§ Mr. Simon HughesTo ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on recent Court of Appeal judgments relating to the use of mandatory sentences under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. [142616]
§ Mr. Boateng[holding answer 15 December 2000]: On 9 November 2000, the Court of Appeal gave judgment in the cases of Matthew Offen, Peter McGilliard, Darren McKeown, Christova Okwuegbunam and Stephen Saunders. The first four cases were appeals, while the last, Saunders, was referred by the Attorney-General under his powers to refer for unduly lenient sentences. In all the cases challenges were made to the lawfulness of the automatic life sentence provisions introduced as section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (now contained in section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000) on the grounds that the imposition of such a sentence was incompatible with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as protected by the Human Rights Act 1998.
Section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 provides that an offender committing any of a list of certain offences (either sexual or violent) on two separate occasions should receive a mandatory life sentence unless there are exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender which would justify it not doing so.
In giving the judgment of the Court, the Lord Chief Justice confirmed the compatibility of the legislation with the rights protected by the ECHR. It therefore remains the position that a life sentence must be given to a person 58W who commits a second of the serious sexual or violent offences covered by the provision unless there are exceptional circumstances which would make it unjust to do so.
The court upheld Offen and McKeown's appeals, substituting determinate terms of three years in place of a life sentence; dismissed Okwuegbunam and McGilliard's appeals, confirming their automatic life sentences; and found in favour of the Attorney-General in the Saunders case, quashing the 12-year determinate sentence and imposing a new automatic life sentence.
The detailed matters for consideration relate to what should constitute "exceptional circumstances". We are currently giving consideration to these aspects of the judgment and their implications for sentencing policy.