§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards the forthcoming review conference of the biological and toxin weapons convention; and if he will make a statement. [38307]
§ Mr. David DavisOur main aim at the biological and toxin weapons convention fourth review conference in November and December this year is the endorsement of work of the ad hoc group set up to consider measures to strengthen the convention. This should include endorsement of the key elements of a future compliance regime. The Government will also play a full part in the wider review of the biological weapons convention, which we believe makes an important contribution to restraining proliferation and enhancing international security. The United Kingdom will chair the conference.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards ensuring that the obligations under article X of the biological and toxin weapons convention are upheld; and what proposals his Department will present to the forthcoming review conference in relation to article X. [38308]
§ Mr. DavisWe expect states parties to the biological and toxin weapons convention to meet fully their obligations under all articles of the convention. Discussion of the implementation of article X is currently324W taking place in the ad hoc group on strengthening the convention established in 1994. The ad hoc group will present a report to the fourth review conference.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what proposals his Department will present to the forthcoming biological and toxin weapons convention review conference with regard to controlling dual-use technologies. [38309]
§ Mr. DavisWe do not intend to present any proposals to the conference in this area. The United Kingdom believes that national export licensing measures, harmonised multilaterally through our membership of the Australia Group, are a key tool in controlling the proliferating of biological weapons, and are necessary to implement article III of the convention in which states parties undertake not to transfer biological weapons to any recipient.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards strengthening the verification regime of the biological and toxin weapons convention; what activities his Department is already undertaking to that end; and what assistance the United Kingdom is receiving from other states in developing on-site inspection procedures. [38310]
§ Mr. DavisWe are working, through the ad hoc group set up in 1994 to examine measures to strengthen the biological weapons convention, for the establishment of a verification system for the convention in the form of a legally binding protocol. The Government believe that the protocol should at least include provisions on mandatory declarations, challenge inspection and the investigations of alleged use of biological weapons. The United Kingdom chairs the compliance measures sessions of the group, which deal specifically with these issues. The ad hoc group is open to participation by all states parties to the convention.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards the future of the Australia Group, and the controls therein, in relation(a) to the chemical weapons convention and (b) to the biological and toxin weapons convention. [38311]
§ Mr. DavisThe Australia Group makes an effective contribution to our overall efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It has stated that it will review, in the light of the implementation of the chemical weapons convention, the measures its members take to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. The UK believes that national export controls will remain an effective means of implementing article III of the biological and toxin weapons convention in which states parties undertake not to transfer biological weapons to any recipient.