§ Mr. Frank Cookasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make available the public safety schemes for Holy Loch, Chatham, Faslane, Rosyth and for landside research and training reactors.
§ Mr. StanleyThe Holy Loch and Faslane areas are covered by the Clyde area public safety scheme. My Department is directly responsible for public safety schemes relating to two landside research and training reactors; these are maintained by the department of nuclear science and technology, royal naval college, Greenwich, and the atomic weapon research establishment, Aldermaston. Safety arrangements for the reactor at Greenwich are covered in its emergency procedures (RNC/NS/SC205). I have arranged for a copy of this document, together with a copy of the Clyde area public safety scheme, to be placed in the Library, where a copy of the Rosyth area public safety scheme is already held. There are detailed safety arrangements for AWRE Aldermaston, but for security reasons these cannot be made public. Since Chatham ceased to be a royal naval base my Department has not conducted any activities there requiring such arrangements; therefore, no public safety scheme is maintained for that area.
§ Mr. Frank Cookasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will provide the total activity and fissile inventory of a source term release from British submarine reactors in which (a) the fuel is new and (b) the fuel has been used for 90 days.
§ Mr. StanleyThe total activity and fission product inventory that might form the source term for release to the environment following an accident to the reactor of a royal naval submarine depends upon the operating history of the reactor, the type and severity of the accident and the performance of the containment system. The maximum design accident, the probability of which is assessed to be no greater than 1 in 10,000 years, may result in a slow release from the primary to the secondary containment of up to 40TBq (1,000 635W Curies) of Iodine 131, together with up to 4 PBq (100,000 Curies) of other volatile and gaseous fission products. Secondary containment procedures ensure that only a small proportion of this release will reach the atmosphere. A more serious accident, the probability of which is estimated to be no greater than 1 in 1,000,000 years, is one in which the primary containment is breached. It may result in a more rapid release of up to 4 PBq (1,000,000 Curies) of Iodine 131, together with 400PBq (10,000,000 Curies) of other volatile and gaseous fission products.
§ Mr. Frank Cookasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there are public safety schemes for the event in which a release of radioactivity occurs from a nuclear warhead on a nuclear-powered submarine; and if he will make a statement.
§ Mr. StanleyMy Department maintains detailed contingency plans to deal with the protection of the public in the extremely unlikely event of an accident resulting in a release of radioactive material from a nuclear warhead on a nuclear-powered submarine. For security reasons, I cannot go into detail.