§ Mr. INSKIPasked the Secretary of State for War whether demobilisation has been refused or delayed in a large number of cases solely on the ground that circumstances do not permit, and who is the judge of such circumstances; whether this qualification of the otherwise explicit regulations leads to inequality and misunderstanding; and whether he can see his way to lay down a rule that the regulations are to be applied without any such qualification except in special emergencies?
§ Mr. CHURCHILLI would remind my hon. Friend that Army Order 55, of 1919, provides that men who are eligible for demobilisation may nevertheless be retained if temporarily required for the military machinery of demobilisation until they can be individually substituted or their services dispensed with. This is more particularly the case with certain staffs and departmental corps whose services are-essential to demobilisation,e.g., Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, personnel of Record Offices, Army Pay Offices, etc.
I would also refer him to the answer I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend the 2532W Member for Midlothian and Peebles (Northern Division) on the 1st April, 1919, from which it will be seen that the decisions of officers commanding units as to the retention of personnel under their command must be referred to higher authority in the case of men in certain categories. Men detailed for release as pivotal men are retained for military duty only under written authority of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief concerned, and for most exceptional reasons. Men whose special release is ordered, or men who are demobilisable under Army Order 55, of 1919, and for whom release slips have been received, or who have received contract offers of employment, are not retained for military duties without the written sanction of an officer not below the status of a brigadier-commander.
Apart from this the decision as to whether it is necessary to retain demobilisable personnel until they can be replaced or their services dispensed with rests with officers commanding units, and I am of opinion that they are the best fitted to judge as to such necessity. These officers are in possession of full instructions governing demobilisation of personnel under their command, and there is no reason to believe that they do not limit the retention of demobilisation personnel to the strictest necessity. Their decisions are, of course, subject to review by higher authority should necessity occasion it, and inspections are being made regularly.
It should also be borne in mind that it is necessary to maintain our garrisons and armies of occupation at adequate strength. These are maintained at the minimum adequate strength compatible with security, and in some cases it may be necessary to retain demobilisable personnel until reliefs can be sent out. This is more particularly the case with regard to the troops in Eastern theatres and commands. These reliefs are being collected as rapidly as possible, but there are other considerations which must be taken into account, the principal of which are the questions of shipping accommodation and the danger to health which would result in moving troops in the tropics during the hot weather. This was fully dealt with in the statement I made in the House on the 25th February, relative to troops in India and the East.