HC Deb 15 January 1996 vol 269 cc422-3W
Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the use of low-level attacks by British aircraft during the Gulf war; what changes to low-level flying operations were made during the war; and if he will state the reasons for these changes. [8991]

Mr. Soames

In the initial stages of the air campaign Tornado GR1 s carried out low-level attacks against Iraqi airfields. These were established RAF tactics designed to allow attacking aircraft to delay detection by hostile radars and to minimise the effectiveness of air and ground defences, particularly when on missions against heavily defended targets. Moreover, the JP233 airfield denial weapon, an important element of plans to disrupt Iraqi air operations, was designed to be delivered at low level. It was always the intention that attacks would in due course be switched to medium level and this decision was taken by the operational commanders on day four of the campaign once it became clear that the task of grounding the Iraqi air force had been achieved and that, with the substantial degradation of the Iraqi air defence system, the threat to operations at medium level was much reduced.

The lessons of the Gulf war have been extensively evaluated. The principal lessons were set out in the "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992" and further evidence was provided to the Defence Select Committee in connection with its report on the implementation of the lessons learned from Operation Granby. In respect of low flying, the conflict demonstrated the need to provide a more flexible capability for the full spectrum of operational environments. The need for low-level flying nevertheless remains. In many scenarios it is critical to the success of operations and the special skills required cannot be acquired at short notice.