Windscale Inquiry (Hansard, 8 May 1978)

§ Mr. Shore

The recommendations fall into three categories; those addressed to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL); those directed to the Government for modifications to existing control arrangements for environmental protection and safety, and those which call for organisational changes. The Government accept immediately all the 12 recommendations in the first two categories. We also accept entirely the underlying purpose of the remaining three recommendations in the last category.

I set out below the Government's detailed response to each of the recommendations.

Recommendations for BNFL. In the first category, BNFL has agreed to design the oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) so that a 336W krypton removal plant can be incorporated when and if reasonably practicable, and to pursue vigorously the requisite research and development (No 2). A condition to this end will be attached to the discharge authorisation under the Radioactive Substances Act 1960. It also accepts that facilities should be made available for whole-body monitoring of local people. It already has two on-site facilities for monitoring employees, and plan to instal a third. BNFL expects to be able to make a full monitoring service available to the general public well before THORP comes into operation (No 3). The provision of such a facility will, if necessary, be made a condition of the discharge authorisation (No 4).

As the inspector emphasised, BNFL is very safety conscious. It accepts the need for strict observance and frequent rehearsal of safety precautions and operating procedures, and will continue to review and improve them. All the safety arrangements are subject to approval and surveillance by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (No. 11). Regular exercises are held to give practice to all those responsible for implementing the Windscale emergency plan and BNFL will assist all the authorities concerned in ensuring that the requirements for action are fully understood (No. 13). The structure and functions of the local liaison committee will be reviewed as recommended (No. 14).

Environmental protection and safety. The second category recommends modifications to the existing control arrangements for environmental protection and safety. The authorising Departments already set quantative limits for liquid wastes for each significant radionuclide, as recommended in No. 7. In their response to the Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Protection, the Government announced that clear quantitative standards would be applied at atmospheric discharges as well (Cmnd 6820) Annex A, Paragraph 3). Operators are required to show in the first place that a discharge cannot reasonably be avoided, and it is our policy that unavoidable discharges must be restricted so that radiation doses to the public are kept as far below internationally recommended limits as is reasonably practicable. (No. 7).

My Department has begun an examination of the provisions of the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 relating to inquiries into proposed discharge authorisations (No. 8).

The adequacy of existing monitoring arrangements for all discharges, not only those to the atmosphere, is being reviewed by an expert group led by the Department of the Environment (No. 9). The Government have undertaken (Cmnd 6820, paragraph 27) to publish annual surveys of discharges and the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) will continue to publish periodic reports on radiation exposure. The delay in publishing Fisheries Radiobiological Laboratory reports has been caused by the need to give priority to the deployment of the limited number of qualified staff to the control of monitoring of discharges. In order to overcome delays steps will be taken which will involve further recruitment (No. 10).

337W

The working methods of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate are under review, as recommended in the Sixth Report of the Royal Commission. The NII already has substantial scientific expertise on its staff and through consultants. The Health and Safety Executive will, however, make sure in the course of the review that they are adequately equipped to assess the design of THORP (No. 12).

The Government can give an assurance that for the foreseeable future the majority of fuel flasks will continue to be delivered to Windscale by rail (No. 15). Strict safety regulations for flasks and vehicles governing design, construction, labelling and the protection of operators and the public are laid down by the Secretary of State for Transport.

Organisational changes. The third category comprises recommendations for more fundamental organisational changes. The Government accept the principle that security measures at Windscale should be checked by an independent person not involved in their design or operation, and will examine how best to put the recommendation into effect (No. 1). There are, however, wider security implications which need further consideration before detailed arrangements can be worked out.

The inspector recommended a single inspectorate to be responsible for determining and controlling all radioactive discharges (No. 5). Pending the Government's decision on the unified pollution inspectorate recommended for England and Wales in the Fifth Report of the Royal Commission, the Radiochemical Inspectorate of my Department will, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, be responsible to Ministers for the tasks described by the inspector, namely:

(a) taking an overall view of the level of discharges to be authorised to all sectors of the environment; and
(b) ensuring that each authorisation take account of NRPB's advice on the total radiation dose from all sources of discharge.

In Scotland, Her Maiesty's Industrial Pollution Inspectorate will discharge similar responsibilities.

The Government agree that it is vital that the public should have complete confidence in the standards of radiological protection on which discharge authorisations are based. As a first step to cover the inspector's recommendation to include an independent person or body with environmental interests in the system for advising them on the fixing of these standards, the review of the constitution of the National Radiological Protection Board initiated by the Secretary of State for Social Services in pursuance of a recommendation in the Sixth Report of the Royal Commission has been extended to cover this recommendation as well (No. 5).

ANNEX

Details of recommendations contained in Chapter 17.8 of the Inspector's Report on the Windscale Inquiry.

"1. Consideration should be given to charging some independent person or body with the task of (a) vetting security precautions both 338W at Windscale and during transit of plutonium from Windscale and (b) reviewing the adequacy of such precautions from time to time.

2. BNFL should devote effort to the development of plant for the safe removal and retention of krypton 85 and, if development proves successful, should incorporate it in the proposed plant.

3. More permanent arrangements for whole body monitoring of local people should be instituted. Subject to certain general principles, the details should be agreed by those directly concerned. They would not be appropriate to planning conditions.

4. The authorising departments should however consider whether provision of such facilities should be made a condition of authorisations to discharge.

5. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of some wholly independent person or body with environmental interests in the system of advising central government on the fixing of radiological protection standards. That person or body should probably be changed from time to time.

6. A single Inspectorate, as recommended by the Royal Commission, should be responsible for determining and controlling all radio active discharges.

7. There should be specific discharge limits for each significant radionuclide. The onus should be placed clearly on the operator to show that a discharge cannot practicably be avoided before the limits are fixed.

8. The provisions of the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 relating to the powers to hold inquiries into proposed authorisations to discharge should be re-examined.

9. The relevant authorities should carry out more monitoring of atmospheric discharges.

10. FRL should publish their annual reports more rapidly in future. There should, as recommended by the Royal Commission, be one comprehensive annual survey published of all discharges and at intervals, reports by NRPB on radiation exposure.

11. BNFL should do more, in future, to ensure that safety precautions and operating procedures at Windscale are sufficient for all eventualities, are strictly observed and are continually rehearsed.

12. The current review of NII should examine whether they are sufficiently equipped with scientific expertise to check the designs for the proposed plant.

13. It is essential that those who would be required to take action under the Windscale emergency plan are fully aware of the responsibilities the plan places on them.

14. The local liaison committee should be reorganised and its functions redefined.

15. Fuel flasks should, as far as possible, continue to be delivered to Windscale by rail, but this is not a matter appropriate to planning conditions."