§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what inquiries, or reports concerning the seven collisions on the Thames involving the Bowbelle, were taken into account by the inspector conducting the inquiry into the collision of that vessel with the Marchioness following his answer of 21 January 1992,Official Report, column 157; by whom any such inquiry in respect of each collision was conducted; to whom any report was sent; and if it is publicly available.
§ Mr. NorrisAs section 15 of the chief inspector's report shows, the inquiry considered past accidents generally, not exclusively those concerning Bowbelle. Particular regard was given to those having points of similarity with the collision with Marchioness, which included one incident involving Bowbelle when she was in collision with the Pride of Greenwich. That, and the other River Thames incidents described in the report, were investigated by a surveyor of the Department of Transport, whose report was sent to the marine directorate. Such reports were not published, but a summary report of the Bowbelle/Pride of Greenwich collision was released in 1991.
§ Mr. DobsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport further to the Minister for Roads and Traffic's reply to the Consolidated Fund debate on 14 December about the Marchioness disaster, whether the transcript of the "Dispatches" television programme on which he relied portrayed the computer graphics included in the broadcast.
§ Mr. NorrisNo. I have, however, now seen the video of the complete broadcast and I can confirm that I do not believe it adds anything material to that which is already known and recorded.
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§ Mr NorrisThe capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise off Zeebrugge was followed by a preliminary inquiry and a formal investigation both of which were held under section 55 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970. The loss of the Marchioness was followed by an inspector's inquiry under section 33 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and regulation 6 of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Investigation) Regulations 1989. A comparison between the three types of inquiry is set out in the table.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what consideration was given by the marine accident investigation branch inquiry into the BowbelleMarchioness collision as to the health and capability of the helmsman of the Bowbelle and official documentation related thereto.
§ Mr. NorrisThe helmsman was interviewed by an inspector who was fully satisfied of his capability. He held a valid medical certificate.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what was the forward extent of deadwater viewed from the wheelhouse of the dredger Bowbelle by a person of average height when(a) loaded with a full cargo down to the marks at level trim, (b) unloaded with ballast tanks filled as per company practice for navigation above bridges on the Thames and (c) as ballasted to the extent it was at Southwark on the night of 20 August 1989; and what evidence was taken, and what tests were made, by the inspector conducting the inquiry into the collision.
§ Mr. NorrisA precise figure for the extent of deadwater cannot be given, irrespective of the state of loading, because it resulted not only from the vessel's trim but also from the presence of dredging gear, as is shown in the chief inspector's report: the effect of this is partly dependant on the observer's position. The significance of the poor visibility from the wheelhouse is given emphasis in the report; the inspector's opinion on this was based on close visual inspection including but not limited to a passage down river in conditions similar as far as possible to those on the night of the accident. As the report says, during this trial the launch taking the place of Marchioness could not be seen from the wheelhouse when she was in any position reasonably close ahead or on the starboard bow.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what steps were taken by his Marine Accident Investigation Branch to contact the survivors and witnesses 131W of the Bowbelle collision with a view to its submission of written or oral evidence to the subsequent inquiry; and if lists of such persons were supplied to it by the Metropolitan police or other persons or bodies.
§ Mr. NorrisLists of survivors from Marchioness were supplied by the Metropolitan police. Copies of their statements and those of other witnesses were also provided; all were examined. When it appeared that the witness was in a position to provide evidence as to the circumstances of the accident, an attempt was made to contact them and invite them to meet an inspector. In addition, press advertisements were placed inviting anyone who so wished to contribute to the inquiry.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what public evidence has been given, orally or in writing, by the captain of the Bowbelle concerning his seeking or obtaining permission to navigate or anchor subsequent to the collision with the Marchioness on 20 August 1989.
§ Mr. NorrisEvidence was given by the master in the form of a declaration before the inspector as required under the Merchant Shipping Act 1979, and therefore not in public. He said that he was given permission to anchor in Long Reach but then told to go to Gravesend, which was later amended to Gallions reach. This is confirmed by the VHF transcript.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) what test had been made, and what information had been requested by or made available to the inspector conducting the inquiry into the Bowbelle collision of 20 August 1989, concerning the nature of that vessel's bow light when navigating with foremast lowered at night above bridges; what was the strength of such a light used whilst so navigating; what requests had been made by the owners of the vessel in respect of these or related matters; what rule or regulation prevented installation of a stronger than normal bow light for such passages; and what evidence was given to the inspector conducting the inquiry on this matter;
(2) what was the strength of the port and starboard navigation sidelights of the sand dredger Bowbelle on the night of 20 August 1989; what tests were made concerning the effect of any equipment carried on its deck or the trim of the vessel on forward visibility of such lights, particularly when viewed from near water level; and if the inspector conducting the inquiry into the collision took evidence on this matter.
§ Mr. NorrisBowbelle carried approved port and starboard navigation lights, which have a luminous intensity of 12 candelas giving a range in ordinarily good visibility of least three miles. As explained in the chief inspector's report, she did not carry the usual forward masthead light being exempt from doing so under PLA bye-laws because the mast had to be lowered to pass under the bridges, but she carried in lieu of it a light about 4½ feet above the deck forward, of similar characteristics: that is having a luminous intensity of at least 94 candelas giving a six-mile range.
A trial passage down river in conditions similar as far as possible to those on the night of the accident permitted a subjective assessment of the effectiveness of the lights from near water level by the inspector on board the launch.
132WAs section 7 of the report says, the lights did not show up well: this, particularly in the case of the forward light, was due mainly to the effect of the background of shore lights.
