HC Deb 09 June 1988 vol 134 c660W
Mr. Ian Bruce

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department has now completed its investigation of the wartime incident involving HMS Sturdy; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Freeman

On 25 November 1944 HMS Sturdy sighted a 350-ton coaster, flying the Japanese flag, off Laut island to the south-east of Borneo. As the water was too shallow for torpedoes to be launched, Sturdy surfaced and opened fire on the ship. When this did not succeed in sinking the coaster, the submarine came alongside and a party boarded her. They found the ship to be carrying a cargo of oil, a legitimate target. About 50 men had already abandoned ship and the boarding party attempted to persuade a number of women and children still on board to do likewise. They refused to do so, although a boat was available and, in addition, there was a quantity of floating wreckage nearby. The sea was flat calm and land was less than 5 miles away.

The boarding party then placed demolition charges with four minute fuses and returned to the submarine, which drew away from the coaster. At this point Sturdy's commanding officer, Lt. W. St. G. Anderson RNR, who had been able to see about eight people on the ship when she was boarded, and who had concluded that there could be no more than about 15 still aboard, learned that there were in fact 40 to 50. By then it would have been too late to return to the coaster. The charges exploded, setting the ship on fire, and she was left as a total loss.

After he reported this action, Lt. Anderson was relieved of command, and the question whether he should face a court martial was raised at a senior level. In examining the case a number of factors were taken into consideration. Lt. Anderson was a young officer—he was 24—bearing a considerable burden of responsibility who had otherwise served with some distinction. The action in question took place in shallow water where Sturdy could not dive. There was a significant risk of air attack from which the submarine would have had no means of escape, and Lt. Anderson would have been placing his boat and crew in additional danger by remaining on the surface longer than was absolutely necessary. Decisions therefore had to be taken very rapidly. Moreover, had the ship, which was readily indentifiable as an enemy vessel by her flag, been in water deep enough to allow the launching of torpedoes, Lt. Anderson would have been fully entitled under the normal conventions of war to sink her by this means without warning, and without regard to the fate of those on board. In these circumstances, while Lt. Anderson was held to have made a serious error of judgment, a court martial was not considered appropriate. He was subsequently returned to command in another submarine. The deaths of civilians involuntarily caught up in war as a result of a foreign occupation is of course a matter of regret.