§ Mr. McNamaraasked the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the extent to which the United Kingdom and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies possess the ability to verify independently and adequately any future reduction by the Warsaw pact of (i) its European-based SS-20 missiles, (ii) short-range nuclear missiles and (iii) medium-range nuclear missiles.
§ Mr. StanleyThe INF negotiations on reductions of United States and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles are between the United States and Soviet Union, who would therefore be responsible for monitoring compliance with provisions of any INF agreement. Verification will be a key issue since almost all the Soviet systems in question are highly mobile and their launchers are assumed to have a reload capability. Detailed verification provisions have already been tabled by the United States at Geneva.
§ Mr. McNamaraasked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what is Her Majesty's Government's policy with regard to the October 1983 resolution 147 on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe made by the special committee on nuclear weapons in Europe;
(2) what is Her Majesty's Government's policy with regard to the November 1982 resolution 134 made by the special committee on nuclear weapons in Europe.
§ Mr. RentonI have been asked to reply.
Our policy on INF arms control is clear. We welcomed the progress made at Reykjavik which was consistent with long-standing Alliance insistence on an agreement on a global basis. A zero-zero solution in Europe must include tight limits on SS20s in Soviet Asia, and on Soviet shorter range INF. As in other areas of arms control, effective verification will be essential.