Representations were made by the owners of Bowbelle and other commercial craft regularly using the river above Tower bridge on the subject of distinguishing lights for their ships, both at meetings and in correspondence. The relevant papers were examined by the inspectors and are discussed in section 15 of the chief inspector's report. The various possibilities were rejected as the report says principally because the Department of Transport considered there would be conflict with the requirement of the International Collision Regulations.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what evidence the inspector conducting the inquiry into the Bowbelle collision on the River Thames took concerning sets and turbulence in the water in the vicinity of Southwark bridge at the time of the collision there on 20 August 1989.
§ Mr. NorrisA research project was commissioned and evidence was taken from the Port of London Authority; the subject is covered in section 6 of the chief inspector's report.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will name the vessel and person transmitting the radio messages, ascribed to an unknown vessel, contained in the radio-telephone transcript of the Port of London Authority Thames navigation service in the period immediately following the collision near Southwark bridge on 20 August 1989; if the name of that vessel and person were available to the inspector conducting the consequent inquiry; and what reference is made to it in the publicised report into that collision.
§ Mr. NorrisThe vessel was the Hurlingham and the person making the broadcast was her skipper. Reference is at section 3.10 of the chief inspector's report.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport on what date advice from his Department was given to the then Prime Minister concerning the merits of establishing a public inquiry into the Marchioness disaster of comparable scope to those conducted into disasters at King's Cross and Clapham.
§ Mr. NorrisThe matter of a public inquiry was discussed on the day of the accident—20 August 1989. It was decided that the MAIB inquiry should proceed, with the option of a public inquiry—formal investigation—left open.
§ 86. Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what port or starboard effect the screw of the sand dredger Bowbelle unloaded with no, or little ballast had on its steering over the range of engine revolutions generally used and being used on the night of 20 August 1989; at what depths the boss and upper tip of its screw were below the surface when navigating King's reach that night; and what evidence was taken, or test made, in this regard by the inspector conducting the inquiry into the subsequent collision.
§ Mr. NorrisNo significant effect was experienced at normal ahead revolutions or observed during the trial carried out in the inspector's presence. On going astern, the crew would be expected to cant the vessel but no astern movements took place on passage before the collision. The depths were about 5 ft and rather less than 2 ft respectively.
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§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) where, and at what time, any representative or member of the management of South Coast Shipping boarded the Bowbelle in the early hours of 20 August 1989 and for what purpose; what such information was available to the inspector conducting the subsequent inquiry; if such a visit was referred to or discussed in evidence given to that inquiry by any member of the crew or management of the Bowbelle; and where it is referred to in the consequent report;
(2) if he will describe the movements of the sand dredger Bowbelle subsequent to its collision on 20 August 1989 with the Marchioness prior to its mooring at Orchard wharf, Leamouth; which persons representing which interests boarded or left the vessel over that period; and if this information was known and considered by the inspector conducting the subsequent inquiry.
§ Mr. NorrisThe movements of Bowbelle immediately after the collision are described in sections 3.11 and 17.1 of the chief inspector's report. Subsequently, she proceeded down river and on instruction from the Port of London Authority anchored in Gallions reach at 0325 hours. She weighed anchor at about 0445 hours and berthed at Orchard Wharf at 0540 hours.
While at Gallions reach she was boarded by the operations manager of South Coast Shipping and by two officers of the Metropolitan police. This information was known to the inspector conducting the inquiry; it is not referred to in the report as it had no relevance to the accident.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary 'of State for Transport what boats, lifebuoys, or other buoyant apparatus were thrown overboard, or otherwise used, after the Bowbelle-Marchioness collision on 20 August 1989(a) from the Hurlingham and (b) from the Bowbelle; if such information was secured by the inspector conducting the inquiry; and whether it was referred to therein (a) in general or (b) in quantifiable terms.
§ Mr. NorrisBuoyant apparatus and life buoys were thrown into the water from Hurlingham, but none from Bowbelle. Evidence as to this was obtained by the inspectors; section 12 of the chief inspector's report refers to that.
§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what test or qualification was obtained by any officer of the sand dredger Bowbelle in respect of exemption from pilotage requirements for operation above bridges in the Port of London; for what period such exemption had been applied; from what date such exemption had been operative; and from what date it has not been necessary for a licensed Thames waterman to be in charge of sea-going vessels above Tower bridge.
§ Mr. NorrisAs is explained in the chief inspector's report at section 9, there were at the time of the accident no requirements for pilotage in the Thames above London bridge; therefore equally there were no requirements for pilotage exemption in that area, although both officers on the bridge of Bowbelle at the time of the accident held valid exemptions for pilotage in the lower reaches. Following recommendation 16 in the report, pilotage or the possession of an exemption is now required. So far as is known, it has never been a requirement for a licensed waterman to have charge of a vessel above Tower bridge.
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§ Mr. SpearingTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what record was made of the proceeding of the inquiry, by an inspector of his marine accident investigation branch, into the collision between the Bowbelle and the Marchioness in August 1989; where it is now held and by whom; how many copies have been made; to whom it has been sent; and if he will deposit a copy in the Library and make it publicly available.
§ Mr. NorrisThe proceedings of the inquiry are recorded in the inspector's report the only copy of which was sent to, and continues to be held by, the chief inspector of the marine accident investigation branch. This procedure is in accordance with regulation 8(4) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Investigation) Regulations 1989; there is no provision for an inspector's report to be released. However, regulation 9(1) provides for the publication of the chief inspector's report of the inspector's inquiry; the chief inspector's report on the collision between Marchioness and MV Bowbelle was published on 15 August 1991.