HC Deb 27 May 1954 vol 528 cc41-4W
Mr. Ian Harvey

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is now in a position to make a further statement about Civil Defence plans, in the light of most recent disclosures concerning H-bomb development and tilt; resultant reaction of certain local authorities.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe

I As I have already indicated to the House, the implications of our recent increase of knowledge about the effects of the hydrogen bomb were immediately made the subject of study from the Civil Defence aspect. It must be some time before this study is completed. In the meantime I have, in consultation with my colleagues, tried to extract the most important results apparent from a preliminary examination.

2. The Prime Minister has stated that the coming of the hydrogen bomb makes the threat of a world war less and not more likely. But if the danger of war has receded it is also largely because we have been strong, and Civil Defence is an important part of our preparations and our strength. Should a world war break out in which hydrogen bombs were used, the problem we should have to face in this country would be far graver than ever before, and Civil Defence would in such a situation have an even more important part to play.

Unless all possible steps are taken to minimise the effects of air attack, to succour the injured and to relieve the homeless, the morale of the civil population could not be sustained and that of the Armed Forces might suffer. Our predecessors made a start with the development of a Civil Defence organisation and it is our clear duty to continue with all practicable measures.

3. This does not mean that we propose to embark on a large new programme involving increased expenditure. What has, however, become incumbent on us is to revise our plans in the light of our present knowledge and to reshape them to meet the new danger and this may involve superseding some of our plans by others of a different kind. I do not want to minimise the possibilities, but greatly exaggerated stories have been put about and it has even been suggested, for example, that a single bomb could destroy the whole of Britain.

If we compare the actual area of destruction of a hydrogen bomb with that of an atom bomb, the picture is of course a formidable one but not one which justifies an attitude of neglectful resignation. From ground zero the radius for total destruction with the atom bomb was about ½ mile, of very serious damage about ¾ mile, and of lighter damage about 1½ miles. According to the Chairman of the United States Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy the corresponding figures for the Eniwetok bomb of 1952 were estimated to be 3, 7 and 10 miles. However great the area of damage, there would still be a large marginal zone in which the Civil Defence services would be useful and, indeed, desperately needed.

4. Apart from structural damage, account must be taken of the danger from radio-active contamination. Alarming accounts have been published regarding this. It is true that there would be very heavy contamination in the immediate neighbourhood of a bomb landing on or near the ground, but the publicity that the radio-active hazard has received results largely from skin injuries to some Japanese fishermen in the Pacific downwind from the explosion and beyond the range of the blast.

That incident demonstrates the need for knowledge and emphasises the necessity for Civil Defence training. Indeed the simplest precaution (even taking shelter below deck level) would probably, I understand, have been sufficient to protect these men. The technical and organisational problems involved in creating a proper system of precautions are being studied as a matter of urgency and instructions will be issued as soon as this study has been completed. There can be no doubt that with good Civil Defence casualties would be greatly reduced.

5. Whatever may emerge from the completion of our study of these and other aspects of the Civil Defence problem, these points are clear:

(i) It is still essential to have local services of trained and organised men and women to deal with the consequences of attack, and in particular to assist those who are trapped, injured or rendered homeless and to fight fires. It will be impossible to build up sufficient war-time services unless we reach out peace-time establishments. It must be remembered that the efforts of those who have worked so hard since 1949 and to whom we are so grateful have taken us barely two-thirds of the way.

(ii) Therefore we intend to press on with the recruitment and training of the Civil Defence corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service and the National Hospital Service Reserve.

(iii) We believe that it is vital that there should be greater co-operation between the industrial Civil Defence service and the local authority services. The new developments make it necessary to consider the whole area and not merely to concentrate on the industrial front.

(iv) Dispersal clearly has a greatly increased relative importance. The plans already made need to be revised. Particular attention must be given to the dispersal of stocks and equipment and to our emergency and mobile feeding organisations, and this may involve giving other measures a lower priority. With the shift of emphasis to dispersal there goes an increased importance for the work of women in Civil Defence.

(v) The training manuals will be revised and the training syllabuses adjusted as quickly as possible. In the meantime the standard system of training hitherto presented is still sound: in fire-fighting, or welfare, or rescue it makes little difference whether the fire has been started or a person trapped or another rendered homeless by the hydrogen bomb, the atomic bomb or conventional weapons. Those who have done or are doing this training will not find it wasted.

(vi) Local services are necessary but not enough. It will be necessary to place an even greater emphasis than hitherto on a mobile organisation based so far as possible outside the main areas of population but available to help them. The plans for the creation of trained reserves for services in mobile columns which were announced in the defence debate on 2nd March will be brought into operation as soon as possible.

(vii) Our operational organisation will be improved and changes will be made in the machinery of control for the purpose of giving effect to the principle of mobility, and securing even closer liaison with the Armed Forces.

6. In all these matters we must neither minimise nor exaggerate the problem. What we have to do is to assess the risk carefully and pay the whole of what seems to us a reasonable insurance premium against the risk. And we must remember too that we are all in this together. We cannot think only of our own danger or our own safety. If our neighbour's defences are neglected or ineffective our own are less secure. In all emergencies, whether in war or in such peace-time disasters as the East Coast floods, we must be able to call on trained help from the neighbouring towns and districts.

7. The further examination of the points I have mentioned and of other measures such as warnings, communications and shelter is being urgently undertaken. Local authorities and others concerned will be given any necessary guidance as to the measures for which they are responsible. In the meantime, it is their clear duty to proceed with the measures which they have been asked to undertake. I have no doubt that we can rely on their co-operation in this work.