HC Deb 01 December 1992 vol 215 cc160-4W
Mr. Livingstone

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) pursuant to his answer of 26 June,Official Report, columns 357–58, what is the nature of the collaborative work between Canada and Britain in the field of chemical and biological warfare carried out since 1962.

(2) pursuant to his answr of 26 June, Official Report, column 359, from what source his Department obtained the sample of shellfish toxin for the study in 1982;

(3) pursuant to his answer of 29 June, Official Report, column 411, under which defence agreement the environmental testing of the S10 respirator in Australia was organised; and what other chemical and biological warfare equipment has been tested in Australia through this agreement since 1962;

(4) pursuant to his answer of 16 July, Official Report, column 936, under which specific international agreement or agreements named in the Official Report, 21 May, columns 255–56, technical and scientific information on VX nerve gas and possible binary gases was exchanged; with which countries this information was exchanged; in what form it has been exchanged; and when the first information was exchanged;

(5) pursuant to his answer of 26 June, Official Report, columns 358–59, how often the CB defence sub-group of the technical co-operation programme meets; when and where the last meeting of the sub-group was held; how many times the sub-group has met since 1967; and when each of the four countries joined the sub-group.

Mr. Archie Hamilton

Responsibility for the subject of the questions has been delegated to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment DSA under its chief executive, Dr. Graham Pearson. I have asked him to arrange for replies to be given.

Letters from Dr. Graham Pearson to Mr. Ken Livingstone, 1 December 1992: 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 26 June, Official Report, Columns 357–8, what is the nature of the collaborative work between Canada and Britain in the field of chemical and biological warfare carried out since 1962 (Question 3, Order Paper, 19 November 1992) has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. 2. The United Kingdom abandoned work into offensive chemical and biological weapons in the 1950s as has Canada and collaboration between the two countries since 1962 has been into the provision of effective protective measures for the members of the Armed Forces of the UK and Canada against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. 3. In both countries, the approach to the provision of such protective measures is made up of:

  1. a. assessments of the hazard which involve evaluation of the potential agents that may be used against our Armed Forces and provide information on the sensitivity levels required for detection and protection,
  2. b. techniques for detection, identification, monitoring and warning,
  3. c. physical protection including respirators, individual protective ensembles and suits as well as collective protection,
  4. d. decontamination of persistent agents to reduce the hazard and,
  5. e. medical countermeasures to enhance the ability of the body to survive should exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents occur.
4. Such collaboration is carried out under the various collaborative arrangements detailed in the answer of 21 May 1992, Official Report, Columns 255–256. These involves meetings, visits to the respective Establishments and Headquarters involved and the exchange of information, personnel and equipment. The benefits from such collaboration include the sharing of limited resources and thus better value for money as well as the achievement of more robust conclusions as a result of peer review by our counterparts in Canada.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 26 June, Official Report, column 359 from what source his Department obtained the sample of shellfish toxin for the study in 1982 (Question 4, Order Paper, 19 November 1992) has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

In my previous letter of 10 August 1992 to you I said that

"The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down is to ensure that the UK Armed Forces have effective protection measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work, it is necessary to investigate the effectiveness of protective measures against the range of potential agents. As stated by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr. Archie Hamilton, MP, in his answer of 26 June 1992, Official Report, column 359, a study on shellfish toxins was carried out in 1982 to establish whether such toxins have any effect on medical countermeasures against nerve agents.

This work into the evaluation of the effectiveness of protective measures against the range of potential chemical and biological warfare agents forms part of the United Kingdom chemical and biological defence programme on which information is exchanged with the United States Department of Defence under the international agreements referred to by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the Rt. Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP in his answer of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255–256. In this instance, the study was carried out using material supplied by the US Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Centre at Edgewood, Maryland."

