Afghanistan (Hansard, 2 November 2001)

§ Mr. Swayne
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many enemy lock-ons have been detected by British aircraft over Afghan airspace. [11015]

§ Mr. Hoon
[holding answer 29 October 2001]: None.

§ Jeremy Corbyn
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what stocks of cluster bombs are held by UK armed forces in the Afghan theatre of conflict. [11434]

§ Mr. Hoon
[holding answer 30 October 2001]: There are currently a number of BL/RB 755 type cluster munitions on board RFA Fort Victoria, which is in the Afghan theatre of conflict. These weapons are for use by the GR7 Harrier aircraft, which is not deployed with the task force. There are, therefore, currently no plans for their use.

§ Mr. Hancock
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the total cost is of Exercise Saif Sareea II; how much the Government have spent in total in its operations against Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden; and if he will make a statement. [11965]

§ Mr. Hoon
Our most recent estimate of the cost of Exercise Saif Sareea II is around £90 million. We are confident that when all bills are finally presented, the actual cost will be within that estimate. With respect to Operations in Afghanistan, I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 23 October 2001,Official Report, column 114W.

§ Mr. Simon Thomas
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy not(a) to authorise and (b) to condone the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan. [12296]

§ Mr. Hoon
Cluster bombs are legitimate weapons that have not been prohibited by any Treaty or Convention. Those used in Afghanistan contain bomblets designed to detonate on impact and to destroy buildings and vehicles. They are not designed as anti-personnel weapons and do not contain any landmines. They are the most effective weapon against certain targets. The coalition will continue to use them, with discretion and proportionality, against legitimate and appropriate terrorist and military targets.

§ Mr. Dalyell
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what criteria are used to settle targets for bombing in Afghanistan; what definition of fixed military target is used; how many fixed military targets have been(a) identified and (b) attacked; how many such targets have been attacked more than once; and what assessment he has made of unintended damage to (i) property and (ii) people resulting from such attacks. [12245]

§ Mr. Hoon
It is not UK policy to comment in detail on targeting issues. Attacks are limited strictly to military objectives, including those objects which by their nature, 877W location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstance ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. Every effort is made to avoid incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects when selecting targets for attack.
As of 31 October, the total number of targets attacked is somewhat in excess of 100, of which around one half have been attacked more than once.
Following an attack on a target, Battle Damage Assessment is conducted to establish the success of that attack. Although we investigate all claims carefully, it is impossible to make a precise assessment of exactly how many civilians may have been killed or injured as a result of coalition action. Painstaking efforts are taken to minimise any unintended injury or damage but, regrettably, on occasion mistakes will happen and where we know this has happened, the coalition has said so publicly. However, we are clear that Taliban reports of civilian casualties are grossly exaggerated.

§ Pete Wishart
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what safeguards will be put in place to protect(a) UK and other military personnel and (b) civilians from hazardous residues from depleted uranium in the current conflict in Afghanistan. [12184]

§ Mr. Hoon
Depleted uranium-based ammunition has not been used in current operations in Afghanistan. We are not aware of any plans for it to be used in future.
In the event that depleted uranium ammunition were to be used in Afghanistan and that UK service personnel might come into contact with it, appropriate guidelines would be issued to ensure that the already low risks to health were minimised.
A great deal of information on depleted uranium has already been put into the public domain. Should the need arise, we would discuss with coalition partners and civil agencies what information needs to be made available to the Afghan civilian population. Regrettably, the activities of the Taliban authorities in restricting the flow of information into Afghanistan could make this unnecessarily difficult for UN and other agencies to achieve.