Chemical Weapons (Hansard, 25 March 1994)

§ Mr. Hanley

This is a matter for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive to write to the hon. Member.

Letter from G.Pearson to Mr. Llew Smith, dated 25 March 1994.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what information his Department gathered as a result of the research conducted by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment into protection against chemical and germ weapons; and how this was used to help protect British Service Personnel in Operation GRANBY has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to ensure that the UK Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. Effective protective measures against chemical and biological weapons necessitate a portfolio of capabilities:

(a) Hazard Assessment. The implications and evaluation of the potential hazard should such agents and weapons be utilised against British forces.
(b) Detection and Warning. The detection of an attack prior 'to inhalation of a harmful concentration and the provision of warning to units located in the downwind hazard area. Identification of the nature of the particular agent facilitates the assessment of the downwind hazard area and of the duration of the hazard and enables appropriate medical countermeasures to be taken.
(c) Physical Protection. The provision of effective protection for the respiratory tract and for the body. This may be provided either as individual protection or collective protection ie the provision of facilities supplied with filtered air in which individual protection does not need to be worn.
(d) Contamination Control. Some agents such as mustard and some of the nerve agents are persistent and present a long term hazard. Action needs to be taken to decontaminate personnel and equipment contaminated with such agents.
(e) Medical Countermeasures. The provision of prophy-lactic or pretreatment measures which enhance the ability of the body to withstand attack by chemical orbiological agents and the provision of therapy after exposure to chemical or biological agents.

4. The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment has over the years built up a group of scientists with the expertise in these areas and skills to apply their scientific and technical knowledge to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with the best possible protective measures.
5. When the United Kingdom sent its forces to the Gulf in Operation GRANBY it was with the knowledge that they would be facing Iraqi forces experienced in the use of chemical weapons. It was also assessed that Iraq had the capability to manufacture and use biological weapons.
6. During the Gulf conflict of late 1990/early 1991 the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down was directly engaged in ensuring that the British Service personnel were as well protected as possible against the possible use of chemical or biological weapons by Iraq. Some two thirds of the senior staff of the Establishment were involved directly in providing advice at least part of the time.
7. Our assistance covered a wide range of areas:

(a) Hazard assessment. Advice was provided on the potential implications should Iraq use chemical or biological weapons. Information was provided for example on the effect of the local environment on the duration of the hazard and on the optimum deployment of detection systems to give the most effective warning of such attacks.
(b) Detection.The existing detection equipment was extended so as to provide audible warning should chemical agents be used against UK Armed Forces. The capabilities of in-service equipment were extended so that all chemical agents which Iraq was assessed to posses would be detected. An expedient biological detection system was developed and deployed to the Gulf together with a supplementary identification capability. In addition, kits for the sampling and identification of biological and chemical agents were produced and deployed so that in the event of an attack, appropriate samples would have been taken and returned to this Establishment for analysis.
(c) Protection. Advice was given on the optimum use of available physical protective measures and on collective protection including the incorporation of air conditioning systems.
(d) Contamination management. Advice was provided on the likely duration of the hazard had chemical or biological weapons been used by Iraq and consequently on how that hazard might have been further reduced by appropriate decontamination techniques.
(e) Medical countermeasures.The effectiveness of exist-ing medical countermeasures against agents assessed to be possessed by Iraq were evaluated and confirmed. In addition, advice was provided on appropriate medical countermeasures to be taken against the potential use of biological weapons by Iraq.

8. The contributions made by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment ensured that the protection available to the British Armed Forces was the best possible.