HC Deb 25 January 1995 vol 253 cc280-3W
Mr. Peter Robinson

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what triggered the nerve agent immobilised alarm detectors alarms on the night of 20–21 January 1991 during Operation Granby.

Mr. Soames

We have found no record of such an incident. There are, however records of an incident in the Al Jubayl area on 19 January 1991 when chemical agent monitor—CAM—and residual vapour detector—RVD—indicated the presence of blister agent—mustard. Nerve agent immobilised enzyme alarm and detector—NAIAD—did not respond, however, thus ruling out the presence of nerve agent.

An immediate follow up by explosive ordnance device—EOD—and chemical reconnaissance teams failed to find any evidence of chemical attack, which if it had taken place, would have included ground contamination, blister is a persistent agent, and weapon debris.

The identity of the compounds which caused the CAM and RVD to alarm on 19 January 1991 is therefore not known. It was assessed that the most likely cause of the incident was a damaged aircraft jettisoning JP4 fuel which is consistent with reports of air activity at the time.

Mr. Peter Robinson

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent the administration of nerve agent pre-treatment set, anthrax and plague inoculations would normally require a medical consultation with the patient to determine whether there are counter indications; to what extent these drugs were administered to military personnel involved in the Gulf war without such consultation; and for what reasons.

Mr. Soames

Standard peacetime medical practice is for consent to be obtained before immunisation with any vaccine. Specific details of anti-biological warfare medical counter-measures employed by British forces remain classified. However, in Operation Granby it was policy for vaccines against those biological agents identified as a threat to be made available to service personnel on the standard basis of informed consent. This entailed informing service personnel of the vaccines they were receiving, their purpose and their possible side effects. In the operational circumstances pertaining in the Gulf it is not possible to guarantee that this policy was universally adhered to.

Standard text books on immunisation detail no specific contraindications for the anti-biological warfare vaccines used during Operation Granby.

The universal and regular basis on which the nerve agent pre-treatment set—NAPS—has to be taken do not allow for individual medical consultation. However NAPS is a licensed drug and the safety and efficacy of its active ingredient, pyridostigmine bromide, in giving protection against chemical warfare agents is internationally medically recognised.

Mr. Peter Robinson

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when personnel at Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, acknowledged that chemical detectors, nerve agent immobilised alarm detectors and chemical agent monitors, could be activated by substances other than the toxic chemicals they were designed to detect; and by what means military personnel involved in Operation Granby were expected to know when they should use their personal protective equipment;

(2) when a copy of the report by Major John Watkinson, the Officer Commanding 21 EOD squadron, was received by Major Parsons of M.0.1/MoD UK Army and Mr. P. Hearn of Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down; and when the memorandum written by Captain Michael Johnson, Commander of the US 54 Chemical Troop, dated 4 January 1994, was seen by MoD officials;

(3) what assessment the MoD has made of the availability of the plague and anthrax vaccines; and what are their common applications.

Mr. Soames

These are matters for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive, CBDE, to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Peter Robinson, dated 25 January 1995:

