§ Mr. KeetchTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the availability was of the AS90, in percentage terms, on Operation Telic(a) on the first day of combat operations, (b) on 30 April 2003 and (c) on average for the duration of combat operations in Iraq; and if he will make a statement on its operational effectiveness. [111824]
§ Mr. IngramPost operational reporting will provide analysis and assessment of the performance of equipment deployed on operations in Iraq. It would, therefore, be premature for me to provide a detailed assessment of the performance or availability of individual equipments at this stage. However, the indications are that the AS90 fleet deployed on Operation Telic was very reliable and performed impressively.
§ Mr. KeetchTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Tomahawk missiles were used in Iraq during Operation Telic; and what plans there are to replace them. [111839]
§ Mr. IngramUnited Kingdom submarines launched a number of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles during operations in Iraq. I am withholding the precise number of missiles fired and plans to replace them in accordance with Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information which relates to Defence, Security and International Relations.
§ Mr. JenkinTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many prisoners have been released by British forces in the Gulf. [112078]
§ Mr. IngramAs at 28 May 2003, 2,282 prisoners of war had been released by the United Kingdom.
§ Dr. PughTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether extended SCUD missiles have been found in post-war Iraq. [112478]
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§ Mr. HoonAs at 9 June 2003, Coalition Forces had not found any extended-range SCUD missiles in Iraq. Coalition Forces are initiating investigations into sites which may be connected with Iraqi programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction in breach of United Nations resolutions, and into other sources of evidence such as documentation or interviews with relevant Iraqi personnel. Investigations are at an early stage and we expect gathering and collating evidence from the various sources to be a long and complex task. We will aim to release information concerning evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes when and where appropriate, as we did before the conflict began.
§ Lynne JonesTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his estimate is of the cost of the clearance of unexploded ordnance left after military action by British forces in Iraq. [116260]
§ Mr. IngramA mix of abandoned Iraqi munitions, as well as United States and United Kingdom ordnance, exists in the UK area of operation. However, UK EOD forces are engaged in the clearance of unexploded ordnance in their area of operations, irrespective of its origin. The costs of the EOD force—in terms of salaries and explosives—amount to some £330,000 per month. A cost of clearance of UK munitions alone would not therefore be meaningful.
§ Dr. PughTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the questions asked by the hon. Member for Southport on 8 May about specific details in the Government's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as laid before the House on 24 September 2002 will be answered; and what is delaying a response. [117822]
§ Dr. PughTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Prime Minister's statement of 14 April 2003,Official Report, column 615–17, on Iraq and the Middle East, how many of the possible sites for weapons of mass destruction have (a) been visited and (b) not been visited; what reasons have prevented sites being visited and inspected; and whether the list has been shared with the UN weapons inspectors. [112366]
§ Mr. HoonAs at 4 June 2003, Coalition forces had initiated investigations into 140 sites within Iraq, from a master list of over 500, which may be connected to programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, investigations had been initiated into a further 67 sites identified since the conflict began. This master list subsumes the 146 sites referred to by the Prime Minister on 14 April 2003 and includes sites identified by our Coalition partners. These sites are being investigated as quickly as practicable and we expect further sites to be identified as investigations progress. Such sites are only one potential form of evidence; others could include delivery systems, documentation or interviews with relevant Iraqi personnel. We expect gathering and collating evidence from these sources to be a long and complex task.
The majority of the sites on the Coalition master list were already known to the UN, having been identified by UNSCOM and the IAEA during their previous inspections. Before the conflict began, UK personnel 654W briefed UN inspectors on suspect activities and capabilities at around 60 of the known sites, and on around 40 additional sites of which we suspected the inspectors may be unaware. We believe that we were as helpful as possible to the UN, working on a presumption of disclosure unless there were pressing security reasons not to. It is likely that other nations shared similar information with the UN concerning possible WMD sites.