§ Mr. GibbTo ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) if he will define the rigorous procedures to check(a) access to information and (b) protection from unauthorised access referred to in paragraph 1.3 of his consultation document on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud; [72105]
(2) what non-Governmental partners he plans will use the proposed entitlement identity card; and whether they will contribute revenue to the running costs of the card; [72114]
(3) what his estimate is of the cost of (a) a full cost-benefit analysis of an entitlement identity card scheme and (b) a proper risk assessment of the challenges posed by the procurement and roll-out, as referred to in Cmnd 5557; [72109]
(4) what checks he plans the issuing authority for a proposed entitlement identity card to make with the banking sector; and what exchanges of information are proposed;[72120]
(5) if he will list the organisations (a) to which he has sent a copy of the consultation paper on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud (Cmnd 5557) and (b) from which he has specifically requested views; [72103]
(6) what assessment he has made of the disadvantages of a non-compulsory, non-universal entitlement identity card; [72106]
(7) whether he plans that the proposed entitlement identity card would allow the (a) police and (b) paramedics and hospital staff access to medical records maintained on the smartcard;[72118]
(8) whether he plans that fingerprint records used in a proposed entitlement identity card would be available to the police; [72117]
(9) what estimate he has made of the number of (a) universal and (b) voluntary entitlement identity cards which will be (i) lost and (ii) stolen per annum; [72158]
(10) if he will define the term core personal information used in paragraph 1.3 of his consultation document on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud; and if he will list the particulars. [72104]
§ Beverley HughesMy right hon. Friend, the Home Secretary, made a statement to the House on 3 July, announcing the publication of a consultation paper on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud. The consultation period will last until 10 January 2002. The Government has made it clear that the introduction of an entitlement card would be a major step and that it would not proceed without consulting widely and considering all the views expressed very carefully.
One of the purposes of the consultation exercise is to identify potential partners. Views are welcomed in the consultation paper from organisations providing services in the public and private sectors on whether they would like to link services to a card scheme and what features they would want to see in a scheme that would most benefit their services. The consultation paper also discusses sharing revenue generated by potential partners' use of a card scheme to cover some of the costs of setting 64W up and administrating a card scheme. If such an arrangement could be agreed, this would reduce the fees charged for entitlement cards.
There are no plans to hold medical records on entitlement cards. The consultation paper discusses holding, at the cardholder's consent, a limited amount of medical information that could be used in an emergency, for example, current medical information on allergies.
There are no plans for the issuing authority for any entitlement card to make checks with the banking sector.
The set up and issuing costs for a universal scheme outlined in the consultation paper are based on the costs of building on the driving licence and passport systems extrapolated to cover all of the resident population. There is no separate estimate for a voluntary scheme.
It is not possible to estimate how many people would apply for an entitlement card as opposed to an entitlement card issued in the form of a photocard driving licence or a passport card. On the assumption that those who do not hold driving licences and passports at present all opt for an entitlement card and that these cards would be lost or stolen at the same rate as driving licences were in 2000–01 (which is the latest date for which complete figures are available), it is estimated that 424,000 cards would be reported as lost or stolen each year once a scheme was fully implemented.
A list of those organisations to which copies of the consultation paper have been or are in the process of being sent has been placed in the Library.
The Government has invited views from all of these organisations. We intend to contact other appropriate organisations as they are suggested to us.
The consultation paper requests views on what information should be held in any central register which might be used to administer a card scheme and what information should be displayed or stored on the card itself.
The proposed central register and entitlement card/driving licence would hold core personal information necessary to administer an effective scheme. The information to be held on the card and in the register would include the holder's name; date and place of birth; residential address; validity dates of card(s) and issuing authority; digitised image of signature; photograph; National Insurance number; driver number; a unique personal number; nationality; sex; employment status; and possibly biometric information.
The central register would also include cross references to other personal identifiers used in schemes linked to the entitlement card such as passport number and driver number. It might also include any secret password, pass phrase or PIN used to help authenticate transactions if it was decided to incorporate such a facility in a card scheme.
The consultation paper invites views on what specific measures should be included in any entitlement card scheme to ensure compatibility with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998.
The consultation paper goes into detail about how a scheme would comply with all eight principles. Paragraphs 6.15 and 6.16 of the consultation paper discuss compliance 65W with the Sixth and Seventh Principles of the Data Protection Act. The Sixth Principle stipulates that personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under the Act. The Seventh Principle stipulates that appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.
The procedures adopted for any entitlement card scheme would build on the experience and expertise of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the UK Passport Service, both of which have a great deal of experience in administering large databases of personal information, including where they are administered by a third party under contract. Both are well placed to develop detailed procedures to comply with the requirements of the Seventh Principle should the Government decide to implement a scheme in this way.
Paragraph 2.9 of the consultation paper assesses the disadvantages of a non-compulsory, non-universal entitlement card scheme. Such a voluntary scheme could not guarantee complete coverage of the population, service providers would need to support different ways of checking the entitlement of the people they served. Benefits for a scheme would therefore be lower than for a scheme where everyone was required to have a card. Those people most likely to benefit from a simple, straightforward means of asserting their rights and entitlements may well be amongst the least likely to apply for a voluntary one. Unless all of society were to hold one, the protections a card scheme could afford to the broader community would be reduced or eliminated.
The costs of a full cost- benefit analysis of an entitlement card scheme, and of a proper risk assessment of the challenges of the procurement and roll-out cannot be determined until a decision is taken on what type of scheme, if any, the Government intend to proceed with. This will not be decided until the views received during the consultation exercise have been carefully analysed.
There are no firm plans to use fingerprints in an entitlement card scheme. The consultation paper discusses the inclusion of biometric information as part of a scheme and fingerprinting is one of the options. In its discussion of the possible use of fingerprints, the paper explains that it would not be necessary to record fingerprints to the same standard used by the police. For example, there would not be a need to identify people using partial fingerprint records such as those retrieved from crime scenes.
Paragraph 3.29 of the consultation document discusses whether the police should have access to any biometric information, such as fingerprints, held on the entitlement card database. Most offenders are already known to the police, who have their own biometric databases of fingerprints and DNA which are more sophisticated than anything envisaged for an entitlement card scheme. It may also cause public unease and a lack of confidence in an entitlement card scheme if the police were to have routine access. However, there may be cases in very closely prescribed circumstances, such as in matters of national security, or the prevention or detection of very serious crimes, where the police might have access to the information. Specific views on this issue are sought in the consultation paper, point 15 (iii).