§ Mr. Arthur Lewisasked the Secretary of State for Transport whether there are 775W barrier wagons separating the locomotive and the guard's brake van from the flasks, as required by the regulations, pink pages E.1/13–19, and sun canopies are travelling with flasks, pink pages D.1/19, when nuclear-spent fuel is travelling through East London.
§ Mr. Kenneth ClarkeBritish Railways Board regulations require that, on all journeys by rail, irradiated nucler fuel flasks must be separated from a locomotive or guard's brake van. Various types of wagon are employed to carry flasks. I am assured that where the particular wagon is of a length which does not provide the necessary separation, barrier wagons are used. I have also been assured that the requirements in section D1/19 of the "pink pages" in respect of sun canopies are complied with.
§ Mr. Arthur Lewisasked the Minister of Transport (1) to what extent the transport of nuclear waste through Stratford, East London, is protected against accident, sabotage and terrorist activities; to what extent this waste contains plutonium and uranium; how many radioactive elements are in this waste; and whether it contains ruthenium 106;
(2) whether he will call for a report from the Health and Safety Commission on the number of lethal lung cancers that would occur in a densely populated area, such as that surrounding Stratford railway station, if a flask containing 6 grams of ruthenium 106 were to explode.
§ Mr. Norman LamontA typical flask might hold up to 200 irradiated fuel elements containing a mixture of up to 2 tonnes uranium, and 4 kg. of plutonium—which are recovered for further use by reprocessing—together with highly radio active substances representing about 1 per cent. of the total mass. The highly radio active substances would include up to 10 grams of ruthenium 106.
The massive structure of the steel flasks used to carry these fuel elements by rail makes them highly resistant to sabotage. It is not possible for the irradiated fuel to explode. Any attempt to destroy a flask and its contents by blowing it up would require the use of several tons of explosive. The use of explosive in such quantities would itself represent a major threat to the safety of those in the surrounding 776W area. A terrorist with such resources could use them to produce greater damage to life and property by other sorts of attack.
Use of a smaller amount of explosive might create a hole in a flask. In theory a similar result might be achieved with a sophisticated anti-tank weapon, but such an attack is less likely to be effective. Making a hole might lead to some radiation hazard in the immediate vicinity of the flask from radiation emerging from the hole, and from the possible leakage of up to 220 gallons of slightly contaminated water. It might also lead, through oxidation of the fuel elements, to a subsequent slow release over a period of hours of a small proportion of the flask's radioactive contents. Appropriate measure would be taken to counter this. In this connection, emergency plans exist for dealing with incidents involving fuel in transit, including those in which there might be a release of radioactivity. Action under them would include, where necessary and as a precautionary measure, temporary evacuation of the immediate area around the site of an incident. In those circumstances it is judged that there would be a low radiation exposure and little risk to the population of that area.
In view of the public interest, however, I am having a special study made of a situation which assumes that a flask has been damaged in this way, and will write to the hon. Member in due course.