BOMBING ACCIDENT. (Hansard, 13 February 1929)

§ Earl WINTERTON

The following is the text of a statement made on the subject in the Indian Legislative Assembly on 11th February.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has received and considered the report of the Court of Inquiry appointed to investigate the terrible accident that occurred at Peshawar on 23rd January. The story of the accident is as follows:

Bombing practice with live bombs is part of the normal training in units of the Royal Air Force and is regularly carried out by them over areas of ground which are reserved as bombing ranges in the same way as artillery and rifle ranges are reserved for use by artillery and troops of the line. There is a bombing range in the neighbourhood of Jamrud, which is used by the Royal Air Force stationed in Peshawar. It had been decided by the local Air Force authorities that bombing practice should be carried out on this range on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 25th January. On such occasions the Royal Air Force unit concerned is responsible for taking certain preliminary steps. It has to notify the district magistrate and obtain from him a statement that there is no objection to bombing taking place on the range on the dates mentioned. It has further to notify the superintendent of police, the Tehsildar and the local military headquarters in order that human beings and cattle may be safely cleared off the ground before practice begins, and in order that both the civil and military authorities in the station may he made aware of the fact that bombing is to take place. All these precautions were duly complied with on 12th January by the officer commanding, No. 20, Army Co-operation Squadron, the unit of the Royal Air Force concerned; and, in addition, a copy of the notice was sent direct to the officer commanding, Poona Horse, as that regiment would be required, in accordance with the usual procedure, to provide four troopers and a non-commissioned officer to help in clearing the danger area of human beings and cattle at the times and on the dates mentioned. Notice of bombing practice appeared in the ordinary course in the local military orders of 16th January.

Some days later it was decided at short notice by the local armoured car authorities to allow, for the benefit of an Inspecting Officer, a technical exercise 417W which had been carried out by an armoured car company over a large area, which included the Royal Air Force bombing range, on 11th January. A feature of this exercise on both occasions was that a squadron of cavalry should enact the role of a party of raiders supposed for the purpose of the exercise to be escaping from Peshawar over the border. It was the function of the armoured car company engaged in this exercise to cut off the supposed raiders before they could have made their way into tribal territory. Arrangements were accordingly made by the Officer Commanding, Armoured Car Company, in Peshawar through the authorities concerned, for the repetition of the tactical exercise which I have described to take place on 23rd January, which was the third of the dates already notified for bombing practice by the Royal Air Force on their bombing range. On the morning of the 23rd the "Safeties," that is, the officer of the Royal Air Force who was detailed to supervise the clearing of the bombing range for live bomb practice, went down early to the range where he met the four so wars and the non-commissioned officer, who had been sent to help him. It was raining and the lorry which should have brought the Air Force personnel required for duties on the ground during the bombing practice, as well as the signals which are used on such occasions, had not arrived. The Safety Officer thereupon went back to the aerodrome at Peshawar, a distance of four miles, on his bicycle. He found the delay to have been due to the fact that the weather conditions were not very good, and that it had not yet been decided whether the bombing practice would take place that morning or not. While he was there, a machine was sent up to test the weather. The Safety Officer was meanwhile told to return to the range and clear it, and, if no bombing had taken place by 10.30 to pack up and return.

This was at about 9 a.m. The Safety Officer accordingly returned to the bombing range, this time in a tender, accompanied by two armourers and an Indian driver, taking with him the signals required on the range. He made his preparations for clearing the range, and sent out sowars to remove any cattle and human beings that might be on the ground. At that moment "C" Squadron, Poona Horse, which had been detailed 418W for the tactical exercise, appeared with two British officers, neither of whom appears to have known that bombing practice was to take place that day. The party were anxious to get across to the other side of the bombing range in order to carry out their part in the exercise. After some colloquy, the Safety Officer agreed to the squadron crossing the ground as there was ample time for it to do this before the range was cleared. The squadron accordingly moved off, led by the two British officers, to cross the range. Meanwhile the Safety Officer proceeded to lay out upon the ground a signal which would be read by any aeroplane coming over the bombing range and which means "await further signal; do not bomb." He had only just finished doing this when a bomb fell from an aeroplane on to the squadron which was now some distance away, but still crossing the danger area. The officer who was piloting the aeroplane had arrived immediately before at a height of 4,000 feet over the bombing range, and had mistaken the signal to wait for the signal which means "all clear." This officer had, it would seem, good reason to suppose that the ground would have been cleared by the time that he arrived. The men of the squadron were dressed in khaki overcoats, as it was raining, and wore white turbans. They were not seen by either of the two occupants; and a very careful reconstruction of the accident convinced the Court of Inquiry that a squadron thus clad could not have been seen from that altitude in the conditions prevailing.

Both occupants had their eyes fixed on the target from which the squadron was then about 200 yards distant. The bomb over-shot the target and, falling as it did upon the squadron in close formation, caused fearful havoc. Three Indian officers and 10 non-commissioned officers and Sowars were either killed on the spot or succumbed to their injuries the same day; 12 non-commissioned officers and Sowars were injured, of whom three subsequently died in hospital. Sixteen horses were killed. Fifteen were injured and had to be destroyed. Medical aid was rushed to the spot as soon as possible, and everything that could be done for the injured was done. The next-of-kin of the deceased were informed without delay, both by telegraph and by letter, and shortly afterwards messages of sympathy from His Excellency the 419W Viceroy, the Secretaries of State for India, War and Air, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, and the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in India were received and conveyed to them.

The Government of India considered immediately the question whether special compensation or gratuities should be paid to the heirs of those who were killed, and also to those who were permanently injured. Under the ordinary rules both these categories are entitled to pensions on an adequate scale, and pensions will be issued in the ordinary course. In addition, the Government of India have decided to grant to the heirs of the three Indian officers who have been killed gratuities on the same scale as are admissible when death is caused by active service, namely, Rs.1,200 to the heirs of Risaldars, and Rs.600 each to the heirs of Jamadars. They are also sanctioning gratuities of Rs.200 each to the heirs of non-commissioned officers and Sowars. For such of the injured as may have to be discharged to pension, they are sanctioning disability pensions at a special rate instead of the ordinary rate.

From information at present before them, Government are provisionally of the opinion that the following were the principal contributory causes of the accident:

First, the fact that certain authorities who had at different times received information both of the forthcoming bombing practice on 23rd January, and of the intended tactical exercise which was to be held in the vicinity on the same day, failed to connect these two events in their minds. It was this failure of memory and co-ordination that in the first instance apparently rendered the accident possible.

Secondly, the despatch of the bombing aeroplane over the range before there had been time to clear the range.

Thirdly, the mistaking of the warning signal for the signal that all was clear.

The Court of Inquiry has found certain officers to blame in connection with the causes that I have mentioned. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has most carefully considered the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and the opinions of the local commanders, and has decided 420W that summaries of evidence should be prepared with a view to the trial of certain officers by court-martial. To some extent, the disaster may be found attributable to a combination of mischances against which no amount of forethought could have prevailed. On the other hand, it may be found due also to failure in judgment on the part of individuals or to some defect in the prescribed system of safeguards. I would ask the hon. Members of this House and, through them, the Press and public, not to form too hasty conclusions, and above all not to express opinions or conjectures that might in any way prejudice the judicial proceedings.

I need hardly add that the sympathies of the Government and, I am sure, of the whole House, go out to the men who have been disabled, and to the widows and children of those who have perished so tragically and so suddenly in the prime of their lives and in the perform once of their duty.