Criminal Proceedings (Northern Ireland) (Hansard, 24 October 1983)

§ The Attorney-General

There is a number of misconceptions which appear to be current, and which should be corrected, about the use of evidence of accomplices in criminal trials in Northern Ireland and about immunity from prosecution which may be granted to such accomplices.

There is nothing new about the use of the evidence of accomplices in criminal trials. The law in England and Wales and Northern Ireland is the same. In both jurisdictions, where an accomplice gives evidence for the prosecution it is the duty of the judge to warn the jury that, although it may convict on his evidence, it is dangerous to do so unless is it corroborated. This is an old rule, well-recognised and rigidly applied, and it now has the force of a rule of law. A precisely similar rule applies where a judge is trying a case without a jury. The judge must warn himself that, although he may convict on the evidence of an accomplice, it is dangerous to do so unless it is corroborated. Subject to these rules, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is admissible in law and the tribunal of fact has the right to convict upon it.

It is in the nature of serious organised crime, and particularly terrorist crime, that persons who are not themselves implicated in it but who could give evidence are liable to be intimidated so that they will not come forward as witnesses. In Northern Ireland terrorist crime is a serious problem and the full extent of the involvement of many of the terrorists is perhaps known only to those engaged with them in their criminal activities.

When one of those who has been involved in terrorism and is thus an accomplice indicates his willingness to give evidence about crimes of which he knows and in which he may have been a participant, it is the duty of the chief constable to put the full facts before the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is then the duty of the director to consider all the evidence and information before him with a view to the initiation of criminal proceedings.

The director must consider each case on its own facts and in the light of the interest of the public that criminals, and particularly dangerous criminals, should be brought to justice. Where the evidence of an accomplice appears to be credible and cogent and relates to serious terrorist crime, there is an overriding public interest in having charges brought before the court. This is especially so when the evidence which such an accomplice can give relates to murder, robbery, explosions and other similar atrocious crimes.

In such circumstances it is the clear duty of the director to put the cases before the court for adjudication. It will then be for the court to determine whether the evidence of the accomplice is so convincing as to its content and so reliable in itself that it reaches the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Where an accomplice is himself to be prosecuted, the practice in Northern Ireland is that he is put forward for trial and sentenced before he gives evidence. This is so that there may be no suggestion that, in giving his evidence, he is motivated by the hope of getting a shorter sentence than he otherwise would. There are, however, cases in which the accomplice will not give evidence unless he himself is freed from the possibility of prosecution.

The Director of Public Prosecutions must then decide whether it is right to grant him immunity from prosecution. Where the evidence which the accomplice can give is credible and cogent and involves perhaps a large number of alleged terrorists who cannot otherwise be charged or brought before the court, the prospect of saving lives, whether the lives of ordinary members of the public or members of the security forces, and the prevention of further violent crime must weigh heavily with the director in making that decision.

The general criteria which are observed in Northern Ireland in considering the possible granting of immunity to an accomplice are the same as those that are applied in England and Wales. I described them (in a different context) in the written answer which I gave in this House on 9 November 1981 in reply to the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) as including:

(i) whether in the interests of justice it is of more value to have a suspected person as a witness for the Crown than as a possible defendant;
(ii) whether in the interests of public safety and security the obtaining of information about the extent and nature of criminal activities is of greater importance than the possible conviction of an individual;
(iii) whether it is very unlikely that any information could be obtained without an offer of immunity and whether it is also very unlikely that any prosecution could be launched against the person to whom the immunity is offered.

In every instance the director's decision to grant any immunity from prosecution to an accomplice is of a limited nature. It relates only to the offences which he has disclosed and of which he has given a truthful account. He is thus liable to be prosecuted in respect of any offence committed by him which subsequently comes to light and 5W which he did not originally disclose and any offence in respect of which it subsequently emerges that he gave a false or misleading account. If, therefore, in the course of further police interview of the accomplice it appears that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has committed an offence which he has not already admitted or that he has given a false or misleading account of an offence which he has admitted, the director's instructions to the police are that the accomplice must be cautioned in accordance with the judges' rules before he is further questioned and evidence of any further offence or any false or misleading account given by the accomplice must be referred immediately to the director for his consideration.

The decision whether to grant immunity to any individual is taken by the director personally. No immunity can be granted by the police. Before any application to grant immunity can be made to the director, the chief constable must recommend that the accomplice should be called as a Crown witness. The director has in a number of instances declined to grant immunity and there have been instances where, although immunity has been granted, the director has subsequently decided that the evidence was not sufficiently reliable to permit him to proceed. When a person is given an immunity from prosecution the director has done all that is within his power to remove from the mind of that person any possible fear, hope or expectation which might tempt him to give untrue evidence in court.

When a prosecution witness is given immunity from prosecution, this fact is disclosed to the defence and to the court and there is no bargain or arrangement between the witness and the prosecution. The director has given instructions that, in every case, the chief constable will furnish him with a statement of all financial arrangements made for the support of the witness and his family and any arrangement for future financial payment to the witness or for his benefit and that these particulars will be disclosed to the defence and will be available to the court of trial.

In all these matters—and I refer now to the decision to institute proceedings in reliance on the evidence of an accomplice as well as the decision to grant immunity to an accomplice—the primary responsibility is vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland. The decision in each case is wholly within his discretion which he exercises in accordance with his professional judgment and in full consciousness of his responsibility for the independent and impartial discharge of the duties of his office. He acts, however, under my superintendence and is subject to my direction. He keeps me fully informed of the general policies which he applies in this field. We consult each other regularly on these matters, both as regards those general policies and as regards specific difficult cases.

I am entirely satisfied both as to the correctness of the principles in accordance with which the director has taken his decisions and with the information which I have received from the director as to the decisions taken in individual cases.