§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will place in the Library a copy of the joint British Rail and Royal Holloway and Bedford New College study into incidents of signals passed at danger.
§ Mr. FreemanI am arranging for copies of the executive summary of the report to be placed in the Library of the House.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what extra training or route familiarisation train drivers receive when the signals and track on routes which they might normally be expected to work, have been significantly repositioned or remodelled.
§ Mr. FreemanFor most significant resignalling schemes details are given to drivers by special signalling notices. In exceptional cases BR provides video training or conductors.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many incidents there were of railway signals being passed at danger since 1979; and how many of those were(a) considered to be sufficiently serious to merit reporting to the railway inspectorate, (b) resulted in a derailment and (c) resulted in a collision involving one or more passenger trains.
§ Mr. FreemanI understand from British Rail that there were 8,171 incidents of signals passed at danger (SPAD) over the years 1979–90. These involved 60 collisions and 124 derailments to trains of all types. There is no statutory requirement for operators to report SPAD incidents unless an accident occurs.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list all the single lead junctions on the railways in Scotland.
§ Mr. FreemanThis information is not readily available.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport what type of signalling was in force at the time of the Newton, Glasgow rail accident on 21 July.
§ Mr. FreemanTrains were signalled under track circuit block regulations and controlled by multiple aspect colour light signals equipped with the automatic warning system. The signalling at Newton is controlled by solid state interlocking.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) if the railway inspectorate made adverse comments on 741W the singling of any specific double junctions proposed under the north Clyde track improvement and resignalling scheme;
(2) if he will list those double junctions which have been or are to be converted to single lead junctions as part of the north Clyde track improvement and resignalling scheme.
§ Mr. FreemanFive junctions were converted as part of this scheme—Bellgrove, Knightswood North, Hyndland North and South, and Westerton. The railway inspectorate discussed the conversions in detail with BR, and in most cases the BR view was accepted but in one case two extra signals were provided and one was moved. Extra controls were added.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport in how many incidents of railway signals being passed at danger in 1990, the signals in question had been repositioned or the track been remodelled less than three months before.
§ Mr FreemanOut of 898 incidents on BR in 1990, nine occurred following signalling and/or track alterations.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many incidents of signals being passed at danger each year since 1989 took place on single lead junctions and involved passenger trains.
§ Mr. FreemanSeven in 1990, and three in 1991.
§ Mr. WilsonTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many double junctions on British Rail were converted to single lead junctions each year since 1989; and on how many occasions the railway inspectorate approved such conversions.
§ Mr. FreemanThree junctions were converted in 1990, and work is in hand to convert four this year. All conversions have been approved by HM railway inspectorate.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport if any parts of the railway routes travelled by the trains involved in the Newton, Glasgow rail accident on 21 July had signalling problems as highlighted in the British Rail signal and telecommunications technical investigation report 91019.
§ Mr. FreemanNo.