satisfied itself that issues have been properly resolved.
§ Mr. DaviesTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what are the implications of the Financial Services Act 1986 for the making of a full public statement by the British Railways Board to explain why on 10 July a London to Manchester train overshot Watford Junction station by five miles. [102]
§ Mr. WattsThe Financial Services Act 1986 requires that any public statement to be issued in the United Kingdom which might constitute an investment advertisement, as defined in the Act, should first be approved by a person authorised under the Act. Until the rail franchising process is completed, British Rail will require its staff to follow guidelines aimed at ensuring that any public statements they make comply with the terms of the Act.