Chemical Weapons (Hansard, 20 July 1993)

§ 11 Mr. Hanley

These are matters for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment under its framework document and I have asked the chief executive to reply.

Letters from Graham Pearson to Mr. Harry Cohen, dated 20 July 1993:

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to the Answer of 12th May, Official Report, column 516, if he will place in the Library a copy of the report on CR gas provided to the United States Department of Defence under the terms of The Technical Cooperation Programme (Question 3, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The report on CR gas provided to the United States Department of Defence in 1962 is classified and I am therefore unable to place a copy in the Library.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how many scientific papers co-authored by scientists from the Chemical Defence Establishment Porton Down and their counterparts in the United States of America military were published between 1963 and 1979; what were the dates of these papers; and in which scientific journals they were published (Question 4, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. I regret that our records do not provide this information in a readily accessible form. Nevertheless, I have consulted my senior staff and two scientific papers co-authored by scientists from the then Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down and their counterparts in the United States of America Department of Defence have been identified. Both papers were published in 1977; one appeared in Atmospheric Environment and the other in the Journal of Electronics.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what cooperation exists between Britain and the United States of America on the scientific and technical aspects of binary chemical weapons (Question 5, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. As the United Kingdom abandoned all work on offensive chemical weapons in the late 1950s and the US binary programme commenced in the 1970s, there has been no cooperation between Britain and the United States of America on the scientific and technical aspects of binary chemical weapons. Some information on binary chemical weapons has been to assist us in our evaluation of the potential hazard to the United Kingdom Armed Forces from potential aggressors who may possess binary chemical weapons.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 12th May, Official Report, columns 519–20, for how many years the Chemical Defence Establishment researched into the behavioural effects of phencyclidine; how many animals and service personnel were tested with phencyclidine; whether 169W these studies were published in open scientific literature; what was the conclusion of this research; and to which other pyschotomimetrics the results of the phencyclidine research were compared (Question 6, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.

3. Phencyclidine is a potent analgesic and anaesthetic which has marked psychotomimetic side effects. Such compounds could potentially represent a hazard to the UK Armed Forces and the behavioural effects of phencyclidine in rats has been compared with other psychotomirnetic compounds to assess the potential hazard to the British Armed Forces should such material be utilized by an aggressor against British Forces. This work was carried out in the early 1960s and involved about 50 rats. No service personnel scientific literature and the conclusion of this research was that phencyclidine like other psychotomimetics could present a possible hazard to the UK Armed Forces if it were dispersed as an incapaciting agent by an aggressor. The work on phencyclidine was compared with several psychotomimetics including lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25), mescaline sulphate, harmine, N-Methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate, dimethyl-tryptamine, diethyltrymptamine and dipropyl-tryptamine, alpha-methyl tryptamine and bufotenine bioxalate.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how many scientific papers co-authored by scientists from Porton Down and their counterparts in the Canadian military have been published since 1979; what were the dates of these papers; and in which scientific journals they were published (Question 7, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. I regret that our records do not provide this information in a readily accessible form. I have made enquiries of my senior staff and of my library and have found no trace of any scientific papers co-authored by scientists from the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down and our counterparts in the Canadian Department of National Defence which have been published in scientific journals.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 15th February to the honourable Member for Brent East, Official Report, column 62, on what date the nerve agent VX was last produced at the Chemical Defence Establishment at Nancekuke, Cornwall; what was the total amount of nerve agent VX produced at Nancekuke; and how all the VX produced at Nancekuke was disposed of (Question 8, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to ensure that the UK Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. In order to carry out this work, it is necessary to have available small quantities of the materials which may be used as chemical or biological warfare agents by a potential aggressor.

3. The nerve agent VX was last produced at Nancekuke in 1968. The total amount produced was less than 110 kilograms. As the object of the work was to evaluate whether VX could be produced by a potential aggressor in sufficient quantity to present a hazard to the UK Armed Forces, the majority of the product was destroyed chemically immediately after production. Small samples were kept for analysis and for storage trials as part of the overall assessment of the potential hazard. Small quantities of VX were occasionally transferred to CBDE Porton Down for research and trials use.

