§ Mr. CohenTo ask the Prime Minister what is her estimate of the proportion of the United State's and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads which the United Kingdom's Trident warheads will represent in the event of the successful conclusion of the 50 per cent, reductions currently being negotiated in the strategic arms reduction talks.
§ The Prime MinisterDespite agreement in principle by the United States and Soviet Union to cut strategic forces by 50 per cent, sublimits on different categories of warheads have not yet been agreed. It is therefore not possible to estimate the proportion of United States or Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads which would be represented by the United Kingdom Trident force.
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§ Mr. CohenTo ask the Prime Minister what are the implications for the maintenance of the United Kingdom's nuclear defence capabilities of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
§ The Prime MinisterA comprehensive test ban treaty is a long term goal. For the foreseeable future, the security of this country will depend on deterrence based in part on the possession of nuclear weapons and, in these circumstances, we shall continue to conduct the number of tests necessary to maintain the effectiveness of our nuclear capabilities.
§ Mr. CohenTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to her reply,Official Report, 3 November, column 625, what figure for reductions in the Soviet and United States strategic arsenals she has in mind as being sufficiently substantial to warrant reductions in Britain's nuclear arsenal.
§ The Prime MinisterWe have never specified an exact figure for reductions in the superpowers arsenals. The United Kingdom deterrent in any case represents an extremely small percentage of each superpower's arsenal.
§ Mr. CohenTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to her reply,Official Report, 3 November, column 625, whether she will list the outstanding problems upon which progress has to be made before Her Majesty's Government would be willing to open negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty.
§ The Prime MinisterLack of adequate verification remains a key obstacle to a comprehensive test ban treaty. The cessation of nuclear testing cannot be divorced from the wider arms control process and the attitudes of other states.