HC Deb 14 March 1990 vol 169 cc288-9W
Mr. O'Neill

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what evidence he asked British Aerospace to provide for the official inquiry into the causes of the accident involving Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott on 22 October 1987.

Mr. Alan Clark

Following the accident the director of quality assurance of the Ministry of Defence took possession, under the terms of the Ministry of Defence's contract with British Aerospace, of all documents known to be of relevance and these were presented to the board of inquiry. The board was also able to have access to additional documents which subsequently appeared relevant in the light of its inquiries.

Mr. O'Neill

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what statutory powers he had to obtain evidence for his inquiry into the causes of the accident involving Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott on 22 October 1987;

(2) what was the statutory basis of his inquiry into the causes of the accident involving Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott on 22 October 1987.

Mr. Alan Clark

It is the standard practice of the Ministry of Defence to hold formal boards of inquiry into the causes of all serious accidents involving military aircraft in the United Kingdom but these boards have a basis in statute, and statutory powers to obtain evidence, only when the pilot is a serving member of Her Majesty's armed forces. Since Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott had retired from the Royal Navy and was employed by British Aerospace the board of inquiry did not have a basis in statute or statutory powers to obtain evidence.

Mr. O'Neill

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he intends to seek further evidence from British Aerospace into the causes of the accident involving Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott on 22 October 1987.

Mr. Alan Clark

No. The British Aerospace memorandum which has recently been reported in the press was not available to the board of inquiry that investigated the accident but has now been examined thoroughly by Ministry of Defence experts. It contains two main points, the first of which is that British Aerospace had identified a problem whereby a foul between the aircraft structure and seat linkage caused an automatic eject of the top portion of the personal equipment connector when the seat was raised and lowered. Ministry of Defence experts have found that a modification needed to overcome this problem was carried out on Lt. Cdr. Taylor Scott's aircraft, Harrier GR5 ZD325, some five weeks before the accident occurred. This particular problem could not have caused the accident on 22 October 1987. The second main point in the British Aerospace memorandum is that documentation was inadequate. The board of inquiry independently expressed a number of concerns over British Aerospace's documentation and certification of work and recommended corrective action. This action has since been taken.

In the light of these findings, I am satisfied that there is no need to seek further evidence from British Aerospace.

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