Chemical Weapons (Hansard, 16 July 1993)

§ Mr. Hanley

These are matters for the chief executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment under its framework document and I have asked him to reply.

Letters from Graham Pearson to Mr. Ken Livingstone, dated 16 July 1993:

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what tests and studies the chemical and biological establishment at Porton Down has carried out on the organophosphorus binary reactant QL; when these experiments were carried out; and for what purpose (Question 12, Order Paper, 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.3. As part of this work, it is necessary to evaluate the potential hazard from nerve agents such as VX. In order to do this, work was carried out at the Chemical Defence Establishment, Nancekuke from early 1960 to about 1968 to study the transesterification process involving QL as part of the study into the nerve gas VX.1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him, pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 163, how many memoranda of understanding have been agreed in the field of chemical and biological defence, as opposed to offensive chemical and biological warfare, involving Britain and the United States of America since 1963; what was the subject and nature of each memorandum of understanding; and in which year each memorandum of understanding was agreed (Question 13, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.2. The United Kingdom abandoned offensive work on chemical and biological weapons in the late 1950s and since then the role of the Chemical and Biological Defence 711W Establishment has been to ensure that the UK Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them.3. The following agreements in the field of chemical and biological defence involving Britain and the United States of America have been agreed since 1963;

(a) The United Kingdom-United States of America-Canada Memorandum of Understanding on chemical and biological defence was signed in 1980 and addresses research, development, production and procurement of chemical and biological defence equipment.
(b) The NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG) Panel VII on nuclear, biological and chemical defence involving both Britain and the United States of America was set up in 1967. This addresses the standardisation of NBC equipment and procedures.
(c) The United Kingdom-United States-CanadaAustra lia American British Canadian Australian (ABCA) Armies agreed The Basic Standardisation Agreement in 1964 with the aims of ensuring the fullest cooperation and collaboration between the Armies, the highest possible degree of interoperability through standardisation and the greatest possible economy through the use of combined resources and effort. This includes a group known as the Quadripartite Working Group (QWG) which has a panel on NBC defence.
(d) The Technical Cooperation Programme which was set up in 1958 activated its Sub Group Eon chemical and biological defence in 1967 which has the aim of promoting collaboration in chemical and biological defence research.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him, pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 162, what information his Department has with the United States of America relating to technical work on its binary chemical weapon, M-687 155 mm artillery round; and how and when this information was exchanged (Question 15, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The United States of America has provided technical information to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down which has enabled us to evaluate the potential hazard to the United Kingdom Armed Forces should a potential aggressor State utilize biological binary weapons.
4. This information has been provided during the course of the development of the M-687 binary artillery round as part of the regular briefings provided by the United States on their chemical and biological programme. Much of this information has been in the public domain and has been provided to the United Kingdom for background information.
5. As the United Kingdom abandoned all offensive work on chemical weapons in the late 1950s, there has been no collaboration with the United States of America on the M-687 binary chemical artillery round.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him in which years VX nerve gas was stored at the Ministry of Defence's establishment at Nancekuke in Cornwall; and why it was stored there (Question 16, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Samples of VX nerve agent were stored at Nancekuke between 1957 and 1976 for studies into the storage stability of 712 this agent so as to assist in our evaluation of the potential hazard to the United Kingdom Armed Forces should an aggressor produce such materials.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 160, when Australia and New Zealand joined the Tripartite Technical Co-operation Programme; for what reasons Britain agreed to each of these two countries joining the programme; and if information was exchanged under the programme on the subject of chemical and biological defence and warfare before 1967 (Question 19, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Australia joined the Tripartite Cooperation Programme in 1965 and, since it was no longer a tripartite organisation, the name of TTCP was changed to The Technical Cooperation Programme thus retaining the same initials. In 1969 New Zealand also joined The Technical Cooperation Programme. Our records do not indicate the reasons why the United Kingdom, US and Canada agreed to each of the two countries joining the programme.
3. Information on chemical and biological defence was exchanged prior to 1967 under the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) agreement and before that under the close cooperation which existed between the Allies during World War II.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him when the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down started and completed work on the AR5 Aircrew Respiratory System; in conjunction with what other countries the research and development of the system was carried out; under which specific defence agreement this collaboration was arranged; and if this system is now in service with any other countries (Question 21, Order, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down started work on the AR5 Aircrew Respiratory System project in 1976 whan the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment provided advice to the lead Establishments of the Defence Research Agency Farnborough (then the Royal Aircraft Establishment Farnborough) and the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine on overall NBC philosophy, materials and testing. CBDE has continued to provide advice in support of the in-service deployment of the AR5 Aircrew Respiratory System.
3. No other countries were involved in the development of the AR5 which is currently in-service with the UK Armed Forces and is also used by the US Navy and Canadian forces.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 162, how many exchange postings in relation to binary chemical weapons the United Kingdom and United States governments arranged and in which years; and under which specific defence agreement these postings were arranged (Question 23, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. As the United Kingdom abandoned work on offensive chemical and biological weapons in the late 1950s, there have been no exchange postings in relation to binary chemical weapons between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments as the US binary programme began in the 1970s.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what experiments his Department carried out on Q fever, when these experiments were conducted; for what purpose the results of these studies were passed to either the United States of America, Canada or Australia; and why and when these results were passed to other countries (Question 27, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment has carried out research on Coxiella Burnettii, the causative agent of Q-Fever. This work was carried out in the late 1980s and has been directed at the development of identification techniques for the organism based on gene probe and antibody technologies. The results of this work have formed part of the programme of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment which is the subject of collaboration with the United States, Canada and Australia under The Technical Cooperation Programme and with the United States and Canada under the Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical and Biological Defence.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him if all research carried out by the Ministry of Defence's Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down into LSD was conducted within the establishment itself (Question 30, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The majority of the work at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment into the evaluation of the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is carried out within the Establishment. Extramural research contracts are placed with universities and other higher education institutes and industry when these outside bodies have an appropriate expertise that is not available within the Establishment and which compliments the expertise of the Establishment.
4. Insofar as the research into LSD is concerned, most of this work was carried out within the Establishment. Some complementary research was carried out in a university under extramural research contract to the Establishment.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what factors led to the signing of the 1980 memorandum of understanding between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada on chemical and biological defence, as referred to in his Answer of 21 May 1992, Official Report, column 255 (Question 31, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. As it was then perceived that the threat from biological weapons had reduced, steps were taken in both the United Kingdom and the United States to reduce their biological defence programmes. There was also a reduction in chemical defence work in the 1970s.
4. As a consequence, it was recognised in both the United Kingdom and the United States that there would be mutual benefits from close collaboration in the fields of chemical and biological defence. Consequently, the Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up between the United Kingdom and the United States together with Canada and signed in 714 1980 with the objective of integrating the chemical and biological defence programmes of the three countries to the maximum possible extent.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him, pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 162, when the two memoranda of understanding referred to in the answer were signed; how many other memoranda of understanding relating to chemical and biological defence Britain has signed with Australia since 1963; and what they were about (Question 32, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The Memorandum of Agreement between the UK and Australia relating to a joint programme of research, investigation and material testing at the Joint Tropical Trials Research Establishment (JTTRE) was signed in October 1977 and this superseded the Joint Tropical Research Unit Memorandum of Understanding signed in December 1970 which in turn replaced an earlier Memorandum of Understanding in 1962 setting up the Joint Tropical Research Unit.
3. There have been three other agreements with Australia relating to chemical and biological defence since 1963:

