§ Mr. Denzil Daviesasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether action has been taken to improve the electronic defence and close-in weapons systems which protect Royal Navy ships from attack in the light of the attack on HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982.
§ Mr. StanleyYes. I refer the right hon. Gentleman to "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons", Cmnd. 8758 —paragraphs 229, 230, 308 and 309—and the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1985, Cmnd. 9430–1 —paragraph 438.
§ Mr. Denzil Daviesasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether, in the light of the events of 4 May 1982., and the sinking of HMS Sheffield, his Department has updated the procedures which govern communications activity in war zones.
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§ Mr. StanleyA number of improvements have been, and are being, made in equipment and operating practices.
§ Mr. Denzil Daviesasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether action has been taken to improve the effectiveness of the Royal Navy's on board radar systems, in view of the fact that the aircraft which sank HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982, had not been detected by the ship's radar.
§ Mr. StanleyThe difficulties encountered during the Falklands conflict in dealing with the threat of air attack on ships are being remedied by improvements to ship-borne surveillance, air warning, and tracker radar systems. Since one of the task force's greatest handicaps was the lack of airborne early warning, each of the operational carriers now carries a flight of Sea King AEW helicopters.
§ Mr. Denzil Daviesasked the Secretary of State for defence what, during the Falklands conflict, was the nature of the communication between HMS Sheffield and Fleet HQ Northwood, at the time of the attack on 4 May 1982; and why it was necessary to undertake such communication when the ship's duties placed it under direct threat.
§ Mr. StanleyIt is often necessary for ships of a force to communicate with each other to ensure co-ordination of the various facets of an operation. The particular communication concerned was an urgent tactical signal to another ship in the task group which was outside the range of reliable line of sight communications. The threat was not judged to be such as to preclude a communication of this sort.
§ Mr. Denzil Daviesasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the events leading up to, and circumstances of, the attack upon HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982.
§ Mr. StanleyThe attack on HMS Sheffield took place at about 1100 hours — 1400 hours GMT—on 4 May 1982. At the time of the attack she was the south-westerly of three type 42 destroyers forming an air defence screen some 18 miles west of the main body of the task force.
Signs of the attack were first detected by HMS Glasgow —another of the three pickets—but, since this was the first experience of an Argentine airborne Exocet attack the aircraft's tactics, in particular flying in very low under radar cover thus giving only fleeting opportunities for detection, were not fully appreciated by all the ships concerned. There had also been spurious radar contacts on previous days. As a result, there was some doubt as to the validity of the contacts.
HMS Sheffield herself did not pick up the same warning signals on her electronic support measures (ESM) equipment because of interference from the SCOT —satellite communications transmitter — then being operated, or initially on her surveillance radar. By the time she appreciated the threat it was too late to respond. In the absence of airborne early warning, only a very few minutes were available between the first detection by HMS Glasgow and missile impact.