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking when personnel at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, acknowledged that chemical detectors (NAIAD and CAM) could be activated by substances other than the toxic chemicals they were designed to detect, and by what means military personnel involved in Operation GRANBY were expected to know when they should use their personnel protective equipment has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the British Armed Forces have the most effective protective measures possible against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The staff of the Chemical and Biological Establishment have long recognised that any detection system for chemical warfare agents needs to have appropriate sensitivity and selectivity so as to respond to the chemical warfare agents and to minimise false alarms. The principal route by which chemical warfare agents attack the body is through the respiratory tract although some agents such as mustard and some nerve agents are percutaneously active. The aim in designing an effective detector is to obtain sufficient specificity without reducing sensitivity to a level in which personnel would be exposed to a harmful concentration prior to the detector responding.
  4. 4. The British chemical agent detectors such as NAIAD and CAM are designed to be highly specific whilst having a sufficient sensitivity to ensure that those utilising such detectors receive a warning from the detector before they inhale a harmful concentration of chemical warfare agent. Although they like all other chemical warfare agent detectors can respond to substances other than chemical warfare agents, it is important to recognise that these other substances are very unlikely to be present on the battlefield in concentrations sufficient to produce an alarm. In practice, the use of more than one type of detector reduces the chance of possible false 282 alarms whilst retaining an undiminished capability for the detection of chemical warfare agents.
  5. 5. Consequently, British Service personnel serving in Operation GRANBY donned their personal protective equipment when they were judged to be under a possible chemical warfare attack. This is known as the Immediate Action Drill and is designed to ensure that Service personnel are protected should they be subjected to an attack in which chemical weapons may be used. Likewise, if a chemical detector such as NAIAD or CAM alarms then full protective equipment is donned. The information relating to the possible attack is then passed to the next high level of command at which a judgement will be made as to whether chemical warfare agents have indeed been used in such an attack. Such a judgement would take into account whether other techniques for detection and monitoring of chemical warfare agents have indicated the presence of a chemical warfare agent or not. The equipment provided to the British Armed Forces to detect and monitor chemical warfare agents is highly effective and is second to none.

Letter from Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Peter Robinson, dated 25 January 1995:

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking when a copy of the report by Major John Watkinson, the Officer Commanding 21 EOD Squadron, was received by Major Parsons of M.0.1/MOD UK Army and Mr. P. Hearn of CBDE Porton Down; and when the memorandum written by Captain Michael Johnson, Commander of the US 54th Chemical Troop, dated 4 January 1994, was seen by MOD officials has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical and biological weapons may be used against them.
  3. 3. The report by 21st EOD Squadron was received in MOD in August 1991 and, in accordance with its recommendations, samples collected in Kuwait City were provided to CBDE Porton Down for analysis.
  4. 4. A subsequent note from CBDE Porton Down to the Ministry of Defence dated 23 August 1991, prior to the receipt of the samples, stated that the brown fumes associated with the material, the destruction of the NBC suit material and the burns produced on skin suggests that the material may be fuming nitric acid, a highly corrosive oxidising acid which may be used as a rocket propellant. The damage to the NBC suit material and the brown fumes showed that the material was not liquid mustard.
  5. 5. The CBDE analytical report dated 24 September 1991 showed that the samples had a definite yellow/brown colour compared to the original white of the resin and were labelled Sample 1 dated 10 August 1991 and Sample 3 dated 10 August 1991. Analytical results showed that there was a high concentration of nitrate in the sample and a pH that was extremely acidic. Extraction of the resin with dichloromethane and analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry showed the presence of no material of CW interest. The samples were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid and there was no evidence of any CW agent being present.
  6. 6. There is no record of a copy of the memorandum by Captain Michael Johnson of the US Army having been received by MOD officials.

Letter from Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Peter Robinson, dated 25 January 1995:

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what assessment the MOD has made of the availability of the plague and anthrax vaccines, and what are their common applications has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out work to ensure that the British Armed 283 Forces have the most effective protective measures possible against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare is assessed and the effectiveness of medical countermeasures evaluated.
  3. 3. As part of this work, the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment carry out a continuing assessment of the availability and effectiveness of vaccines. Plague and anthrax vaccines are available from a number of countries which include the following:
    1. (a) Plague. This is available from Greer Laboratories in the United States of America and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories in Australia.
    2. (b) Anthrax. This is available from the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research at Porton Down and the Michigan Department of Public Health in the United States of America.
These vaccines are produced to protect individuals at risk from the respective diseases; these include persons working with these microorganisms in laboratories and the pharmaceutical industry or at risk from the natural occurrence of the disease.

Mr. Peter Robinson

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if plague vaccine used during Operation Granby was obtained on a named-patient basis.

Mr. Soames

Details of the specific medical countermeasures employed by British forces against the potential biological warfare threat during Operation Granby remain classified. All vaccines administered to British forces in Operation Granby were offered on the basis of voluntary informed consent. Any vaccines without a United Kingdom product licence were licenced in their country of origin, fully tested in the United Kingdom and cleared for use.

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