§ Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations have been made to the Government of Luxembourg about the subsequent re-export of depleted uranium supplied by British Nuclear Fuels Limited to International Metals SA in 1984 and the implication of the manner in which this was carried out for the operation of the non-proliferation treaty; and if he will make a statement.
§ Mr. LuceI refer the hon. Member to the answers I gave to the hon. Member for Merionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Thomas) on 25 July. The Luxembourg Government have been made aware of our views on this matter.
§ Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether, at the non-proliferation treaty meeting in August, he will propose free trade in nuclear materials between any country that is a member of the non-proliferation treaty.
§ Mr. LuceNo. Our export policy with regard to nuclear materials remains as set out by the then Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) on 31 March 1976. Of course, membership by the recipient country of the non-proliferation treaty is a positive factor in our consideration of individual cases.
§ Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what information he has as to breaches of the non-proliferation treaty recorded by the monitoring organisations regarding the supply of nuclear material to other states without the required notification in each of the last five years and as to the states involved and the materials involved in each case.
§ Mr. LuceThe Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has informed the agency board of governors that in 1984, as in previous years, the secretariat, in carrying out the safeguards obligations of the agency, did not detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material — or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards under certain agreements—for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown. Details of the agency safeguards activities within particular states remain confidential to the agency secretariat and the state concerned.