HC Deb 16 October 1995 vol 264 cc83-7W
Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport which recommendations from the report of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster have not yet been implemented; for what reasons; and what is the target implementation date. [36660]

Mr. Norris

All the recommendations of the court of inquiry into the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise have been taken forward. After consultation and consideration, one recommendation was not supported at the time and some others were not developed further in the light of subsequent technical appraisal, or were taken forward in ways different to those recommended by the inquiry for reasons of technical practicality or because of international developments.

Two long-term recommendations of the court of inquiry were not implemented. These were the recommendation that roll-on roll-off passenger ferries should have dedicated pumps capable of stripping at a rate of at least 600 tonnes an hour and that there should be drain valves which must be controlled remotely and operable from the bridge.

Both recommendations were considered, but after consultation were felt to be unnecessary because, in practice, existing drainage arrangements could already cope with amounts of water approaching these levels. Moreover, pumps of the size recommended could not cope with the significantly larger volume of water involved in catastrophic flooding as occurred on the Herald of Free Enterprise and, indeed, on the Estonia. There may also be difficulties in guaranteeing power supplies in situations of catastrophic flooding. Automatic drain valves are now fitted as a matter of course, so there is no need for their remote control.

Two long-term recommendations were implemented in alternative ways. These were the recommendations that the freeboard from the margin line to the vehicle deck should be increased to a minimum of perhaps 1 m, and that attention should be given to recommendations were addressed through an extensive research programme and the subsequent adoption of the SOLAS 90 survivability standard for existing ships.

The Government believe that there are no recommendations left to be implemented. All have been considered and action taken where appropriate.

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the Manchester airport disaster in 1986 that have not been implemented, the reasons why and the target date for implementation. [36667]

Mr. Norris

The air accidents investigation branch made 31 safety recommendations in the report into the Manchester airport accident. All of the recommendations were addressed to the Civil Aviation Authority. The CAA reports that only recommendation 4.31, which concerns fire hardening of the aircraft hull, has yet to be brought to conclusion. The research in this area is being carried out jointly by the joint aviation authorities and the US federal aviation administration. It is not possible to predict when action on this recommendation will be complete. The status of AAIB recommendations made to the CAA is contained in "Civil Aviation Publication 652: Progress Report 1995".

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the Kegworth aircrash that have not been implemented, the reasons why and the target date for implementation. [36666]

Mr. Norris

The air accidents investigation branch made 31 safety recommendations in the report into the Kegworth aircrash, all of which were addressed to the Civil Aviation Authority. Recommendation 4.09, to fit indicator warning devices alerting pilots of maximum engine vibration levels, was initially accepted but later rejected following extensive consideration. The CAA reports that only recommendations 4.23 and 4.31 have yet to be brought to conclusion. These relate to passenger seating and overhead storage lockers. Both need to be agreed at an international level before action can be taken. The CAA expects agreement to be reached on these issues by the end of 1995. The status of AAIB recommendations made to the CAA is contained in "Civil Aviation Publication 652: Progress Report 1995".

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the Lockerbie bombing that have not yet been implemented, the reasons why and the target implementation date. [36662]

Mr. Norris

Two relevant reports have been published in the UK into the Lockerbie disaster. These follow the investigation by the air accidents investigation branch and the fatal accident inquiry.

The AAIB made five safety recommendations in its report on the disaster: four related to the CAA and one to my Department. All of these recommendations have been implemented and related research projects are underway.

The sheriff principal made 20 findings in his report on the FAI. Of these, one related to my Department and criticised airline baggage reconciliation procedures. New legal requirements were placed on airlines last year to account for, and to authorise, the carriage of all hold baggage.

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations of the Donaldson report that have not yet been implemented, the reasons why and the target date for implementation. [36664]

Mr. Norris

I have placed in the Library of the House a note showing the current position on each of the recommendations of the Donaldson report.

