HC Deb 19 July 1993 vol 229 cc80-3W
Mr. Cohen

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) pursuant to his answer of 12 May,Official Report, column 520, when the quantity of clostridium perfringens beta-toxin was transferred from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down; for what reason it was transferred; what safety precautions were taken during the transfer; and which British safety authorities, American safety authorities and British local councils were informed beforehand of the transfer;

(2) when nerve agent was last transported from the Ministry of Defence establishment at Nancekuke to Porton Down;

(3) pursuant to his answer of 12 May, Official Report, column 516, when his Department carried out research on animals using BZ; what number of each species of animals were involved; and what was the conclusion of these tests;

(4) what work Porton Down has done on evaluating pyrroles as an incapacitating agent; when this work was carried out; how many tests and studies were carried out on animals and service volunteers; what was the conclusion of the studies and tests; when the results were shared with the United States of America; and through which defence agreement this scientific information was exchanged;

(5) how the defence agreement outlined in his answer to the hon. Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone) on 21 May 1992, Official Report, column 255–56, will be affected by the chemical weapons convention;

(6) pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) on 2 February, Official Report, column 156, if he will list the external suppliers which have supplied chemical and biological compounds for prophylactic research at Porton Down since 1979.

Mr. Hanley

These are matters for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment under its framework documents and I have asked the chief executive to reply.

Letters from Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Harry Cohen, dated 19 July 1993:

  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 12 May, Official Report, column 520, when the quantity of Clostridium perfringens beta-toxin was transferred from the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, for what reason it was transferred; what safety precautions were taken during the transfer; and which British safety authorities, American safety authorities and British local councils were informed beforehand of the transfer (Question 9, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The sample of clostridium perfringens beta-toxin was transferred from the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment on 5 August 1992. The sample was packed and transported in accordance with the IATA regulations for air transport of such materials. Import of the sample into the United Kingdom did not require an import licence and there was no requirement to advise British safety authorities, American safety authorities or British local councils beforehand of the transfer.
  3. 3. The sample was used for experimental work to investigate the molecular biology of the beta-toxin with the objective of designing gene probes and testing antibodies to detect the beta-toxin.
  4. 4. Prior to commencing work at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment with the sample of beta-toxin, an assessment of the risk posed was carried out under the HSE Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations. This assessment was reviewed and accepted by a local Safety Committee. In view of the very small quantity of the toxin, the risk to individuals was considered to be low and the sample was handled appropriately in a microbiological laboratory.
  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him when nerve agent was last transported from the Ministry of Defence establishment at Nancekuke to Porton Down (Question 17, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. Nerve agent was last transported from the Ministry of iefcncc Establishment at Nancekuke to Porton Down in May 1977. The quantity concerned was small and appropriate 82 precautions were taken to ensure that there was no hazard to the public.
  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 12 May, Official Report, column 516, when his Department carried out research on animals using BZ; what number of each species of animals were involved; and what was the conclusions of these tests (Question 20, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectivenes of British protective measures evaluated.
  3. 3. Research into BZ was carried out between 1960 and 1975. About 350 animals were involved in this research. These were mostly rats, mice and guinea pigs. The conclusion of the research was that BZ possessed high psychotomimetic (incapaciting) properties. The studies also showed the BZ induced effects could be effectively antagonised by the anticholinesterase drug physostigmine.
  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what work Porton down has done on evaluating pyrroles as an incapacitating agent; when this work was carried out; how many tests and studies were carried out on animals and service volunteers; what was the conclusion of the studies and tests; when the results were shared with the United States of America; and through which defence agreement this scientific information was exchanged (Question 23, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
  3. 3. Studies in the early 1960s indicated that simple pyrrole derivatives might show pharmacological effects that might be used by an aggressor as an incapacitating agent. Several classes of pyrroles were studied in the early 1960s using small laboratory animals. No studies were carried out with Service volunteers. The results of the work indicated that pyrroles did not appear to present much hazard as an incapacitating agent.
  4. 4. The information arising from these studies was part of the chemical and biological defence programme and would therefore be part of the technical database drawn upon in cooperation with the United States of America under The Technical Cooperation Programme and its predecessors.
  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how the defence agreement outlined in his Answer to the honourable Member for Brent East on 21st May 1992, Official Report, column 255–56, will be affected by the Chemical Weapons Convention, (Question 32, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. As all the agreements referred to in the previous answer relate to the provision of chemical and biological defence, the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its entry into force will have no effect on these agreements.
  3. 3. Indeed Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention states that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons. It goes on to encourage the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons and requires the 83 provision annually to the Technical Secretariat of information on States Parties programmes related to protective purposes.
  4. 4. It is becoming apparent that the provision of effective protective measures is an essential element of the web of deterrence which also includes arms control and export monitoring and controls. The provision of effective protective measures not only reduces the utility of chemical weapons to a potential aggressor but also reduces the range of chemicals that might be used as chemical weapons and hence need to be subject to arms and export controls.
  1. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him, pursuant to his Answer to the honourable Member for Blaenau Gwent on 2 February, Official Report, column 156, if he will list the external suppliers which have supplied chemical and biological compounds for prophylactic research at Porton Down since 1979 (Question 34, Order Paper 9 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
  2. 2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
  3. 3. The normal practice at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down is to purchase any required chemical and biological compounds from commercial suppliers when these are commercially available. If they are not commercially available then the Establishment will synthesise the appropriate compounds.
  4. 4. In order to support the programme of work, chemical and biological compounds are purchased from a number of commercial suppliers. We do not maintain records which enable us to identify which suppliers provided the compounds used for prophylactic research.