§ Mr. Andrew F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if Her Majesty's Government plan to submit proposals under article 2, section 1, of the partial test ban treaty to the depository Governments for ciruclation lo all the treaty's signatories for a reduction in the 150 kiloton limit governing nuclear weapon tests.
§ Mr. RentonNo. The 150 kiloton limit is the subject of the 1974 threshold test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. This treaty is so far unratified. We regret that the Soviet Union has not responded to recent proposals by the United States on verifying the yield of nuclear tests with a view to ratifying this treaty.
§ Mr. Andrew F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will publish in full the text of the scientific advice so far made available to the Government about technical inadequacies in the United Kingdom's ability to detect, identify and quantify nuclear weapon tests.
§ Mr. RentonThe United Kingdom's paper to the conference on disarmament in July 1985 (CD 610), a copy of which is available in the Library of the House, set out very fully the scientific grounds on which we continue to believe that verification difficulties at present stand in the way of negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty.
§ Mr. Andrew F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will list the parameters governing his assessment of technical considerations when determining whether a proposed method of independently verifying nuclear weapons tests is adequate.
§ Mr. RentonAs has been made clear to the House on a number of occasions, we are looking for adequate verification that is sufficiently reliable to give confidence to all sides. In particular, I refer the hon. Member to the replies given in two Adjournment debates; the first by my right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), the then Minister of State, on 7 June 1985 and my own on 26 March 1986. In both those speeches there are details 413W of the considerations which we would need to take into account in assessing the adequacy of any verification regime.