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4. The VX produced at Nancekuke was disposed of by hydrolysis with caustic soda followed by dilution. Before being released into the sea, shrimps were released into the diluted hydrolysed material to ensure that it was harmless to marine life.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 12 May. Official Report, columns 516–7, when the United States of America first supplied quantitities of the nerve gas VX to Britain; how many times VX was transferred from the United States of America to Britain; to which United Kingdom Ministry of Defence establishment the VX was supplied on each occasion; for what the VX was used on each occasion; how much VX was supplied on each occasion; from which United States military establishment the VX originated in each case; and if the transfer of VX was arranged under The Technical Cooperation Programme (Question 9, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The United States of America first transferred VX to the Chemical Defence Establishment at Nancekuke in 1957. Subsequent transfers again to CDE Nancekuke took place in 1959 and 1961 and in 1967 to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down. The total quantity of VX transferred was about 100 kilograms and was used for stablity studies and collaborative trials at CBDE Porton Down on downwind hazard evaluation as part of the evaluation of the potential hazard to the UK Armed Forces from VX. Our records do not clearly indicate where the VX was produced in the US; the usual Establishment involved in arranging the provision of the nerve agent VX was the predecessor of the present Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center sometimes known as Edgewood Arsenal. The transfers took place under the Tripartite Toxicological Conferences and in the latter case under The Technical Cooperation Programme.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how many times the United Kingdom supplied nerve agent VX to the United States of America; from which United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Establishment the VX originated on each occasion; and for what reason the VX was transferred on each occasion (Question 10, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. VX was transferred in 1957 from the Chemical Defence Establishment Nancekuke to the precursor of the Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center for comparative analytical studies.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how many staff from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence visited or were posted to the United States nerve gas factory at Newport, Indiana; when these visits or posting occurred; and under which defence agreement they were arranged (Question 11, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. Our records about past visits or postings to the United States nerve gas plant at Newport, Indiana are very limited. A visit by two members of staff from the then Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment to the Newport, Indiana factory took place in 1962.

3. This visit took place under a collaborative programme that arose from the authorisation by the US Congress in 1956 under the mutual security programme of financial support for R&D programmes of friendly countries. Information about this collaborative programme is limited but appears to have been on a bilateral basis between the United States and the United Kingdom and also between the United States and a number of countries in Europe. The scope of this collaborative programme was very broad and was known as the Mutual Weapons Development Programme. The programme did include collaboration chemical and biological 171W defence under the generic headings of detectors, neutralisers and treatment. The visit to the Newport, Indiana factory was arranged under this programme.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his Answer to the honourable Member for Brent East of 26th June 1992, Official Report, column 357, on what dates chemical and biological agents have been transferred from Britain to Canada for the purposes of the provisions of effective protective measures; how the agents were used on each occasion; from which British military establishments and to which Canadian military establishments the agents were transferred; and through which defence agreement these transfers were arranged (Question 12, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. Our records do not contain information on whether chemical or biological agents were transferred from the UK to Canada during World War II or the immediate subsequent years. Since the early 1960s, no transfer of biological agents has taken place and small quantities of a chemical agent were transferred from the UK to Canada in the early 1970s. These were transferred from the then Chemical Defence Establishment at Nancekuke to the Canadian Defence Research Establishment Suffield. Our records do not include information on how the agent was used by Canada or on the precise defence agreement involved. The transfer was probably under one of the defence agreements referred to by the Rt Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP in his reply of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255–6.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 12th May, Official Report, column 518, to the honourable Member for Leyton, when formation gained through tests and studies on Francisella Tulerensis was first exchanged between Britain and the United States of America; and under which agreement this was exchanged (Question 13, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. Our records do not indicate precisely when information gained from tests and studies on Francisella Tulerensis was first exchanged between Britain and the United States of America. As indicated in the answer of 12 May, Official Report, column 518, tests and studies on this organism had been carried out since the early 1950s by the then Microbiology Research Department, subsequently by the Microbiology Research Establishment, Porton Down until its closure in 1979 and since then by the Chemical Defence Establishment and now the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down. The information gained has been the subject of information exchange and collaboration with the United States of America on a continuing basis. This information was exchanged under the aegis of the defence agreements referred to by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the Right Honourable Archie Hamilton, MP, in his reply of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255–256.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what research his Department carried out on the viral disease psittacosis (Question 14, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. We have no record that any research work has been carried out at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment or its precursor Establishments into psittacosis.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how the workings of the Technical Co-operation Programme were affected by the British decision to give up offensive work on chemical and biological weapons; and how this changed the nature and direction of research exchanged through the Technical Co-operation Programme (Question 15, Order Paper 12 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

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2. The Technical Cooperation Programme was established in 1958 and the Sub Group E on Chemical and Biological Defence was not activated until 1967. As the United Kingdom had ceased work on offensive chemical and biological weapons in the late 1950s, the Technical Cooperation Programme collaboration on chemical and biological defence through Sub Group E was unaffected by the earlier decision of the United Kingdom to give up offensive work on chemical and biological weapons.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 12 May, Official Report, column 515, if he can indicate, without disproportionate cost, the approximate number of service volunteers tested with BZ; in which years these tests were carried out; what was the conclusion of the evaluation of BZ; what monitoring was carried out of the volunteers since the tests; in which year information was exchanged with the United States of America; and under which agreement it was exchanged. (Question 130, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

3. The approximate number of service volunteers tested with BZ was twenty-five in the mid 1960s. The conclusion of the evaluation of BZ was that it could indeed effect the behaviour of Service personnel and as such presented a potential hazard which should not be ignored in considering the potential hazards to which UK Forces might be exposed. The volunteers were examined before and after the tests by the resident Army psychiatrist and no indication of any continuing effect was observed. There have been no reports of any subsequent sequelae from any of the volunteers.

4. The information obtained was part of the UK programme into chemical and biological defence and as such was drawn upon in our collaboration and information exchange with the United States of America under The Technical Cooperation Programme through Sub Group E on chemical and biological defence.