HC Deb 29 October 1986 vol 103 cc197-200W
Mr. Strang

asked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what is his policy towards the statement by United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Mr. Richard Perle, that fears of a zero option for INF in Europe leading to NATO vulnerability to Soviet conventional superiority are unfounded;

(2) what is his policy towards the statement by United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Mr. Richard Perle, that a zero option for INF in Europe will not impair flexible response, nor the United States guarantee to defend Europe.

Mr. Stanley

I indicated the Government's view of the INF zero option in my reply to the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) on 23 October, at column 1294. An INF agreement on the basis I indicated would not impair NATO's security or invalidate either the strategy of flexible response or the United States' commitment to the defence of the NATO European countries.

Mr. Strang

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is his policy towards the statement by United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Mr. Richard Perle, that Soviet short-range INF missiles are not at significantly higher levels than in 1976.

Mr. Stanley

Since the mid-1970s the Soviet Union has been modernising its shorter-range intermediate and short range nuclear missile forces. There has been some net increase in numbers over this period, and the newly deployed systems such as the SS21 and the SS23 are more capable than their predecessors. In addition the older system Scaleboard (range 900 km) is now deployed forward into East Germany and Czechoslavia which was not the case 10 years ago. These are significant developments.

Mr. Strang

asked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what assessment he has made of the likely impact of an agreement to withdraw all INF missiles from Europe on the implementation of the Montebello decision to reduce and redistribute the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's nuclear stockpile;

(2) what assessment has been made of the implications of an agreement to withdraw all INF missiles from Europe for the emphasis on nuclear roles for dual-capable INF aircraft such as the F111;

(3) what assessment has been made of the likely impact of an agreement to withdraw all cruise, Pershing 2 and SS20 missiles from Europe on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation plans to deploy a new generation of chemical and short-range INF weapons.

Mr. Stanley

It is too early to be able to assess what could be the precise implications of a zero option long-range INF agreement for NATO's future tactical nuclear plans and weapons procurement programmes. A significant factor would be the terms and nature of the collateral constraints applying to shorter-range systems which have still to be determined.

Mr. Cartwright

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy towards deployment by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of the W79 nuclear warhead.

Mr. Stanley

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Caborn) on 20 January, at columns 90.91, and to the latest communique of the NATO nuclear planning group, a copy of which has been placed in the Library. No decisions have been taken regarding the modernisation of the battlefield nuclear weapons of British forces.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett

asked the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 30 June, column 438, if he will list the reasons given by those other states participating at the Geneva conference on disarmament for their rejection of Her Majesty's Government's proposal for an ad hoc committee to discuss seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban.

Mr. Renton

I have been asked to reply.

The difference between the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee proposed by the United Kingdom together with a number of Western countries and those proposed by others is that the Western mandate does not envisage the immediate resumption of negotiations, while those other mandates do.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is his policy towards regular meetings with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Ministers for the purpose of discussing means of advancing the resolution of the technical difficulties associated with verifying a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban.

Mr. Renton

I have been asked to reply.

While nuclear testing issues are discussed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, for example at the recent meeting of the nuclear planning group, NATO is not the appropriate forum to discuss the resolution of the technical difficulties associated with verifying a comprehensive nuclear test ban. As we have made clear to the House on numerous occasions, we hope to see further work on such issues at the conference on disarmament in Geneva.