Nuclear Weapons (Hansard, 13 July 1992)

§ Mr. Rifkind

The report of Professor Oxburgh's working group on the safety of United Kingdom nuclear weapons has been given careful consideration within the Ministry of Defence. On the basis of this consideration, I have now decided that the report should be published—subject only to a small number of excisions required to preserve national security. Publication will take place today: copies of the report are being placed in the Library of the House.

This report provides welcome corroboration of our confidence in the safety of our nuclear weapons, and handling and transport arrangements. The report's recommendations, which we have set about implementing, will help us ensure that the high safety standards confirmed by the review are maintained for the future. The decision to publish the report reflects both the Government's emphasis on avoiding unnecessary secrecy on issues of legitimate public interest, and our belief that the report will provide substantial reassurance to those concerned with nuclear safety issues.

Hon. Members will recall that in June 1990 the US house armed services committee commissioned a panel of experts under Dr. Sidney Drell to examine the safety of US nuclear weapons. The Drell report was published in December 1990. The safety of United Kingdom nuclear weapons has long been ensured both by internal audit and control procedures, and by the scrutiny of the MOD's permanently constituted independent advisory body, the nuclear weapon safety committee (NWSC)—a body which Drell recommended the US to replicate. Nonetheless, following publication of the Drell report, the Government decided to ask MOD's chief scientific adviser, Professor Sir Ronald Oxburgh, to lead a review of the safety of United Kingdom nuclear weapons. Professor Oxburgh was supported by a group of distinguished experts drawn form both inside and outside government. The working group's terms of reference were: To review, in the light of any relevant aspects of the report of the Drell Panel in the United States, the safety of the present and prospective UK nuclear armoury.

The review was therefore allowed to range freely over all aspects of United Kingdom nuclear weapon safety. 520W Like the Drell team, the United Kingdom review addressed the overall organisational aspects of the management of safety, as well as the specifics of the current and future stockpile. Whole weapon systems were considered, including associated handling and transportation arrangements.

Reviewing the safety of the United Kingdom nuclear stockpile, the working group found that procedures have been effective, well implemented and rigorously inspected".

The group was able to identify a number of areas whre improvements could be made in the overall management of safety. However, the group found no indication that every practicable step to optimise weapon safety at the design stage had not been taken, and once in service to make weapon handling and storage as safe as possible".

On transport and weapon handling, the review concluded that the approach to safety and security was "sensible and practical". It noted the mechanical unreliability of the current weapon transport vehicles, which are due for replacement later this year; but in all other respects it described road transport arrangements as "a well-run operation". As to the weapon systems themselves, the group found no evidence to suggest that in-service or planned weapons required any significant redesign. Discussing the Trident system, the working group concluded that Trident safety levels would be comparable to and in some ways higher than those associated with the Polaris system.

Therefore, provided that the full UK safety case and its assessment are completed, the group saw no reason to suggest that it should not be accepted into service.

The published report contains some 20 recommendations, all of which the Government have accepted. These recommendations cover a wide range of procedural and organisational issues, from the proposal that a formal design review of each in-service weapon system should be held every seven years, to the suggestion that a "champion" of nuclear weapon safety should be established as a central auditor of the various nuclear safety functions undertaken within the MOD. The Ministry is already at work on putting the recommendations into effect, including determining the exact fashion in which the proposal for a "champion" can best be implemented. Three further recommendations, which cannot be published for security reasons, have also been accepted.

The Government would like to record their thanks to Professor Oxburgh and the other members of his team for the thorough review they have undertaken. Their report confirms the Government's confidence in the standards adopted in maintaining the safety of our nuclear weapons. We welcome the group's recommendations to ensure these standards are continued in the future.