§ Mr. Blackburnasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is now in a position to make a statement on the proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry held into the loss of five Royal Air Force aircraft near the Egyptian-Palestine border on 7th January.
§ Mr. A. HendersonI have now received the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry into the loss of five R.A.F. aircraft near the Egyptian-Palestine border on 7th January and a summary of the evidence and findings together with the comments of the Air Commander-in-Chief is embodied in the following statement:—
The Court found that the orders to the pilots on all three missions were comprehensive and clear; the frontier was not 216W to be crossed at any point; no attacks were to be made on ground forces even though they fired on our aircraft; and no attacks were to be made on Jewish or other foreign aircraft except in self defence; these orders were fully understood and scrupulously observed by all pilots. The forces ordered were adequate for the task and the crews detailed were experienced and of high morale. All our aircraft were fitted with guns which were loaded and fit for battle. No other armament was carried.
Coming now to the morning tactical reconnaissance, the evidence of the pilots shows that they complied with their flight plan, which provided for them to make a reconnaissance of the Ismailia-Beersheba road from a point east of Abu Aweiglia to the Palestine Frontier (but not to cross the Frontier) and then to turn north and follow the El Auja-Rafah road up to an easily identifiable road block some five miles south-west of Rafah and then to return to base. The weather was clear and the El Auja-Rafah road was identified. The Court found that the aircraft did not cross the Frontier.
As the formation turned for base in the vicinity of the road block the Spitfire flown by Pilot II Close was hit by ground fire and he had to bale out. This led the other three pilots very naturally to concentrate their attention on pinpointing the exact place of the parachute descent, and it was while they were so occupied that they were attacked by Jewish aircraft. The element of surprise was enhanced by the fact that the attacking aircraft were Spitfires with British type camouflage and with red airscrew spinners similar to those of the aircraft of 208 Squadron. Flying Officers Cooper and McElhaw were hit before they realised what had happened. It is a reasonable assumption that the same thing happened to Pilot II Sayers, who was killed. Cooper and McElhaw were able to bale out.
Evidence given by an R.A.F. officer who subsequently inspected the ground established that all four Spitfires crashed ten or more miles on the Egyptian side of the frontier. He found and identified the wrecks of the aircraft flown by Cooper and Sayers. Cooper was picked up by Bedouins and returned that same night to Ismailia. As regards McElhaw 217W and Close and their aircraft, evidence was given by local Arabs that Jewish forces coming from the east had taken away the pilots and had later removed parts of the aircraft and had buried the rest. This statement was borne out by the signs found by the inspecting R.A.F. officer of many tracks of track and tyre vehicles moving between the area of the crashes and a point to the east. Fragments of two Spitfires were found on the site, one of which was specifically identifiable as belonging to Close's aircraft. Empty Jewish cigarette packets and sweet papers also seen on this site suggested that Jewish forces had been there.
The Court inquired into the report that Close, while in Jewish hands, had stated that his formation crossed the frontier and that he was shot down over Palestine. This pilot was injured during his parachute descent and suffered a broken jaw and concussion. In evidence before the Court he confirmed that his instructions were not to cross the frontier and that, as far as he was aware, the flight was carried out according to briefing (this evidence was confirmed by Flying-Officers Cooper and McElhaw). Close also said that for the first six days he was in Jewish hands he was severely grilled by intensive questioning, usually twice a day. The Court found that his memory of what happened during this period appeared to be very hazy; and since he was still suffering very considerable physical and mental strain, they did not feel it proper to press him. The Court's estimate of his condition is confirmed by R.A.F. doctors.
As regards the afternoon reconnaissance, the evidence shows that there is little of substance to add to the account I gave on 19th January, except that the leader of the Tempest formation returned fire, though we do not know if the Jews suffered any casualties. The Court considered that the Jewish attack was deliberate and highly skilled, and that the Jews had every intention of attacking any aircraft encountered over this area.
The officer who inspected the ground afterwards was informed by the Egyptian army that an aircraft which possibly belonged to the R.A.F. was shot down in combat on the afternoon of 7th January and fell at a point about four miles inside Palestine. This may well have been Pilot-Officer Tattersfield's aircraft. The Court considered that since this aircraft was 218W shot down from a considerable height it may well have travelled several miles before hitting the ground and that it was possible that it did crash a short distance on the Palestine side of the frontier.
Evidence was given that between 30th December and 6th January seven previous tactical reconnaissances had been completed without serious incident.
Evidence given showed that the instructions for the morning tactical reconnaissance on 7th January were that the aircraft should fly in two pairs, one pair at about 500 feet and the other pair 1,000 feet above. I am advised that the pair is the normal fighting unit for tactical reconnaissance which was used throughout the last war, and the two aircraft fly in wide line abreast to cover each other's tails. The tactics of the sections are evasive, and the reconnaissance is carried out at best height to minimise flak risks with periodic descents to low level to make identifications. In the event of attack by enemy aircraft the cover aircraft gives warning and the section relies on its flexibility and superior performance to evade attack. The Spitfire 18 aircraft with which this formation was equipped were believed to be superior in performance to any Jewish fighter known to be operating. The force despatched was therefore in every way suitable and adequate for the task. The Air Commander-in-Chief has had wide practical experience of wartime tactical reconnaissance operations and enjoys my entire confidence.
I am placing in the House of Commons Library a map which shows the route followed by both morning and afternoon tactical reconnaissances with the locations of the crashed Spitfires and other relevant details.