Benefit Fraud (Hansard, 23 July 2002)

§ Mr. Roy
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions what steps he will take to co-ordinate activities between the Child Support Agency and the Benefits Agency to combat benefit fraud; and if he will assess the advantages of measures to deal with deliberate evasion of child support maintenance by absent parents. [69741]
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§ Malcolm Wicks
Jobcentre Plus and the Child Support Agency (CSA) already work closely to identify and investigate benefit fraud.
In a Child Support case where either parent is in receipt of prescribed benefits and fraud is suspected or detected, the case is referred to Jobcentre Plus to investigate. All Departmental fraud investigations (including those carried out by the CSA) are to a common standard informed by a single Professional Standards Unit established in Jobcentre Plus. All fraud structures and processes are informed by the Fraud Head of Profession in Jobcentre Plus who has the function of integrating and co-ordinating good practice.
In January 2001 new criminal offences were introduced to the Child Support legislation. Parents who seek to avoid their child support responsibilities by lying to the Child Support Agency or refusing to provide information now face criminal proceedings. The legislation provides for a fine of up to £1000. The CSA has so far successfully prosecuted 5 non-resident parents under this legislation.
Legislation was also introduced in April 2001 to allow the courts to consider disqualifying a non-resident parent from holding or obtaining a driving licence as an alternative to a term of imprisonment for non-payment of maintenance. The courts decide which, if either, option to use. Since April 2001 the CSA has submitted 94 cases for committal. Of these, 44 non-resident parents began paying maintenance when they learned of the possible disqualification. The courts withdrew one driving licence and imposed a suspended disqualification in three other cases.

§ Mr. Rooney
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions what action he intends to take following the second report by the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate on the administration of housing benefit and council tax benefit in Kirklees Metropolitan Council. [72979]

§ Malcolm Wicks
Using the powers available to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in Section 139D of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, my right hon. Friend is today giving Directions to Kirklees Metropolitan Council, following the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's second report on the Council's administration of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit.
We are disappointed that Kirklees Metropolitan Council has been the subject of two critical reports by the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate before taking action to remedy their problems with benefit administration.
However, we are pleased that the Council is now starting to take its responsibilities seriously and that significant improvements are being made in benefit administration.
We hope the council will look upon the Directions as a further stimulus for continuing improvement.
A copy of the Directions has been placed in the Library.

§ Mr. Webb
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions if he will estimate the(a) total cost of benefit fraud investigations and (b) the net savings from benefit fraud investigations in each of the last five years. [71778]

§ Malcolm Wicks
[holding answer 22 July 2002]: We set out our strategy for tackling fraud and error in the paper "A New Contract for Welfare: Safeguarding Social
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Security" (CM4276) published on 23 March 1999. The overall aim of the strategy is to have a benefit system that is secure from first claim to first payment.
The implementation of this strategy means that an anti-fraud focus is integral to the work of the Department, as is dealing with the wider agenda of error and incorrectness in benefit payments. It is therefore not possible to account for the cost of anti-fraud work separately.
The work of benefit fraud investigators has an important effect both through fraud detected and as a deterrent that prevents fraud happening in the first place. It is therefore not possible to provide an estimate of net savings from benefit fraud investigations. However, we know from our continuous measurement of the level of fraud and error in income support and jobseeker's allowance that by March 2001 we had achieved a reduction of 18 per cent.—almost twice the target of 10 per cent. for March 2002 and a year ahead of schedule.
The Spending Review announced by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 15 July includes an increase in our existing target to reduce fraud and error in payments of income support and jobseeker's allowance. We are now committed to a 33 per cent. reduction in these payments by March 2004, as a milestone towards a 50 per cent. reduction by March 2006. And for the first time we have set a target for tackling fraud and error in housing benefit that aims for a 25 per cent. reduction by 2006.