§ Mr. Llew SmithTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will publish the framework guidelines implemented by Her Majesty's Government to cover the transfer or retransfer of plutonium from the United Kingdom to foreign states under article 9 of the International Atomic Energy Agency INECIRC/254/REVI part 1, on nuclear export controls.
§ Mr. Douglas HoggI refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs gave to the then hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield on 31 March 1976. The relevant paragraphs state
When considering the export of nuclear equipment, material or technology we shall study each case on its merits. 544W Our first consideration will always be the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty, and whether or not the prospective customer has concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.Our detailed requirements will include the application of IAEA safeguards or comparable safeguards which are verified by the IAEA to exported nuclear equipment and material: an assurance that whatever we export will not be used to manufacture nuclear explosives for any purpose: an assurance that our exports will be adequately protected against the possibility of theft or sabotage: and assurances that if the equipment or material that we export is re-exported then the new purchaser will be required to give the same assurances on safeguards, non-explosive use and physical protection as were given by the original customer."—[Official Report, 31 March 1976; Vol. 908, c. 515.]The safeguards requirement in these guidelines was subsequently expanded by the statement issued by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 24 September 1991:
As part of our policy of seeking further to strengthen the barriers against nuclear proliferation, the British Government has decided with immediate effect to adopt a policy of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. This means that in future Britain will not allow the export of any significant new nuclear supplies or materials to any country, other than the nuclear weapon states, where there are any unsafeguarded nuclear installations.