HC Deb 24 July 1986 vol 102 cc373-4W
Mr. Hanley

asked the Secretary of State for the Environment what progress has been made by the inquiry set up to investigate the flooding at the Victoria and Albert museum on 21–22 March; and if he will make a statement.

Sir George Young

Early in the morning of 22 March 1986 it was discovered that a temporary water main at the Victoria and Albert museum had failed, causing serious flooding of the basement area and damage to the artifacts stored there. On 25 March, at cols. 425–26, I announced that, in consultation with my right hon. Friend the Minister of the Arts, I had ordered a full independent investigation into the accident. The inquiry, led by Mr. John Bartlett, CBE, MA, FENG, FICE, has now produced its report.

The inquiry concludes that the flooding is attributable to the failure of a joint on a temporary mains pipe as the joint came under increasing water pressure during the night. The temporary main was installed by a contractor employed by the Property Services Agency while he carried out his main task of replacing the existing services (drainage, water, gas, electricity) in the east access road which runs along the eastern side of the museum. A repair clamp was used to join an existing water pipe protruding from the museum wall to a new and different size pipe, which was part of a temporary diversion of the museum's mains pipe. The clamp is designed to repair damaged pipes and not to join separate pipes. On this occasion, however, it was used to connect two pipes of significantly different outside diameters, one of which fell outside the manufacturer's recommended range for the clamp used. The inquiry further considers that the joint and adjacent temporary pipework were inadequately propped when they were installed on 21 March, and that the overnight build up of pressure in the main was more than the repair clamp and the limited strutting were capable of resisting.

The inquiry found no evidence of flooding inside the V and A at 4.50 am on 22 March, when a warder patrolled the relevant section of the basement. It concludes that the joint failed in the early hours and that water started to enter the museum at about 5 am. Because of a combination of circumstances, water entered the basement for up to one and half hours before the flooding was discovered by warders on patrol at 6.25 am.

Once the alarm was raised, the museum staff acted with commendable speed to turn off the water supply and, with the assistance of the contractor, to start immediate pumping operations. Staff from the museum, the PSA, the fire brigade and the contractor dealt with the emergency speedily and efficiently over the weekend of 22–23 March. The cost of the damage was approximately £¼ million.

The contractor reassembled the temporary pipework on 22 March and instituted 24-hour surveillance of his site. Following an inspection of the reassembled temporary pipework by the contractor and the PSA, additional strutting was installed in a number of locations. The PSA has instructed the contractor that the relevant section of pipework should be dismantled in one piece when it is no longer required on site and sent for testing. The inquiry will report again should the results of these tests bring any new evidence to light.

The design and installation of the temporary mains were entirely the responsibility of the contractor, as for any other temporary work. The inquiry concludes that the PSA staff supervising the contract acted properly in the context of existing rules and guidance, but believes that there is a need to distinguish between such important and vulnerable temporary works and others. It therefore recommends that the agency should review the status of temporary work within a contract and consider creating a new category of temporary works where a client is relying on a vital service for a significant time and where its failure would have serious consequences for people other than the contractor. Such work should be accorded greater scrutiny, supervision and testing than is usual for temporary works.

Other recommendations made by the inquiry are that: —the PSA and its clients should formally consider the risks associated with building projects during the design stages; —the current review of the V and A's security systems should consider the need for alarms to indicate the presence of water and for bulkheads to prevent the flow of water; — the V and A should review its night patrolling arrangements; — the V and A should review its arrangements for calling in help in emergencies; —floor plans should be readily available for use by the fire brigade and other emergency services; — the national museum and galleries should consider establishing "salvage teams" for major accidents and formalising the arrangements for helping to deal with the consequences.

I am grateful to Mr. Bartlett and the other members of the inquiry team for their detailed and constructive report. I am also grateful to all those who co-operated with the inquiry team in their works and, in particular, to the director, trustees and staff of the V and A museum for the help they gave to the inquiry.

I have placed copies of the report in the Libraries of both Houses and I shall now be considering with my right hon. Friend the Minister for Arts and other interested parties how the report's recommendations should be followed through.