(a) The Technical Cooperation Programme set up in 1958 under which chemical and biological defence was addresed in Sub Group E which was created in 1967. Australia joined The Technical Cooperation Programme in 1965 and information on research into chemical and biological defence has been exchanged with Australia under this agreement since Sub Group E was created in 1967.
(b) The United Kingdom-United States-Canada-Australia American British Canadian Australian (ABCA) Armies agreed The Basic Standardisation Agreement in 1964 with the aims of ensuring the fullest cooperation and collaboration between the Armies, the highest possible degree of interoperability through standardisation and the greatest possible economy through the use of combined resources and effort. This includes a group known as the Quadripartite Working panel on NBC defence.
(c) The United Kingdom United States and Canada Air Standization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) was extended to include Australia in 1964; the ASCC has a working party addressing CB defence.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his Answer to the honourable Member for Brent East on 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 164, if he will list the location, dates and participating countries at each of the subsequent tripartite conferences on toxicological warfare until the present day; and if he will outline the recommendations and conclusions of each of these conferences (Question 34, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The locations, dates and participating countries at each of the subsequent tripartite conference on toxicological warfare until the present day are as follows:

(a) Fifteenth Conference held in the United Kingdom in 1960 and attended by representatives of Canada, United Kingdom and United States.
(b) Sixteenth Conference held in Canada in 1962 and attended by representatives of Canada, United Kingdom and United States.
(c) Seventeenth Conference held in the USA in 1964 and attended by representatives of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States.

3. In 1965 the America, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) Armies Group reviewed the effectiveness of these toxicological conferences. This led to their being subsumed into the Technical Cooperation Programme under which Sub Group E on Chemical and Biological Defence was created in 1967.
4. It is not practicable to outline the recommendations and conclusions of each of these conferences as these were the subject of trinational and, in the 17th meeting quadrinational 715 agreement. It would be necessary to seek the agreement of all the countries concerned to the release of the recommendations and conclusions of these conferences.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him which British scientific research institutions have received stocks of toxins and biological agents from the United States of America Department of Defense since 1979; which toxins and biological agents have been transferred and when; which United States Department of Defense establishments have supplied these toxins and biological agents; under which defence agreements these toxins and biological agents were transferred; and for what purpose on each occasion (Question 36, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to ensure that the UK Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. In order to carry out this work, it is necessary to have available small quantities of the materials which may be used as chemical or biological warfare agents by a potential aggressor.
3. It is not possible for us to comment on what toxins and biological agents may have been received by other British scientific research institutions from the United States of America Department of Defense since 1979. This reply is necessarily limited to the Ministry of Defence scientific research institutions.
4. The quantities involved are very small and in no way could be regarded as stocks of agent. Small quantities of the following toxins and micro-organisms which might be used by a potential aggressor as biological agents have been provided:

(a) Shellfish toxin (saxitoxin) from the then US Army Chemical Research and Development Center in 1982
(b) Clostridium perfringens betatoxin from the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in 1992.
(c) Bacillus anthracis strains from the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in 1985. The strains received did not contain the toxin plasmid and are regarded as attenuated strains.

