HC Deb 14 May 1956 vol 552 cc148-50W
Mr. McKibbin

asked the Secretary of State for Air if he is now in a position to make a statement on the findings of the Royal Air Force court of inquiry convened to investigate the accident on 27th March, when a Royal Air Force Vampire aircraft nearly collided with an Elizabethan aircraft of British European Airways Corporation.

Mr. Birch

The court of inquiry established that a near-collision occurred between a British European Airways Elizabethan G-ALZR and a Royal Air Force Vampire training aircraft at about 1006 hours on 27th March some twelve miles south of Daventry, within Airway Amber 1 which runs from the London Control Zone to the Manchester Control Zone. The Elizabethan was flying on an instrument flight plan and was descending in accordance with an air traffic control clearance. At the time of the incident, this aircraft was passing through 9,500 feet still descending.

The visibility was agreed as being at least equal to 3 n. m. Both aircraft were flying in visual flight rules weather conditions, and when flying in such weather conditions, it is the responsibility of the person in command of an aircraft to avoid collision with other aircraft notwithstanding that the flight is being conducted on an air traffic clearance. There is no evidence that the sun or any other external cause adversely affected the visibility, or that the crew of either aircraft was affected by fatigue or strain.

The Elizabethan was flying towards London on an approximately southeasterly course. The Vampire crossed the path of the Elizabethan at right angles from north-east to south-west, having just completed a left-hand turn from a point some miles ahead of the Elizabethan, and on its port bow.

When the aircraft were three nautical miles apart, the closing speed was such that 26 seconds would have elapsed before the courses of the aircraft intersected. Each pilot saw the other aircraft only when a collision seemed inevitable and sought to avoid it; the Vampire pilot by climbing and the Elizabethan by diving. There is no evidence that the aircraft touched one another but injury was caused to some of those travelling in the Elizabethan because of the sudden change of altitude.

Under the Rules of the Air, the paths of approach of the two aircraft were such that the Elizabethan had the right of way. This meant that the pilot of the Vampire had to give way and that the pilot of the Elizabethan had to maintain his course and speed whilst, at the same time, being prepared to take such action as would best aid to avert collision.

The Vampire was a dual control aircraft, which at the time was being flown by a pilot under training to become a flying instructor. This pilot had over 900 hours flying experience, of which over 400 hours were on Vampire aircraft. The instructor was engaged in navigation.

The Elizabethan carried its normal crew complement of three—captain, first officer and radio officer. The radio officer's position is such that it is impossible for him to see out of the aircraft. The actual look-out from the aircraft therefore rests with the captain and the first officer, the latter also being responsible for the navigation of the aircraft. At the time of the incident, the captain was the only crew member free to maintain a look-out; the first officer was studying his charts. The captain had some 9,000 flying hours, of which over 2,500 hours were on Elizabethan aircraft.

From the evidence given to the court of inquiry, I conclude that both aircraft were entitled to be in the airway, but that whilst each pilot at the last moment succeeded in taking action which averted a collision, a situation of some danger had developed before either pilot became aware of it. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation concurs in this conclusion.

In view of this occurrence, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation and I have decided to institute a review of procedures governing flight in controlled airspaces to see whether the rules now in existence should be altered with the object of further reducing the chances of incident.

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