§ 40. Sir John FarrTo ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the outcome to date of the inquiry into the helicopter escape from Gartree prison.
§ Mr. HurdTwo highly dangerous category A prisoners, Kendall and Draper, escaped by air from Gartree prison at about 3.15 pm on 10 December 1987. They were taken out in a helicopter whose pilot had been hijacked by an armed passenger. They disembarked a short distance from the prison and made good their escape by road. Police inquiries into the escape are continuing, but both men are still at large. Mr. G. H. Lakes CB, MC, deputy director general of the prison service, has completed his inquiry into the escape and has reported the results to me.
786WThe escape was able to succeed mainly because, while Kendall and Draper were taking their normal exercise in a large open space under the supervision of prison staff, there was no physical barrier to stop the helicopter from landing in that part of the prison and no practical means of preventing it from leaving. The attempt was made easier because it came as a complete surprise to the staff and because those planning it had been able confidently to predict the time and place at which the escapers would be taking their outdoor exercise that day. The helicopter was on the ground for only 23 seconds and then in the air for less than five minutes before it landed again outside the prison. That was too short a period in which successfully to track it by radar in accordance with existing contingency plans, which have been further refined in the light of this incident.
It has been suggested that reduced manning levels resulting from fresh start transitional arrangements may have contributed to the success of the escape. A comparison of staff deployment both before and after 1 November clearly indicates that manning arrangements were unchanged.
Immediately after the escape an immediate and vigorous review of security measures was ordered and all establishments holding category A prisoners were put in a heightened state of alert. A number of practical steps were taken at once within dispersal prisons to frustrate any similar or other possible method of escape. Regime activities and arrangements for outdoor exercise have been changed and now make it significantly more difficult for individual category A prisoners to predict where they will be from day to day. Physical obstacles, for example wires strong enough to foul helicopter rotor blades, have been erected above exercise areas at a number of prisons, and will be installed at others very shortly, in order to impede a helicopter attempting to land in those areas. At suitable prisons observation posts at a level to watch for approaching aircraft will be manned at times when this is necessary. The prison service is reviewing the policy assumptions governing the arrangements for the security of category A prisoners. It has already introduced some changes which will bring the difficult job of preventing escape by highly dangerous prisoners under closer management attention.
The current system of dispersal prisons was designed to contain highly dangerous prisoners securely. It also has to provide satisfactory regimes which allow control to be maintained. It has to operate with sufficient flexibility to enable inmates to be moved from one establishment to another within the system for security, control or other reasons. Steps have been taken to tackle the security weaknesses revealed by this escape and further measures are being considered to give added strength to the dispersal system.