5. In addition other materials including some vaccines and simulants have been transferred which are neither toxins or biological agents. All the materials transferred have been to support collaboration into the provision of effective protective measures.
6. These materials have been supplied under The Technical Cooperation Programme and under the Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical and Biological Defence.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him on what dates, and in which publications, scientists on extramural research projects funded by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, published their findings in 1991, as referred to on page 15 of the Establishment's annual report 1991–92 (Question 39, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. It is not the practice of the Ministry of Defence on both national and personal security grounds to identify links between the Ministry of Defence and the contractors engaged on extramural research. It is left to the individual contractors to decide whether or not to disclose their contracts with the Ministry of Defence. I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful on this occasion.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him for what reasons the Ministry of Defence delayed dismantling its nerve gas agent plant at Nancekuke, Cornwall after the Ministry had decided to decommission the plant; what tasks were carried out at the site in the intervening years between the decommissioning and dismantling; and if these tasks were connected to the United Kingdom's chemical and biological defence programme 716 (Question 41, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Work on the pilot scale nerve agent plant at Nancekuke was completed and the plant decontaminated in January 1956 before the decision was taken to decommission the plant later in that year. The plant was partially dissembled to allow other work to be carried out on the site. This other work included tasks related to the chemical and biological defence programme such as the manufacture of a dye for detector paper, a chemical needed to produce P2S, which is an ingredient in medical countermeasures against nerve agents, as well as research work aimed at determining whether other nerve agents presented a hazard to British Armed Forces.
3. The plant was not finally dismantled until the closure of Nancekuke in the late 1970s because of the absence until then of the necessary resources as great care was taken to avoid any hazard to the staff involved in the dismantling work and to ensure that any toxic chemicals were safely disposed of.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him, pursuant to his Answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 164, if he will publish the official name and details of the informal agreement under which the 15th Tripartite Conference on Toxicological Warfare was organised; and if this agreement still exists (Question 44, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Exeuctive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The 15th Tripartite Conference on Toxicological Warfare had its origins in informal agreements of 1946 which in turn had their roots in World War II allied cooperation between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Whilst the agreement which led to the Toxicological Warfare conferences no longer exists, its spirit continues in respect of the cooperation between United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the Technical Cooperation Programme in the activities under Sub Group E on Chemical and Biological Defence. This transition from the Tripartite and eventually Quadripartite Conferences occurred in the mid 1960s.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him how many members of the 1985 Independent Advisory Group on Gruinard Island have since been on scientific advisory committees serving the Ministry of Defence or the Porton Down chemical and biological warfare establishment. (Question 47, Order Paper 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The Independent Advisory Group on Gruinard Island was established by the then Chief Scientific Adviser of the Ministry of Defence writing to the President of the Royal Society to invite him to nominate a Chairman for the Independent Advisory Group. The Chairman of the Advisory Group then decided who he wished to have on his Advisory Group and he chose its membership which included a representative from the Scottish Home and Health Department. At the time of their appointment, none of the members of the Independent Advisory Group on Gruinard Island were on or had been on scientific advisory committees to the Ministry of Defence or to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down.
3. The Independent Advisory Group on Gruinard Island carried out its work during the period 1985 to 1989 which resulted in Gruinard Island being returned to its original owners in May 1990. Since becoming members of the Independent Advisory Group on Gruinard Island, one member of the Group has served as a member of the Chemical and Biological Defence Board of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council and subsequently as a member of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him what experiments his Department has carried out on the chemical agent B staphylococcal enterotoxin; when and where these tests and studies were carried out; for what purpose; when the results of these experiments were first exchanged with the United States of America, Canada and Australia; and if this exchange occurred under the arrangements of the Technical 717 Co-operation Programme (Question 48, Order Paper, 8 July 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B is a potent toxin produced by the bacterium staphylococcus aureus. The toxin causes vomiting and diarrhoea and is known to be highly active when delivered by the aerosol route and for these reasons, the toxin is considered to be a potential biological agent which might be used against the United Kingdom Armed Forces.
4. The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment has carried out studies on staphylococcal enterotoxin B to assess the potential hazard to the United Kingdom Armed Forces and to devise effective protective measures such as detection and medical countermeasures against this toxin. The results of this work have been exchanged with the United States, Canada and Australia under the Technical Cooperation Programme since 1979 and also with the United States and Canada under the Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical and Biological Defence since 1980.