§ Mr. Chris Smithasked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) when one or more inspectors of Her Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate last observed an exercise of emergency procedures at Sizewell nuclear power station; if he will publish the exercise scenario used on that occasion; if he will describe each accident or fault said to have occurred for exercise purposes; whether any fire or explosion was said to have occurred for exercise purposes; and if he will make a statement;
(2) when one or more inspectors of Her Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate last observed an exercise of emergency procedures at Bradwell nuclear power station; if he will publish the exercise scenario used on that occasion; if he will describe each accident or fault said to have occurred for exercise purposes; whether any fire or explosion was said to have occurred for exercise purposes; and if he will make a statement;
(3) when one or more inspectors of Her Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate last observed an exercise of emergency procedures at Dungeness A nuclear power station; if he will publish the exercise scenario used on that occasion; if he will describe each accident or fault said to have occurred for exercise purposes; whether any fire or explosion was said to have occurred for exercise purposes; and if he will make a statement;
(4) when one or more inspectors of Her Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate last observed an exercise of emergency procedures at Dungeness B nuclear power station; if he will publish the exercise scenario used on that occasion; if he will describe each accident or fault said to have occurred for exercise purposes; whether any fire or explosion was said to have occurred for exercise purposes; and if he will make a statement;
(5) what part Her Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate plays in determining the reference accident for the off-site emergency plan of a nuclear power station; what are the material factors taken into account by the nuclear installations inspectorate in relation to approval of the reference accident in considering approval of an off-site emergency plan; and if he will make a statement;
(6) what is the reference accident for the off-site emergency plan of (a) Sizewell A nuclear power station, 688W (b) Bradwell nuclear power station, (c) Dungeness A nuclear power station and (d) Dungeness B nuclear power station; when each reference accident was last revised or restated; whether in each case fire or explosion is said to occur in the reference accident; and if he will make a statement.
§ Mr. GoodladHer Majesty's nuclear installations inspectorate has observed exercises of emergency procedures as follows:
Site Date of observed exercise Postulated incident Sizewell 27 August 1986 failure of standpipe closure Bradwell 18 June 1986 failure of standpipe Dungeness A 4 June 1986 burst bottom duct Dungeness B 20 May 1986 CO2 by-pass duct safety valve failure It is not the practice to publish detailed scenarios. These scenarios are submitted to the nuclear installations inspectorate for acceptance, and are discussed in general terms with chief officers of emergency services when seeking their participation. The scenarios incorporate a wide variety of accident conditions including, to the extent relevant to the type of reactor, depressurisation, fire and the release of radioactive fission products. A report on each emergency exercise is made to the local liaison committee.
The Health and Safety Executive's published booklet "Emergency plans for civil nuclear installations" describes how the accidents used for emergency planning purposes are determined. Those for all gas-cooled reactors involve loss of coolant; for Magnox reactors they also involve a fuel channel fire. The fault studies defining releases in accidents are subject to periodic revision. They were last revised in May 1986 for Sizewell, in January 1983 for Bradwell and in March 1986 for Dungeness A. Revision is currently in hand for Dungeness B.
§ Mr. Chris Smithasked the Secretary of State for Energy what has been the total financial sum and manpower effort invested to date by the electricity supply industry in engineering, economic and site evaluations and planning for the programme of retrofitting flue-gas desulphurisation equipment to three power stations.
§ Mr. GoodladThis is a matter for the Central Electricity Generating Board and I am arranging for the chairman to write to the hon. Member.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) whether he is satisfied that there has been sufficient co-operation between countries involved in European collaboration on commercial demonstration fast reactor safety;
(2) what progress has been made in the European collaboration on commercial demonstration fast reactor safety; and whether he is satisfied with the progress made.
§ Mr. GoodladProgrammes on fast reactor safety are an integral part of the fast reactor collaboration, and are coordinated by a working group on safety. The United Kingdom is fully involved in this work.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Secretary of State for Energy what the load reactor of the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay has been over the last two years; and what problems have resulted in any reactor shutdowns.
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§ Mr. GoodladI am advised by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority that the load factor of the prototype fast reactor in 1985 was 41 per cent. and in 1986 44 per cent.
The causes of significant unplanned loss of output were: in 1985, replacement of the main generator transformer, removal of development fuel and blockage of the condenser's seawater intake; and in 1986, condenser leak repair and replacement of superheater tubing.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Secretary of State for Energy what delays have been experienced in the Scarabee-N programme of the European collaboration on commercial demonstration fast reactor safety; and what have been the consequences for the United Kingdom's involvement.
§ Mr. GoodladI understand from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority that there has been a lower rate of testing under the Scarabee-N programme than originally envisaged, but that this has not affected the authority's involvement.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) whether, as part of collaboration with the United States of America on fast reactor safety, he is satisfied with progress being made under the PFR-TREAT and safety design principle agreements; and whether he expects such agreements to continue;
(2) what progress has been made in collaboration with the United States on fast reactor safety since January 1986; and whether he is satisfied with progress made.
§ Mr. GoodladContacts continue between the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and the United States Department of Energy on various aspects of fast reactor research, including safety research. Various tests have been successfully completed under the PFR-TREAT programme. An agreement on safety design principles expired in November 1986 and has not been renewed. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority considers that adequate opportunities exist for further exchanges of information in this area.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Secretary of State for Energy what decision has been made as part of the European collaboration on commercial demonstration fast reactor safety on the CABRI 2 programme; and what financial, technical and manpower contribution is planned from each of the collaborating countries, including the United Kingdom.
§ Mr. GoodladI am advised by the UKAEA that decisions on levels of participation in the CABRI 2 programme have not yet been taken.