HC Deb 14 March 1995 vol 256 cc517-20W
Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what biological weapons detection assets were employed by Her Majesty's armed forces during the Gulf war.

Mr. Soames

This matter is for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive, CBDE, to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from Graham Pearson to Dr. David Clark, dated 14 March 1995:

QUESTION 5, ORDER PAPER 9 MARCH 1995

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what biological weapons detection assets were employed by Her Majesty's Armed Forces during the Gulf War, has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical and biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The biological weapons detection assets deployed with the UK Armed Forces during the Gulf conflict comprised:
  1. a. The nine Biological Detection Systems which provided a capability to detect the presence of biological warfare agent in the atmosphere.
  2. b. Stand-by Assay Kits which were deployed both with the Biological Detection Systems and separately. The Stand-by Assay Kits provided a capability to analyse swab samples for the presence of biological warfare agent.
  3. c. SIBCA kits. Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agent (SIBCA) kits were deployed with the UK Armed Forces to the Gulf. These kits would have been used to obtain samples from a suspected attack. A chain of custody would have been provided for the return of the samples to the United Kingdom for analysis at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down.
Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what assessment he has made of the United States Department of Defence nuclear, biological, and chemical log from the Gulf war, specifically of those incidents cited on (a) 18 January 1991 at 05.00 hours, (b) 19 January 1991 at (i) 04.30 hours and (ii) 16.10 hours, (c) 20 January 1991 at (i) 17.10 hours and (ii) 22.40 hours, (d) 3 March 1991 at (i) 15.15 hours, (ii) 18.10 hours and (iii) 18.20 hours and (e) 12 March 1991 at (i) 16.20 hours and (ii) 17.40 hours; and if he will make a statement;

(2) on what occasions information on chemical weapons compiled by monitoring teams during the Gulf War has been shared by the allies.

Mr. Soames

These are matters for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive, CBDE to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from Graham Pearson to Dr. David Clark, dated 14 March 1995:

QUESTIONS 4 AND 6, ORDER PAPER 9 MARCH 1995

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what assessment he has made of the United States Department of Defence Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Log from the Gulf War, specifically of those incidents cited on (a) 18 January 1991 at 0500 hours, (b) 19 January 1991 at (i) 0430 hours and (ii) 1610 hours, (c) 20 January 1991 at (i) 1710 hours and (ii) 2240 hours (d) 3 March 1991 at (i) 1515 hours, (ii) 1810 hours and (iii) 1820 hours and (e) 12 March 1991 at (i) 1620 hours and (ii) 1740 hours; and if he will make a statement and on what occasions information on chemical weapons compiled by monitoring teams during the Gulf War has been shared by the Allies, has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical and biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The United States Department of Defence Nuclear Biological and Chemical log from the Gulf conflict was drawn upon by the US Department of Defence in preparing material used to brief the US Defence Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects. An abbreviated selection of chemical/biological incidents extracted from these logs is contained in Appendix B, pages 1–6 of the report of the Defence Science Board issued in June 1994.
  4. 4. As Director General and Chief Executive of CBDE Porton Down, I was invited to attend and participated as a specialist adviser to the Defence Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects and was therefore present at the briefings to the Defence Science Board by the Department of Defence on the incidents reported in the US Department of Defence NBC log from the Gulf conflict and summarised in Appendix B to the Defence Science Board Task Force. The Defence Science Board Task Force concluded that they had found no evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was deployed at any level against the coalition forces or that there were any exposures of US Service members to chemical or biological warfare agents in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The Task Force noted that they were aware of one soldier who was blistered, plausibly from mustard gas, after entering a bunker in Iraq during the post-war period. The report noted that the one plausible injury occurred during inspection and demolition of Iraqi bunkers and stated that "It seemed to be the result of accidental contact of the soldier with contaminated soil in a bunker that may have been used previously, (probably during the Iran-Iraq war) for storing mustard".
  5. 5. The United Kingdom and the United States utilised a wide range of detectors so as to provide warning to our forces prior to exposure to a harmful concentration of agent. Such detectors are sensitive and there are carefully laid down procedures in the event of any single detector alarming for checks to be carried out so as to determine whether an alarm was indeed caused by a chemical or biological weapon attack. The incidents cited from the US Department of Defence NBC log from the Gulf conflict did not result in any confirmation that chemical or biological warfare agents had been used by Iraq against the coalition forces. The coalition forces in the Gulf War had arrangements whereby, had there been a 519 confirmed chemical or biological weapons attack in one area, this information would have been between the Allies and, in particular, appropriate warning would have been given to other units of the coalition forces in the hazard area. It is clear from examination of the US Department of Defence NBC log from the Gulf conflict that there was sharing of information on unconfirmed alarms arising from chemical or biological weapons detectors during the Gulf War with coalition forces. However, there was no confirmed use of chemical or biological warfare agents during the Gulf conflict.
Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions he has had with his American counterpart concerning the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf war; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Soames

This matter is for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive, CBDE to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from Graham Pearson to Dr. David Clarke, dated 14 March 1995:

QUESTION 7, ORDER PAPER 9 MARCH 1995

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what recent discussions he has had with his American counterpart concerning the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War; and if he will make a statement, has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical and biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The Ministry of Defence has had continuing discussions with the US Department of Defence concerning the Gulf conflict. Officials have participated in the US Defence Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf Health Effects which was briefed by the US and by the UK participant on whether there was any evidence, which there was not, to suggest that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf conflict. The UK view continues to be that there was no evidence of the use of chemical or biological weapons by Iraq against the coalition forces during the Gulf conflict.
Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of(a) allied air raids on Iraqi chemical weapons installations during the Gulf war and (b) whether chemical agents could have been released into the atmosphere as a result of these raids; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Soames

This matter is for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive, CBDE to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from Graham Pearson to Dr. David Clark, dated 14 March 1995:

QUESTION 8, ORDER PAPER 9 MARCH 1995

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what assessment he has made of (a) Allied air raids on Iraqi chemical weapons installations during the Gulf War and (b) whether chemical agents could have been released into the atmosphere as a result of these raids; and if he will make a statement, has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical arid biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The Ministry of Defence during Operation GRANBY made assessments of the potential hazard to Service personnel resulting from the Allied bombing of Iraqi targets at which chemical weapons were produced or stored. These assessment were based on various assumptions for the quantity of agent that might be released as a result of a bombing attack and for the associated meteorological 520 conditions. The result of the assessment indicated that even assuming simultaneous release of the majority of agent from several bunkers under meteorological conditions which favoured the downwind travel of the agent cloud and ignoring the fact that chemical agents are organic materials which are destroyed by combustion, the maximum distance at which there would be any hazard was of the order of a few tens of kilometres. In practice, simultaneous release is unlikely to occur, agent will be destroyed by combustion and meteorological conditions will be less favourable resulting in a significantly reduced downwind hazard distance.
  4. 4. Whilst chemical agents could have been released into the atmosphere as a result of the Allied air raids, there is no evidence to indicate that the resulting concentrations of agent in the atmosphere resulted in any harm to Iraqi personnel at those installations or in their vicinity, let alone the Allied Forces some hundreds of kilometres away from those installations.