3. The sample of shellfish toxin was therefore provided by the US Army Chemical Research and Development and Engineering Centre at Edgewood, Maryland which has from 1 October 1992 been renamed as the US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency located at the Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Centre.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 29 June, Official Report, Column 411, under which Defence agreement the environmental testing of the S10 respirator in Australia was organised; and what other chemical and biological warfare equipment has been tested in Australia through this agreement since 1962 (Question 5, Order Paper, 19 November 1992) has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The environmental testing of the S10 respirator was carried out at the Joint Tropical Trials Research Establishment (JTTRE) under a Memorandum of Agreement between the UK and Australia relating to a joint programme of research, investigation and material testing at the JTTRE which was an outstation of the Materials Research Laboratory (MRL) of the Australia Department of Defence and is now designated as MRL-Queensland.

3. Some carbon-impregnated overgarmets were tested in the late 1960s and early 1970s in an indoor storage trial at the Joint Tropical Research Unit (JTRU) under an earlier UK/Australian Memorandum of Understanding which set up JTRU in 1962. The JTRU was subsequently incorporated into the JTTRE.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 16 July, Official Report, Column 936, under which specific international agreement or agreements named in the official report, 21 May, Columns 255–6, technical and scientific information and VX nerve gas and possible binary gases was exchanged; with which countries this information was exchanged; in what form it has been exchanged; and when the first information was exchanged (Question 8, Order Paper, 19 November 1992) has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. VX nerve gas was synthesised in the early 1950s and information was first exchanged in the early 1950s between the UK, US and Canada under the Tripartite Cooperation Programme which involved the United Kingdom, United States and Canada and subsequently became the Technical Cooperation Programme referred to in the Official Report, 21 May, Columns 255–6. The form of the information was in oral presentations and papers presented at the cooperation meetings, the exchange of reports and through the exchange of information on a more informal basis between individual scientists and during exchange postings arranged under the auspices of this collaborative arrangement. In the 1970s, the chemical, physical and general physiological properties of VX became unclassified. Patents on VX were also unclassified.

3. Insofar as possible binary gases are concerned, this has been the subject of much less exchange as the binary concept was developed by the United States in the 1970s and 1980s at a time when the UK no longer had an interest in retaliatory capabilities. Such information as has been exchanged of relevance to assessment of the potential hazard from binary gases has been largely under the UK/US/Canada MOU on Chemical and Biological Defence and the Technical Cooperation Programme.

1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him pursuant to his answer of 26 June, Official Report, Columns 358–9, how often the CB Defence sub-group of The Technical Co-operation Programme meets; when and where the last meeting of the sub-group was held; how many times the sub-group has met since 1967; and when each of the four countries joined the sub-group (Question 6, Order Paper, 20 November 1992) has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2. The Sub Group E on chemical and biological defence has met 15 times during the period 1967–1992 and the last meeting was held in the UK at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment in June 1992. The frequency of meetings is about once every 12 to 18 months and is as often as necessary to meet the objectives of the sub-group to promote collaboration in chemical and biological defence research. The UK, US, Canada and Australia were founder members of the sub-group when it was activated in 1967.

Mr. Livingstone

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many memoranda of understanding have been agreed in the field of chemical and biological warfare involving Britain and the United States of America since 1963; what was the subject and nature of each memorandum of understanding; and in which year each memorandum was signed.

Mr. Archie Hamilton

The United Kingdom abandoned all offensive chemical and biological weapons in the late 1950s, since when the United Kingdom has been solely concerned with the provision of effective protective measures for the United Kingdom armed forces. It therefore follows that no memoranda of understanding on chemical and biological warfare have been agreed since 1963.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 21 May at column 255 for details of general defence agreements between the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the field of chemical and biological defence.

Mr. Livingstone

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contingency plans his Department established in association with the United States of America following the United Kingdom's decision to abandon offensive work in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

Mr. Archie Hamilton

I refer the hon. Member to the answers I gave him on 21 May at columns 255–6 and on 26 June at column 358.

Dr. David Clark

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what information he has concerning the use of chemical or biological weapons in the former Yugoslavia; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Archie Hamilton

There is no clear evidence to suggest that any of the republics of former Yugoslavia possesses chemical or biological weapons, although the Yugoslav Army does have quantities of tear gas.