§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what standing instructions were in force on 2 June 1994 concerning preferred routes for Aldergrove-based helicopters flying at low level to Fort George or Inverness; and what changes have been made to those instructions. [31637]
§ Mr. SoamesThere are no such instructions in place. The crew would have selected the most appropriate route.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the authorising officer at RAF Aldergrove, who approved the flight of Chinook ZD576 from Aldergrove to Fort George on 2 June 1994, was given special instructions relating to the high security status of the personnel travelling on the flight. [31635]
§ Mr. SoamesNo special instructions were required.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what altitude restrictions due to the possibilities of icing were in force for Chinook flights from Northern Ireland to the north of Scotland at the time of the flight of Chinook ZD576 on 2 June 1994. [31631]
§ Mr. SoamesThere were no specific altitude restrictions in place for that particular flight. The aircraft icing limitation was +4° Celsius and the crew would have sought to avoid flight above the +4° celsius isotherm in cloud because of the potential icing hazard.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the minimum authorised altitude for the flight of Chinook ZD576 from Aldergrove to Fort George on 2 June 1994; and by whom this minimum altitude was laid down. [31623]
§ Mr. SoamesThe minimum authorised altitude of 50 ft. above ground or sea level was in keeping with No. 1 group support helicopter air staff orders, authorised by the Air Office Commanding.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what were the latitude and longitude of(a) the first and (b) the second planned turning points after leaving Aldergrove on the route of Chinook ZD576 to Fort George on 2 June 1994; and if they were known to the board of inquiry into the aircraft's accident. [31639]
§ Mr. SoamesThe board of inquiry determined that the latitude and longitude of the planned turning points were(a) N55° 18/' WOO5° 48' and (b) N56" 43' WOO5° 14'.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the global positioning system equipment on board Chinook ZD576 was found to have been(a) serviceable and (b) in use at the time of the crash on 2 June 1994. [31627]
§ Mr. Soames(a) Yes. (b) Yes.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence for how many hours each of the two pilots of Chinook ZD576 on 2 June 1994 had flown(a) in total and (b) on Chinooks. [31633]
§ Mr. SoamesThe information is as follows:
267W
- Captain of the flight: (a) 3,165 hours (b) 683 hours
- Co-pilot: (a) 2,867 hours (b) 1,492 hours
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the height above sea level of the initial impact of Chinook ZD576 on 2 June 1994. [31625]
§ Mr. SoamesEight hundred and ten feet above mean sea level.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the flight of Chinook ZD576 from Aldergrove to Fort George on 2 June 1994 was found to have been properly authorised(a) at station level and (b) by RAF West Drayton. [31636]
§ Mr. Soames(a) Yes (b) Yes.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the planned en route ground speed of Chinook ZD576 for its flight to Fort George on 2 June 1994; and what was the estimated speed of the aircraft at impact. [31624]
§ Mr. SoamesThe planned ground speed was 120 knots and the estimated ground speed at impact was 150 knots. The weather indicated a tailwind component.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many hours had been flown by each of the two pilots killed in the Chinook crash on 2 June 1994(a) on previous flights on the day of the accident and (b) during the 30 days up to 2 June 1994. [31640]
§ Mr. SoamesThe information is as follows:
- Captain of the flight: (a) 5 hours 40 minutes (b) 59 hours
- Co-pilot: (a) 5 hours 40 minutes (b) 20 hours
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if each of the two pilots of Chinook ZD576 on 2 June 1994 had been given special clearances to fly passengers of high security status. [31628]
§ Mr. SoamesNo such clearances were required.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the crew of Chinook ZD576 were informed of the high security status of their passengers from Aldergrove to Fort George on 2 June 1994 prior to planning their route for the flight. [31634]
§ Mr. SoamesYes.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if Chinook ZD576 was equipped with any form of electronic map or route display for its flight on 2 June 1994. [31626]
§ Mr. SoamesRAF Chinooks carry automatic chart displays in the cabin to provide secondary information to the loadmasters on the position of the aircraft. The board of inquiry was unable to establish whether the automatic chart display was in use during the flight.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the sortie planning for the flight of Chinook ZD576 from Aldergrove to Fort George included, at any stage, consideration of a flight at medium altitude. [31630]
§ Mr. SoamesYes, but this was rejected because of the poor weather forecast.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what magnetic compass heading the Chinook ZD576 was flying immediately prior to impact; 2 June 1994; and what evidence there was that the aircraft had altered its heading in its last few minutes of flight. [31638]
268W
§ Mr. SoamesThe compass heading at impact is not known. The board of inquiry determined that the magnetic track, which indicates the actual direction flown across the ground, was 025° at impact. There was no evidence of any significant heading change prior to impact.
§ Mr. FoulkesTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what revisions have been made to the syllabus for training of Royal Air Force Chinook aircrew as a result of lessons learned from the inquiry into the crash on 2 June 1994. [31338]
§ Mr. SoamesExisting poor weather abort instructions have been reinforced and issued to all helicopter aircrew to remind them of the procedures to follow in weather conditions where it is unsafe to continue flying under visual flight rules.