§ Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now make a statement on the results of his inquiries into the conduct of Colonel Mitchell of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in Aden.
§ Mr. HealeyYes. I must first remind the House of the situation in Aden in June/July, 1967. The garrison of some 15,000 men was responsible for maintaining law and order, evacuating our stores and assisting the High Commissioner in carrying out Her Majesty's Government's aim of leaving a stable administration after our withdrawal. There were also over 2,000 dependants still in Aden and British expatriates living throughout the Federation, many of whom could depend only on the Federal Army and Police for personal protection. Against the background of the tragic events of 20th June which led to our original withdrawal from Crater—namely the mutiny of elements of the South Arabian Police and the crisis of confidence between the South Arabian Armed Forces, the Federal Government and perforce the British authorities—the situation was such that a wrong or misunderstood move at even a comparatively low level could have led to a complete breakdown, a general mutiny of the South Arabian Forces, the massacre of British citizens up-country and a fighting withdrawal with many British and Arab casualties, with the possibility of repercussions elsewhere in the Middle East damaging to British interests. Thus for unassailable reasons the senior British civilian and military authorities were agreed on following the usual internal security doctrine of using the minimum force required to deal with a particular situation. I should like to emphasise that there was no question of political direction in London holding back the military authorities in Aden. The High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief were in complete agreement throughout and the timing, method and every other aspect of the reoccupation of Crater were planned in Aden.
139W2. It is against this background that the questions which my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) asked about Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell on 15th July must be considered. He asked whether it was true that Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell disobeyed administrative and operational orders in Aden; if so, what was the reaction of the Commander-in-Chief; and whether an order that grenades should be kept at Regimental Headquarters was not carried out in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
3. As regards the first question, there is no evidence that Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell disobeyed administrative and operational orders, with the possible exception of the episode of the grenades to which my hon. Friend referred. The facts about this episode are as follows. Grenades are weapons which can have devastating effects in crowded streets and are just as liable to kill innocent women and children and other bystanders as the person at whom they are thrown. Moreover, terrorists had tried to blame British troops for grenade incidents in Aden and, therefore, orders were given that all grenades were to be held in Battalion Headquarters. During a visit to an observat on post occupied by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the Brigade Commander found three grenades; they were not primed and the primers were kept in a separate box. The Brigade Commander ordered their removal to Battalion Headquarters. I am informed that the Brigade Commander says that his orders on this were perfectly clear and that Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell says that he was unaware of such an order.
4. At about the same time the Brigade Commander thought it necessary to emphasise to Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell that the maintenance of law and order with minimum force leading to an orderly withdrawal from Aden with minimum casualties was the policy that had to be followed. I understand that Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell has stated that he was not reprimanded. A reprimand is a specific form of punishment laid down by the Army Act and, in the case of a Lieut.-Colonel, can be awarded only by a court-martial. In this formal sense what Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell said is correct.
5. My hon. Friend asked if the Commander-in-Chief raised these matters with me. I would not normally expect 140W a Commander-in-Chief to make a report direct to a Minister about the conduct of an officer of Lieut.-Colonel's rank, and no report was made on this occasion.
6. My hon. Friend also alleged that the battalion suffered from a lack of discipline. I cannot accept this charge. I I am assured that although they were tough and spirited, they were also extremely well led and well disciplined.
7. My hon. Friend's questions on Crater were largely answered by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration during the debate. Before this operation the Argylls carried out a number of reconnaissances into Crater. The Brigade Commander was present on one occasion when such a reconnaissance party was about to leave. As my right hon. Friend stated, intelligence gathered by the Argylls was available to those planning the reoccupation. The planned re-entry into Crater was postponed for several days whilst the Brigade Commander carried out discussions with officers of the South Arabian Armed Police in Crater who were in touch with local feeling there. These discussions were largely instrumental in leading to the almost bloodless reoccupation of the area.