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the Marchioness disaster that have not yet been implemented, the reasons why and the target implementation date. [36661]

Mr. Norris

All the recommendations in the marine accident investigation branch's report into the collision between the Marchioness and the Bowbelle have been implemented.

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the King's Cross fire that have not yet been implemented, the reasons why and the target date for implementation. [36665]

Mr. Norris

Of the 127 Fennell recommendations aimed at London Transport/London Underground, 112 have been implemented in full. Work is in hand on the remainder, which are of a more long-term nature. Progress is regularly monitored by Her Majesty's railway inspectorate. The expected dates of implementation, where appropriate, are shown in the following table.

Fennel recommendation number Recommendation Completion date
2 Escalator replacement programme Ongoing
6 Non-inflammable escalator lubricant Ongoing
8 Line Controller's facilities By 2001
16 Research on air movement Ongoing
36 Replacement of wooden treads on escalators By 2003–2004
49 Station ventilation systems By December 1995
52 Elimination of VIR cable on trains By March 1998
69 Hazardous materials on rolling stock By 2001
Fennel recommendation number Recommendation Completion date
74 Occupiers of premises complying with code of practice Ongoing
93 Rule Book By December 1996
114 Improvement to CCTV Ongoing
115 Public payphones By December 1995
124 Secondary means of escape Ongoing
125 Control of smoke and ventilation Ongoing
142 Subway link at Kings Cross Under consideration in light of CTRL proposals.

Ms Walley

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list the recommendations from the report of the Clapham rail disaster that have not yet been implemented, the reasons why and the target implementation date. [36663]

Mr. Watts

Sir Anthony Hidden's report into the Clapham accident made 93 recommendations, 78 of which related to British Rail and the British Transport Police. Action has been taken on all the recommendations addressed to BR and the BTP. Many of the recommendations are on-going, and BR and Railtrack are monitoring compliance. The position on outstanding recommendations is as follows.

Recommendation 13 related to BR's departmental instructions. BR took immediate steps to ensure understanding of departmental instructions. This did not extend to requiring all staff subject to annual appraisal to sign a statement every two years to the effect that such instructions had been read, because alternative systems for briefing staff on the issue and amendment of departmental instructions were put in place.

Recommendation 23, that the annual appraisal system, albeit in a simplified form, should be extended to senior technician level was included in restructuring proposals for signalling and telecommunications staff, but was not agreed by trade unions. However, the recommendation has been overtaken by a competence-based approach, as required by the Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994.

Recommendation 27 on the non-statutory reporting of wrong side failures of signalling was implemented on 1 January 1990. Legislation making such reporting a statutory requirement will become effective in April 1996, when revised industry-wide incident reporting requirements are planned to come into effect—recommendation 28.

As regards on-train data recorders—recommendation 40—this equipment is specified for new rolling stock.

The major part of the programme to install the national radio network system of communication between driver and the signal man—recommendation 43—was completed by the target date of 1992. Complete fitment of this system is expected by early 1996. A review of this programme led to a decision by BR to install the cab secure radio system in south-east England, which is more appropriate to driver-only operated routes. This system will be completed by 1997. Technical difficulties and higher priority safety projects have extended completion of this programme beyond BR's original target date of 1995.

Recommendation 46 related to automatic train protection. On 30 March, my right hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Dr. Mawhinney) endorsed the view of the Health and Safety Commission that, following extensive work by BR and Railtrack, ATP measures may be justified in parts of the rail network but that the fitment of ATP as developed by BR could not be justified throughout the network. A programme of alternative train protection measures is being developed. Railtrack and BR continue to examine the implementation of these measures.

Recommendation 55 concerned the structural integrity of rolling stock. BR completed its programme of research—recommendation 54—by the target date of April 1991. BR then discussed this with the Health and Safety Executive's railway inspectorate. HSC endorsed BR's conclusion that very few of those vehicles in classes 411, 413, 415, and 416 were projected to remain in service for eight years or over and that it would not be reasonably practicable to carry out structural changes to these or to the remainder of mark I vehicles.